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1. AN OVERVIEW OF NASA'S DIGITAL FLY-BY-WIRE
TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM
Calvin R. Jarvis
NASA Flight Research Center
SUMMARY
The feasibility of using digital fly-by-wire systems to control aircraft was
demonstrated by developing and flight testing a single channel system, which used
Apollo hardware, in an F-8C test airplane. This is the first airplane to fly with a
digital fly-by-wire system as its primary means of control and with no mechanical
reversion capability. The development and flight test of a triplex digital fly-by-
wire system, which will serve as an experimental prototype for future operational
digital fly-by-wire systems, is underway.
INTRODUCTION
The advantages of digital fly-by-wire (DFBW) systems in terms of control
system flexibility and reliability were demonstrated for spacecraft applications in
NASA's manned space program. However, the transfer of this technology from
spacecraft to aircraft is not direct and will require the identification and solution
of many problems.
DFBW technology, when fully utilized in the flight control system of an air-
craft, can provide significant advantages over conventional control systems in
terms of reduced costs, weight, and volume, and in improved performance. A
redundant digital system, which can identify in-flight system failures and recon-
figure itself, offers a potential reliability comparable to that of the basic aircraft
structure as well as the advantages of automatic control techniques.
Although these benefits cannot be easily quantified for all classes of aircraft,
design studies do indicate major rewards in terms of more effective flight control
systems and, thus, more effective aircraft. But even more important, these sys-
tems lay the ground work for active control technology, and it is the active-
control-configured aircraft that offers the greatest potential in economic gains and
performance advancements.
The overall objective of NASA's digital fly-by-wire program is to provide the
foundation for this technology, in terms of design criteria and operational experi-
ence, which will lead to the development of practical digital fly-by-wire systems
for future aircraft. To accomplish.this objective, the program was separated into
two phases, witl! ar~ F-8C-:apIaRe (fig. 1) used as the test vehicle.
The goal of Phase I, which has been accomplished, was to demonstrate the
feasibility of using a DFBW system as the primary flight control system of an air-
craft. To accomplish this goal, a single channel DFBW primary flight control sys-
tem was flight tested, using an analog backup control system for fail/safe redun-
dancy.
The goal of Phase II is to establish a design base for the development of prac-
tical DFBW systems. This will involve the development and flight test of a triplex
DFBW system using redundancy management and data bus concepts.
Figure 2 shows the schedule for Phases I and II. The major aspects of each
phase are discussed in the following sections.
SINGLE CHANNEL SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT
To establish the feasibility of the DFBW concept, a system was designed to
replace the basic mechanical primary flight control system of the F-8C test airplanein all three control axes. All mechanical connections linking the pilot's control
stick and rudder pedals to the control surfaces were removed. To be compatible
with fly-by-wire design philosophy and development practice, no mechanical
reversion capability was provided even during the first part of the flight-test pro-
gram. This is particularly significant because it required that satisfactory design
and test techniques be demonstrated before the first flight. A single channel
digital system concept was selected as the most straightforward approach to estab-
lishing system feasibility.
To minimize cost and development time, digital hardware and software orig-
inally developed for the Apollo program were used as the heart of the digital sys-
tem. An Apollo guidance and navigation system was used which consisted of adigital guidance computer, an inertial measurement unit, and associated interface
elements. Use of this hardware also made available highly trained Apollo support
teams. Another factor leading to the selection of the Apollo computer was itsdemonstrated 70,000-hour mean-time-before-failure record. This factor overrode
shortcomings of the hardware which resulted in some operational constraints.
A more complete description and discussion of the digital system is presented
in paper 2. Pertinent aspects of man-rated software are covered in paper 4.
To provide redundancy if the primary digital system failed, an analog flight
control system from a lifting body research vehicle was modified extensively andinstalled in the F-8C airplane as a triplex analog backup control system (paper 3).
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Phase I began in January 1971. During the following 15 months, five major
contractors took part in the development and flight qualification of the Phase I sys-
tem. These contractors and their areas of responsibility were:
Delco Electronics . Digital system hardware
The Charles Stark Draper . Digital system software
Laboratory, Inc. (MIT)
Sperry Flight Systems Division . . Analog backup control system
Hydraulic Research and . Secondary actuators
Manufacturing Company
Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc. . Aircraft and electrical systems
In addition to control law design and contractor coordination, NASA was
responsible for specifying the Phase I system baseline configuration and interface
requirements, verifying the final software and hardware flight readiness, and con-
ducting the flight tests.
The Phase I system was first used in flight on May 25, 1972. This was the first
flight of an aircraft in which a digital fly-by-wire flight control system was the
primary means of control. As noted previously, no mechanical reversion capability
was provided. Confidence in the reliability of the digital system was demonstrated
by using it on the first takeoff and landing.
Forty-two flights were made before the flight program was completed in
November 1973. The total flight time was 58 hours. The pilot controlled the air-
plane most of this time using the primary digital system. Approximately 14 hours
were flown using the analog backup system for evaluation purposes, inasmuch as no
digital system failures were experienced during flight. The flight-test results are
presented in papers 3 and 6.
Phase I established the feasibility of DFBW systems for primary aircraft control
and provided flight data related to control law design, software verification, and
operational procedures for DFBW systems.
MULTICHANNEL SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT
The goal of Phase II is to establish a design base for the development and imple-
mentation of future practical DFBW systems. To accomplish this goal a multi-
channel system is being developed which will provide redundancy management
flight-test experience and verify other concepts of particular concern to the space
shuttle orbiter development.
The Phase II system configuration and major tasks are discussed in the follow-
ing sections.
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System Configuration
A simplified diagram of the fully redundant triplex DFBW system is shown in
figure 3. The principal elements of the system are to be installed on a removable
pallet assembly, as the single channel system was in Phase I. Major components
developed for Phase I, such as the analog backup control system, redundant
secondary actuators, electrical power system, and instrumentation system, are to
be retained for use during Phase II.
Dedicated, redundant sensors will be used to measure airplane angular rate,
attitude, acceleration, and air data. Sensor inputs will be cross-strapped to each
computer and synchronized on a bit-by-bit basis. Surface command outputs will
be voted for fault detection and supplied to the triplex, force-summed, secondary
actuator servo valves. Differential pressure equalization will be used to minimize
nonlinear secondary actuator effects. A two channel (active and monitor) analog
backup control system will be provided for use if the primary system fails.
The system will be designed to minimize ground operational and preflight
support requirements. All system status testing will be automated and will be done
onboard the airplane.
The digital processor selected for Phase II is a state-of-the-art, off-the-shelf,
general-purpose computer with floating-point and microprograming features. The
computer is an order of magnitude faster than the Apollo computer used in Phase I.
The main storage memory is fully programable, which provides greater software
flexibility. This increase in computer capability is of particular importance in
carrying out the objectives of the Phase II program.
Evaluation of Space Shuttle Orbiter DFBW Concepts
An important aspect of Phase II is coordination with the shuttle orbiter flight
control system development. In addition to being the first application of DFBW in
an aerodynamic vehicle, the orbiter will contribute significantly to digital system
technology by addressing the problems of redundancy management (reliability)
and overall mechanization.
The shuttle flight control system will use the same digital processors as thosebeing used in Phase II of the F-8 DFBW program. The Phase II triplex processor/
sensor configuration will thus make it possible to evaluate certain aspects of the
shuttle system by using the F-8C airplane as a test-bed.
Redundancy management. 
- The redundancy management concept developed
for the orbiter system to detect and isolate digital processor and control system
sensor failures will be implemented and flight tested during Phase II. Because a
reliable means of achieving failure detection and isolation is a major problem in thedesign of redundant DFBW systems, flight-test verification of the concepts in
Phase II will establish a significant data base for future applications.
Data bus.- The data bus concept of reducing cabling and connector require-
ments for redundant systems by compressing data from several sensors onto
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redundant transmission lines is important in the development of DFBW technology.
The discrete format of signals in DFBW systems makes the data bus a natural solu-
tion to the complex cabling problem. In Phase II the technique proposed for the
shuttle system will be used to process trim commands and mode panel information
(e.g., status lights, mode change commands) and to transmit the information from
the airplane cockpit to the palletized system in the equipment bay. This will
greatly reduce the number of wires and will verify data bus utility for shuttle as
well as future system applications.
Computer synchronization. - Of major concern in the design of any redundant
DFBW system is whether or not to synchronize the computer operations and, if so,
the best way to do it. The Phase II system will be designed with enough flexibility
to permit the use of various synchronization approaches as well as asynchronous
operation. Included will be the baseline approach selected for the orbiter system.
Control laws. - The first control laws to be evaluated in flight during Phase II
will be similar to those developed for the F-8C airplane during Phase I and similar
in format to those being developed for the shuttle orbiter. These include C* and
rate command modes for pitch and roll as well as direct control modes for each axis.
Control law software required for moding and initialization will therefore be similar
for both programs, which will permit some system verification.
Higher order programing language. - A higher order programing language,
called Higher Aerospace Language (HAL), is being developed in support of shuttle
software requirements. Use of this language in developing certain elements of the
control laws for the Phase II system will make it possible to debug and verify it
before it is actually applied to the shuttle orbiter.
Backup control system. - The present shuttle system configuration will require
a dissimilar single channel digital backup control system during initial horizontal
flight tests to override possible primary system generic failures. The executive
structure for the shuttle backup system will be implemented in the Phase II system
and flight-qualified through flight-test verification.
Advanced Control Law Development
To assess the capability of a digital system to perform the functions necessary
for future active control applications, additional control laws will be programed and
evaluated during Phase II. A specific task is the investigation of improvements that
can be made in aircraft control law implementation as a result of the rapidly advanc-
ing digital fly-by-wire system capability. The availability of a powerful onboard
digital computer system that can process sophisticated flight control laws in real
time has added a new dimension to realizable control law development. Control
laws previously too complex and unwieldy for analog system applications can now
be considered prime candidates for digital applications.
Initial Phase II control law research is directed toward the use of active control
for maneuver load control, possible improvement in ride quality, suppression of
turbulence effects, flight envelope limiting techniques, and operation at reduced
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static-stability margins. The basic elements of such a control law now being devel-oped for the longitudinal axis are illustrated in figure 4. The structure consists ofa boundary controller for angle-of-attack limiting, a normal controller for longi-tudinal commands, a direct-lift controller for commanding symmetric ailerons, aload controller, and autopilot modes. A proportional flap-to-elevator crossfeed isplanned to compensate for the pitching moment produced by symmetric ailerondeflection.
The design objective for the longitudinal axis is to achieve good handlingqualities by matching desired response criteria for both positive and negative staticstability margins. Gust load alleviation is provided by additional damping of short-period dynamics using the elevator surface. Angle-of-attack limiting is providedthroughout the flight envelope.
Direct lift of the symmetric ailerons is combined with the elevator to minimizedrag during maneuvers and to enhance gust load alleviation during cruise. Thethree autopilot modes are the conventional attitude hold, altitude hold, and Machhold.
Other advanced control law prospects, in which adaptive techniques and optimalcontrol theory are used, are being studied for possible flight-test evaluation duringPhase II.
Remotely Augmented Vehicle Facility
As part of Phase II, a unique remotely augmented vehicle facility is to bedeveloped to support advanced control law research and flight-test evaluation.A diagram of the proposed facility is shown in figure 5. During a test flight, aspecial remotely augmented vehicle test mode may be selected by the pilot that willdivert his control commands to a ground computer facility, via a telemetry down-link, on which a particular advanced control law to be evaluated is programed.Control surface commands are determined by the ground computer on the basis ofthe pilot's airborne commands, the airplane's response, and the programed controllaw. The surface commands are then transmitted, via a telemetry up-link, to the air-plane system and the corresponding control surface. The pilot flies the airplanethrough the control laws programed on the remotely located ground computer. Failsafety will be maintained through the use of reasonability tests built into the groundcomputer facility and safety networks in the telemetry equipment. This approachwill permit a great deal of flexibility for control law evaluation without compro-mising the basic airborne system verification requirements.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The full realization of the benefits of active control technology and the benefitspredicted by its application to aircraft design depends on the development of prac-tical, reliable, and versatile digital fly-by-wire (DFBW) control systems. Thefeasibility of such systems and confidence in their reliability and integrity were
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established in Phase I of the F-8 DFBW program. The goal of Phase II of the pro-
gram is to establish a design base from which practical, reliable systems can be
developed. This will be accomplished by developing and flight testing a fully
redundant triplex DFBW system.
The multichannel system development carried out during Phase II will establish
techniques for validating redundant system software and hardware interfaces and
for establishing operating procedures unique to DFBW systems. Flight-test eval-
uation of orbiter control system concepts using the F-8C airplane will result in
verification of redundancy management software for digital processor and sensor
fault detection and reduced generic failure probabilities for the orbiter system.
Flight-test evaluation of advanced control laws during Phase II will provide an
opportunity to assess the capability of DFBW systems to perform the complex control
tasks associated with active control applications.
The NASA DFBW program, although complementary to other fly-by-wire
activities, is aimed specifically at providing the technology for practical digital
flight controls for civil aircraft. As such, it represents the first step toward a new
generation of active-control-configured aircraft which will offer significant economic
advantages.
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Figure 1. F-8C test airplane.
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Figure 2. F-8 DFBW program schedule.
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2. DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT EXPERIENCE
WITH A DIGITAL FLY-BY-WIRE CONTROL SYSTEM
IN AN F-8C AIRPLANE
Dwain A. Deets
NASA Flight Research Center
SUMMARY
To assess the feasibility of a digital fly-by-wire system, the mechanical flight
control system of an F-8C airplane was replaced with a digital primary system and
an analog backup system. The Apollo computer was used as the heart of the primary
system. This paper discusses the experience gained during the design and develop-
ment of the system and relates it to active control systems that are anticipated for
future civil transport applications.
INTRODUCTION
A major deterrent to the application of active controls to transport aircraft has
been a lack of experience in designing highly reliable flight control augmentation
systems and verifying them in flight. Digital fly-by-wire technology has the
potential for providing the necessary reliability while still offering design flexibility.
To assess the feasibility of a digital fly-by-wire system, the NASA Flight Research
Center conducted a flight research program in which the mechanical flight control
system of an F-8C airplane was replaced with a digital primary system and an
electrical analog backup system.
This paper describes the fly-by-wire system and the design and development of
the digital primary system. The system and the design procedures are assessed in
light of similar applications being contemplated for future transport aircraft.
The paper was written in conjunction with papers 3, 5, 6, and 7 which discuss
the backup control system, software management, and results from the flight tests.
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SYMBOLS
K proportionality constant
KAZ norpa.lacceleration feedback gain to stabilizer, deg/g
KG stick or rudder pedal gearing constant, deg/m
KP roll rate feedback gain to ailerons, deg/deg/sec
KQ pitch rate feedback gain to stabilizer, deg/deg/sec
KR yaw rate feedback gain to rudder, deg/deg/sec
qk pitch rate at k t h sample, deg/sec
s Laplace transform variable
T sample period, sec
z complex variable, eST
ek pitch angle at k t h sample
TEST AIRPLANE
An F-8C airplane (fig. 1) was selected for use in flight testing a digital fly-by-
wire system. Several characteristics of the airplane made it suitable for this test
program. The handling qualities without control augmentation were acceptable for
emergency operation, thus backup control could be provided through a relatively
simple system. In addition, the airplane had enough space for the system's compo-
nents, and the capacity of the hydraulic systems was adequate.
Some features of the F-8C airframe had an impact on the fly-by-wire system
design. The variable-incidence wing moves up 80 for low-speed flight. This
rotates the fuselage nose down relative to the free airstream, improving the pilot's
visibility during the approach. Several functions within the flight control system
are programed as a function of wing position. For example, the horizontal stabilizer
is driven 50 leading edge up when the wing is raised.
The F-8C airplane does not have independent flap surfaces, so the ailerons are
driven collectively to serve as flaps through a mechanical linkage independent of
the primary control system. For this program the linkage was disconnected and the
ailerons were driven to the drooped flap position through the fly-by-wire system.
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The original F-8C flight control system had a direct linkage in pitch (no augmen-
tation), and roll and yaw stability augmentation systems (SAS) (figs. 2 (a) and 2(b)).
The yaw SAS included an aileron-to-rudder interconnect with a gain programed as
a function of stabilizer position.
DATA ACQUISITION SYSTEM
A standard NASA pulse code modulation (PCM) system was installed to record
airplane motion, pilot input, and fly-by-wire system parameters external to the
computer. Seventy-seven channels of 9-bit data were recorded on an onboard tape
and telemetered to a ground station for real-time monitoring. Eight of the channels
were digital words indicating the state of 57 discrete values from the fly-by-wire
system. Although excellent for automated data reduction, the PCM system proved
to be unsuitable for investigating the effects of analog-to-digital and digital-to-analog
quantization. The resolution of the PCM system was on the same order as that of the
digital control system quantization, which made it difficult to isolate the effects of the
control system quantization.
Internal digital computer parameters were recorded on the onboard PCM tape
recorder. One-hundred-word pairs were strobed out every 2 seconds and recorded
for postflight analysis. The word lists were resident in the software onboard the
airplane and could be reprogramed during the flight tests. This recording system
was used primarily to determine the gross status of the computed parameters within
the flight control system; the strobe rate was inadequate for tracing individual
parameters each control computational cycle.
IRON BIRD SIMULATOR
An iron bird simulator played an important role in the development of the fly-
by-wire system. The simulator consisted of another F-8C airplane, in which all the
digital fly-by-wire flight control hardware was installed, tied in with a hybrid
computer and appropriate interface equipment (fig. 3). The digital fly-by-wire
hardware was flight qualified and served as spares for the flight vehicle. The F-8C
aerodynamics and bending modes were modeled by using the digital portion of the
hybrid computer for the aerodynamics and the analog portion for the bending modes.
FLY-BY-WIRE SYSTEM
The fly-by-wire system had a digital primary control system and an electrical
analog backup control system. Components of the fly-by-wire system are shown in
figure 4, and the location of the components in the F-8C airplane is illustrated in
figure 5.
A simplex digital primary system and a triplex electrical analog backup system
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provided enough reliability that the mechanical system could be completely removed.
The digital primary system consisted of a computer, inertial measurement unit,
coupling data unit, and display and keyboard, all taken from the Apollo guidance
and navigation system. Reference 1 provides details on this equipment relative to
the Apollo application. The triplex backup control system consisted of only surface
position command electronics. Specially designed electrohydraulic secondary
actuators interfaced the primary and backup electronic commands with the conven-
tional F-8C control surface power actuators.
Components of the fly-by-wire system were part of the primary or backup
system and, in some instances, were shared between the two systems. Individual
components are described in the following sections according to function.
Computational
The Apollo computer performed all flight control computations in the primary
control system. Characteristics of this computer are summarized in the following
tabulation:
Read-only memory . . . . . 36,864 words
Scratch pad memory . . . . 2,048 words
Word length . . . . . . . . 14 bits plus sign and parity
Number system . . . . . . . Fixed point, ones complement
Memory cycle time . . . . . 11.7 microseconds
Computation time -
Add ...... . . .. . 23.4 microseconds
Multiply . . . . . . . . . 46.8 microseconds
Divide ...... . . . . 81.9 microseconds
Although slow by today's standards, the computer could perform all flight control
functions within 30 milliseconds. Flight control laws for the F-8C airplane were
programed for the computer's hardwired memory and could not be changed after the
memory was manufactured. However, flexibility was achieved by placing feedback
gains, logic flags, digital filter coefficients, and other gain variables in the
computer's scratch pad memory; 105 of these variables associated with the flight
control system could be changed.
Control laws for the backup system were mechanized in triplex control electronicboxes, which can be considered to be special-purpose analog computers. Each
electronic box contained 67 operational amplifiers. Requirements for high reliability
in the flight environment dictated the use of ruggedized packaging and hardwired
circuits. Consequently, flexibility for changing control laws was limited to gain
and nonlinear constant changes; even these changes required replacement of hard-
wired resistors and diodes. Although the control system is considered to be an
analog system, more than half of each electronic box containing individual channels
of the analog electronics was devoted to logic elements, such as comparators between
the redundant channels.
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Pilot Interface
Vehicle control and trim inputs.- The center stick was the primary means of
control for both the primary and the backup systems. It was connected to the basic
F-8C mechanical feel system. Disconnecting the mechanical links to the control
surface caused undesirable looseness in the lateral stick, so a viscous damper was
added. Stick position was sensed through two separate linear variable differential
transformers (LVDT) in each axis. Each LVDT had triplex windings. Two of the
windings from one LVDT in each axis were used by the primary system; the third
winding was for instrumentation. The second LVDT provided triplex inputs to the
backup control system.
A minimum displacement, two-axis side stick was used as an alternate controller
input to the backup system. This side stick was not part of the original fly-by-wire
system; it was used only as a means of evaluating a "force type" side stick controller
in an actual aircraft environment (papers 3 and 7).
The rudder pedals provided inputs to both the primary and the backup systems.
Similar to the center stick, they were connected to the F-8C mechanical feel system
and used LVDT's for sensing rudder pedal position.
Trim commands for primary pitch and roll were made through a two-axis beeper
switch on the center stick. Backup trim inputs in all three axes were made through
separate spring-loaded toggle switches on the pilot's left-hand console. These
toggle switches were also used to provide primary yaw trim and primary pitch and
roll trim inputs if the center stick trim switch failed. When the side stick was being
used, trimming was accomplished through a beeper switch on the side stick.
Fly-by-wire functional control.- Figure 6 shows the mode and power panel,
which was the pilot's means of communicating with the primary system. The pilot
was able to choose between several different control system modes simply by
depressing the appropriate button. Additionally, he was able to change system gains
according to the logic loaded in the software before the flight. Several primary
system failure status lights were located across the top of the panel, and power
switches and power status lights were located across the bottom. Individual axes
could be transferred to backup through the backup control system (BCS) switches.
The pilot could also transfer all axes to backup simultaneously by using a "paddle
switch" on the center stick.
A servo engage panel on the left-hand console permitted the pilot to selectively
engage or disengage each channel of each servo actuator. The panel provided
control over both the backup and the primary systems. The status of the actuation
system and the backup electronics was displayed on this panel.
Motion Sensing and Interface
Another component from the Apollo guidance and navigation system was the
inertial measurement unit. Although angular body rates and linear accelerations
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were not measured directly in the Apollo application, the substitution of aircraft
gyros and accelerometers for the fly-by-wire tests would have required a major
system modification and would have sacrificed the integrity of the total Apollo
system. An alternate approach was adopted: Body rates and linear accelerations
were computed from the gimbal angles and the digital incremental velocity vector
information the inertial measurement unit provided to the Apollo computer for use in
the primary system.
A coupling data unit provided the interface between the inertial measurement
unit and the Apollo computer in the Apollo guidance system and provided the same
function for the primary system in the F-8C application. The angular resolution was
0.0110; however, the rate resolution was of more importance and was nonlinear with
gimbal angle rate. Body angular rate estimation was directly related to gimbal angle
rate resolution. Gimbal rate resolution was +0.183 deg/sec for rates less than
4.4 deg/sec, and ±2.74 deg/sec for rates between 4.4 deg/sec and 70 deg/sec. The
error was manifested as a random noise band of 2.74 deg/sec peak to peak for rates
greater than 4.4 deg/sec. Acceleration was sensed by using pulse integrating
pendulous accelerometers. The quantization level for the normal acceleration sig-
nals was 0.2g.
The coupling data unit contained several digital-to-analog converter channels,
which made it possible to send the necessary primary system commands to the
control surfaces. To protect against undetected failures between the computer and
the surface actuators, dual signals were generated in each axis, beginning with
dualized commands to dual digital-to-analog converters in the coupling data unit in
each axis. The control surface drive signals were quantized to ±384 levels, which
is somewhat less than a full 9-bit word.
Control Surface Actuation
Similar actuation systems were used in each axis. Each actuation system had a
secondary actuator and a power actuator. Separate sets of actuators were used for
the left and right horizontal stabilizers and ailerons. A single set of actuators was
used for the rudder.
The hydraulic power actuators from the basic F-8C airplane were used without
modification. Electrohydraulic secondary actuators were installed to drive the
metering valves of each of the five power actuators. The secondary actuators
acted as three-chamber force summing devices when driven from the backup system.
The primary system drove the secondary actuators through active monitor servo
valves.
When the secondary actuators were driven through the primary system, they
were stabilized through the active servo valve in the primary system electronics
box. Analog 5-hertz low-pass filters were included in the primary system elec-
tronics. When driven through the backup servo valves, the secondary actuators
were stabilized in the backup system electronics packages, one for each of the three
backup channels.
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Paper 3 describes the actuation systems in more detail.
Primary/Backup System Interface
A functional diagram of the fly-by-wire system is shown in figure 7. The
Apollo computer received inputs from the pilot's stick together with aircraft motion
information from the inertial measurement unit. Surface commands were computed
according to the programed control laws.
The two drive signals for each surface represented commands to the secondary
actuator position loop, which was closed with analog stabilization electronics outside
the Apollo computer. As shown in figure 7, there was an active and a monitor servo
path. If a failure occurred in either path, a hydraulic comparator would sense the
differential pressure between the active and the monitor servo valve and transfer
control to the backup control system. As long as the primary control system was
operating normally, the backup control system would track the active channel by
way of the synchronization network. Only the hydraulic pressure was bypassed at
the secondary actuator, so that the backup system was ready to take over at any
time. If a transfer to the backup system was requested, the bypass was removed
and the synchronization network was disabled, resulting in immediate proportional
control from the pilot's stick. In the backup mode, the active servo valve was
blocked and the secondary actuator operated as a force summer for the three backup
channels. The digital computer continued to operate, computing the control laws
which gave the best estimate of what the backup system commanded. If a transfer
to the primary control system was attempted, the transient was small as long as the
computer was tracking the backup system. If the error was excessive between the
primary control system and the backup control system, a cross-channel comparator
prevented transfer to the primary control system.
Fault Detection
Although built-in fault detection was extremely important for both the primary
and the backup systems, it was of particular importance in the primary system.
Because the primary system was full authority as well as single channel, its
responses could have been hazardous if failures were not handled properly.
Therefore, it had to be established that no digital computer system hardware failure
could cause a hardover or otherwise hazardous signal. Figure 8 shows the type of
digital system failure detection used. The Apollo computer had an extensive and
proved fault detection and reporting system which was built into the computer
hardware (item 1 in the figure). This system, modified slightly for application to
the F-8C airplane, was the most significant portion of the failure detection system.
Some of the types of failures detected were:
Logic circuits -
Parity failed
Program entered loop and did not exit
Program attempted to access unused read-only memory
Program failed to check in occasionally
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Analog circuits -
Voltage went out of limits
Oscillator failed
Timing pulse generator failed
Each of the failures caused a restart, that is, a hardware-forced transfer out of the
control law program to a software routine which performed several clearing and
initialization steps in an attempt to correct the cause of the restart before allowing
control law computations to continue. For some restart conditions, a signal wasissued which caused a transfer to the backup control system.
The Apollo computer also monitored the performance of the inertial measurement
unit (item 2, fig. 8). Written into the software were decisions either to transfer the
system to the backup control system for serious failures or to select the direct modein the primary system for situations such as an inertial measurement unit acceler-
ometer failure, which would affect only certain augmented modes.
Analysis of primary system failures showed the need for additional hardwarefailure detection circuitry (item 3, fig 8). The failure of certain channel outbits
not monitored by the Apollo computer, in combination with normal pilot reactions,
could have led to hazardous situations. These conditions first became apparent inpiloted, closed-loop simulations using the iron bird simulator. The necessary hard-
ware modifications were made and implemented in the system to circumvent thesefailure conditions or to cause a transfer to the backup control system when prevention
was not possible.
Built-in test equipment for the backup system and primary electronics wasprovided in the pilot's side console. This self-test equipment could be activated
only during preflight tests (paper 3).
FLIGHT CONTROL SOFTWARE
Software flexibility made it possible to investigate a multimode F-8 digital flight
control system using hardware that was designed for an entirely different purpose -guidance and navigation in space. The structure of the primary system control laws,
which were implemented through software, and the associated logic functions aredescribed.
Control Law Modes
Control in each axis was provided in the control laws. The simplest form in
each axis was the direct mode, illustrated in figure 9. The control law structure
and gain settings were selected to be as close as possible to those of the backup
control system. The first level of augmentation was rate feedback in the pitch and
roll axes. Figure 10 illustrates these SAS modes as they were during flight tests.In the yaw axis, an aileron-to-rudder interconnect was included in addition to theyaw rate feedback (fig. 11). The most advanced type of control law was a blended
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pitch rate and normal acceleration command augmentation mode, illustrated in
figure 12.
The sampled-data aspect of the digital fly-by-wire system significantly affected
the implementation of the software. The pitch SAS mode, illustrated in figure 13,
was representative of the other augmented modes. A multirate sampling system was
used, with a major cycle sample time, T, of 30 milliseconds and a minor cycle
sample time, 3T, of 90 milliseconds. Gimbal angles were transformed to body angles
by using sines and cosines of gimbal angles updated once every minor cycle. A
second-order rate estimator operating on these gimbal angles provided body rates,
which were then filtered. General-purpose digital filters were programed so that
different characteristics could be selected independently for each feedback parameter.
Proper selection of the difference equation coefficients could provide a wide range
of filter characteristics. A first-order prefilter, a dead band, and a parabolic
nonlinear gradient were available to shape the pilot's input.
Logic Functions
An important capability made possible through software was the integration of
logic statements in the control law code. Logic statements, even though complex,
were easily written into the software. Had the system been analog rather than
digital, special-purpose hardware would have been necessary to perform the same
logic functions. One mode logic function associated with the yaw axis is discussed
in reference 2.
Another type of logic function was the software reasonability test which was
applied to each surface command before it was sent to the digital-to-analog converter.
If the new command differed from the previous command by more than a predeter-
mined amount, the affected axis would have transferred to the direct mode. This
down mode philosophy was based on the assumption that a reasonability limit would
be exceeded because of generic failures in the augmentation control laws rather than
because of a hardware failure which would have affected the direct mode as well.
It was assumed that a hardware failure would have been detected by the built-in
Apollo computer fault detection logic.
Trim inputs were also tested for reasonability before the trim value was updated.
If a combination of primary trim commands was sensed that corresponded to an
impossible situation for an unfailed system, a failure was assumed, the primary trim
was deactivated, and an auxiliary trim system was activated. A test for runaway
trim was included which disabled trim updates if the trim command persisted for
more than 3 seconds.
DIGITAL FLY-BY-WIRE DESIGN
Design Ground Rules
Several ground rules were established in order to meet the objectives of the
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program. First, the airplane was to fly from the first flight without mechanical
reversion capability. This forced the designers to take the care necessary toestablish as much confidence in the system, including the software, as would berequired for future active control applications. Second, the primary digital system
was to utilize the hardware from the Apollo guidance and navigation system. Thesystem was to remain intact; only software changes were allowed. The primaryreason for this requirement was to retain the system's high degree of built-inintegrity and reliability. A third basic design ground rule established early in theprogram was to make the pilot's interface with the computer as simple as possible.As a result, the pilot was given control over flight control functions rather than adirect communication with the computer. All functional changes (for example, amode change) desired by the pilot were to be made through single switch actions.This allowed the pilot to perform functional changes rapidly and eliminated thepossibility of incorrect entry or improper addressing which could have had direconsequences close to the ground or at high dynamic pressure. The last ground
rule was to provide handling qualities that would be judged satisfactory by thepilots. A criterion based on C* response to a step pitch stick command (ref. 3)
was used as a guide during the design of the longitudinal control system. MilitarySpecification MIL-F-8785B, level 1, was used during the lateral-directional control
system design.
These ground rules had further implications. For example, the interfaceequipment associated with the Apollo hardware established limits on the flight
envelope for satisfactory operation. The analog-to-digital converter used for pilotstick inputs had only 45 usable discrete levels between zero and full stick. In thepitch axis each discrete level resulted in a specific level of aircraft normal acceler-ation, depending on stick gearing and dynamic pressure. In this instance, theacceleration increment became objectionable to the pilot within the basic flight
envelope. Thus a new flight envelope limit was established at the dynamic pressureat which the stick quantization effect was not objectionable. Because of the designcharacteristics of the inertial measurement unit, some additional restrictions wereplaced on the airplane's maneuverability. These included a roll angular rate limitof 70 deg/sec and a pitch attitude limit of 700.
Design Synthesis and Analysis
The closed-loop primary system was synthesized and analyzed by using twomethods. The first was an analog sample and hold simulation which was useful inthe learning process in that it pointed out the more general aspects of the digital
control problem. For example, the acceptable range of sample rate, 25 to 50 samplesper second, was defined. The effect of the folding phenomenon of sampled-data
systems on the structural mode frequencies and the influence of common nonlinearitieswere also studied in this design phase. The second method used a digital synthesisprogram which provided linear analysis as a cross check and a background for thesample and hold simulation. Basic control laws, compensation, and logic wereestablished by using these two methods. A specification for the control law softwarewas then formulated, thus providing the basis for coding the flight software.
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Design Verification and Refinement
With the delivery of portions of the flight hardware, including the Apollo
computer and the coupling data unit, and early releases of flight software, design
verification and refinement was started. A six-degree-of-freedom digital aerodynamic
model of the F-8C airplane was used in conjunction with the flight hardware to form
a partial hardware hybrid simulation.
The first two analysis methods did not consider any pilot interface, but the
partial hardware hybrid simulation included a lunar module hand 
controller with
which the F-8C model could be crudely flown. Coarse input quantization, a problem
of importance later, did not become evident in this simulation because it was
completely masked by the characteristics of the hand controller. 
This is one of the
major disadvantages of any simulation which does not include major hardware
elements.
Another important tool in the design verification and refinement was the batch
process all-digital simulation. This simulation included the software 
being verified,
an Apollo computer emulator, and a program representing the F-8C aerodynamics,
all run on a large host computer. Powerful plotting routines made the internal
computer parameters visible during each run. All the control system 
parameters
were examined for reasonableness, particularly as they responded to mode and gain
changes. One of the most useful plots was duty cycle versus run time. A typical
variation of duty cycle during a maneuver is shown in figure 14 for a roll step.
Because of some additional code for computation of stick nonlinearities when the
stick was displaced from zero, additional computational time was required during
this maneuver. This was reflected in an increase in the duty cycle, as shown in
the figure. Other contributions to duty cycle were the interrupts from the motion
sensors. The increase in roll rate produced a loss in available computation time
roughly proportional to the roll rate. This loss of computation time effectively
increased the duty cycle.
The last step in the design verification used the iron bird simulator. One
problem - the coarse quantization of the pilot's stick inputs -
was uncovered
immediately. The problem became obvious once the hand controller was replaced
with the actual center stick. The staircase shape of the computer output commands
produced sharp responses at the secondary actuators which were 
unacceptable from
the standpoint of mechanical motion and structural element excitation. Low-pass
filtering of the computer output was undesirable because of its adverse effect on
closed-loop performance. This suggested the use of a digital pilot prefilter that
had not been anticipated in the control law specifications. The flight software had
already been substantially verified, but fortunately the read-only memory had not
yet been manufactured. The prefilter was quickly programed 
in software and the
code was reverified. Consequently, there was essentially no effect on the overall
schedule. This points out one of the significant advantages of a digital flight
control system: Necessary changes can be made late in the design without affecting
hardware procurement, packaging, or requalification. Although additional software
verification will be required, it will not have the adverse effect on program sched-
ules that is typical of a hardware redesign of an analog system.
Looking back on the various design and analysis tools, it is apparent that they
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complemented one another. Confidence in the system grew each time an independent
simulation or analysis gave results comparable to those obtained previously. Theimportance of having the pilot in the loop with as much actual hardware as possiblewas demonstrated vividly. In terms of time spent on verifying the various aspectsof the design, the largest proportion was devoted to systematically verifying eachlogic function and mode transfer and the effects of failures. Another time-consumingaspect was the refinement of stick gradients and nonlinearities near zero stick. Amuch smaller proportion of time was spent on closed-loop augmentation character-istics, probably because of the good agreement generally found between the resultsfrom sampled-data analysis methods and simulation results.
RELATIONSHIP TO FUTURE APPLICATIONS
The configurations of future fly-by-wire systems will probably be stronglydependent on the specific missions for which they are designed. As such, eachsystem will be unique in some respects, but will have a large degree of commonalitywith other fly-by-wire systems. The F-8 fly-by-wire system was unique in thatit consisted of a simplex digital primary system, a triplex analog backup system,and no mechanical reversion capability. However, in this unique system wereseveral features that will be relevant to the systems that will be required to achievethe advantages that active control offers. These features were, basically, dissimi-lar redundancy, single string software, and the experience associated with thedigital system design.
Dissimilar Redundancy
The F-8 fly-by-wire system experience with two dissimilar systems providesinformation applicable to future systems which are likely to have dissimilar
redundancy. Most of the problems were concerned with the synchronization of thetwo systems. Transfers from one system to another were handled differently, butthe goal was to minimize transients caused by the transfer. In each instance, thesystem in control was tracked by the other system so that transients would beminimized. However, the primary system tracked the backup system by estimatingthe surface command of the backup system based on the pilot's control commandsand trim inputs only. In transfers from the primary system to the backup system,the backup system tracked the output of the primary system. Although thiseliminated the need to reconstruct the primary system signal propagation in thebackup system, it did open the possibility for unusual initialization conditions whenthe transfer occurred during an abrupt maneuver. Another factor was that atransfer from the primary system to the backup system could have been initiatedautomatically as a result of a failure, thus the failure analysis had to consider allpossible failures that could have resulted in a transfer. The timing of this transferwas critical in some instances when it could have coupled with the pilot's normalresponse to cause unacceptable conditions.
Some aspects of the dissimilar redundant system gave insight into redundancymanagement problems which may be expected in the future. The backup system
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mechanized the trim function using a digital integrator to reduce drift. Because of
differences in the sampling mechanisms between the two systems, large errors
between the two trim signals were noted after extended flight with the backup
system in control in which numerous trim inputs were made. Figure 15 illustrates
the two sampling mechanisms. The primary system sampled trim commands every
90 milliseconds. If trim was being commanded at the time of the sample, the trim
value was updated in the software. The backup control system did not update its
digital trim integrator until a capacitor was charged up to a prescribed threshold.
Although the capacitor began charging the instant the trim button was pushed,
approximately 175 milliseconds were required before the first update of trim. As a
result of these two sampling mechanisms, trim inputs of less than 175 milliseconds,
but greater than 90 milliseconds, caused the primary system, but not the backup
system, to update trim. To correct the problem, there would have had to be either
some exchange of actual trim value information between the two systems or some
form of verification that one system received the trim command before the other
system updated the trim value. Each of these possible solutions would have required
additional connections between the two systems, which would have been undesirable
because they would have created new failure possibilities. For this particular
research application, a procedural change in conjunction with close monitoring of
telemetered data in the control room made modification of the system unnecessary.
Single String Software
Because a simplex digital system can have only a single program in control at
one time, it can be described as a system with single string software. However,
redundant digital systems with the same program in each computer also effectively
have single string software. The experiences with the F-8 digital system software
are closely related, then, to the multichannel digital systems expected in future
civil transports. Generic software failures would have equivalent effects on any
system with single string software, regardless of the system's redundancy. The
software controls described in paper 5 suggest that careful verification will always
be necessary, but that the confidence necessary for man-rating the software can be
established.
Another factor that emphasized the importance of man-rated software was that
the single string software had full-authority control over the control surfaces; thus
it was obviously flight critical. Digital systems will be called on to perform more
and more flight-critical functions and, on the basis of our experience, can be
depended on to perform with high integrity.
Removal of all mechanical reversion capability before the first flight had a
significant effect on the entire design and verification process. It forced an
approach that would establish complete confidence in the system on the basis of
simulation alone. If the alternate approach had been taken, that of retaining a
mechanical link, the most probable flight-test procedure would have been to fly to
a safe altitude using the mechanical system and then engage the fly-by-wire system.
After confidence was gained at altitude, the more critical flight safety functions,
such as takeoff and landing, would have been encompassed gradually.
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Design Experience
On the basis of the F-8 digital fly-by-wire design experience, several recom-
mendations can be made regarding the design of digital control systems for futurecivil transports. Many of these recommendations correspond simply to good designpractice. Analyzing closed-loop performance using standard sampled-data analysistechniques such as z-plane root locus can be relied on to give good agreement with
more complete simulations. Several forms of simulation and analysis should beused to build confidence in the system before the first flight. A simulation thatincludes as much actual hardware as possible is important in correctly assessing
system performance. The interface with the pilot is particularly important.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The feasibility of a digital fly-by-wire system was assessed by replacing themechanical flight control system of an F-8C airplane with a digital primary and ananalog backup fly-by-wire system. The design and verification procedures whichwill be necessary if flight-critical active control is to be used in future aircraftwere established and successfully applied as part of the flight program. Carefulapplication of standard sampled-data design methods and systematic verification ofcontrol system hardware and software using complete simulations resulted in adigital fly-by-wire system with extremely high integrity. The successful use ofsingle string software in a full-authority flight control system demonstrated thehigh level of confidence which can be placed in digital flight control.
The experience with the F-8 digital fly-by-wire system pointed up severalfactors that will be important in the successful design of future full-time, flight-critical digital control systems:
(1) Batch process all-digital simulation was extremely helpful in tracinginternal computer variables and in providing visibility to system response duringmode changes.
(2) A complete piloted simulation with actual flight control system hardwareprovided important results relative to the pilot/stick interface that had not beenobtained in earlier simulations which did not include the actual control stick.
(3) The largest portion of the design and verification effort was devoted tologic functions, such as mode transfers, and the effects of failures.
(4) Software changes made late in the design to correct hardware-relatedproblems had a negligible effect on the program schedule.
A major aspect of the F-8 digital fly-by-wire system which will have applicationto future systems was its dissimilar redundancy. Failure isolation between theprimary and the backup systems was achieved as desired, although some problemswere encountered with intersystem synchronization.
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Figure 1. F-8 digital fly-by-wire airplane. E-24823
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TRIPLEX FLY-BY-WIRE BACKUP CONTROL SYSTEM
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NASA Flight Research Center
and
Gaylon B. Whitman
Sperry Flight Systems Division
SUMMARY
A redundant three-axis analog control system was designed and developed to
back up a digital fly-by-wire control system for an F-8C airplane. Forty-two
flights, involving 58 hours of flight time, were flown by six pilots. The mechaniza-
tion and operational experience with the backup control system, the problems
involved in synchronizing it with the primary system, and the reliability of the
system are discussed.
The backup control system was dissimilar to the primary system, and it pro-
vided satisfactory handling through the flight envelope evaluated. Limited flight
tests of a variety of control tasks showed that control was also satisfactory when the
backup control system was controlled by a minimum-displacement (force) side stick.
The operational reliability of the F-8 digital fly-by-wire control system was
satisfactory, with no unintentional downmodes to the backup control system in flight.
The ground and flight reliability of the system's components is discussed.
INTRODUCTION
A control system consisting of a primary digital fly-by-wire system and a dis-
similar triplex analog backup system was flight tested in an F-8C airplane by the
NASA Flight Research Center. The mechanical linkages of the original F-8C control
system were removed except for cockpit stick and pedal centering and feel. A
single channel digital computer, the associated electronics, a power-generating
system, and electrohydraulic secondary actuators made up the primary control
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system. A triplex backup control system provided the redundancy required for
manned flight and gave the total system two-failure-operate reliability.
.The . ircombnentsof the backup control system were the sensors, the elec-tronics,~a'id the soqpda- y actuators. The system was analog for signal processing,had no feedback for stability augmentation, and was designed to provide emergency
return-home capability with airplane handling qualities equal to those of the basicF-8C airplane. The F-8C airplane can be flown through most of its flight envelope
without augmentation.
This paper describes the backup control system and its integration with theprimary control system, which is described in detail in paper 2. The mechanization
of and operational experience with the primary and backup control systems arediscussed. Some aspects of the primary and backup control system design were
unique; however, many of the design features would apply to fly-by-wire controlsystems in active control aircraft. The reliability of the total system during the
program is described.
A limited flight test evaluation of the backup control system was conducted using
a minimum-displacement (force) side stick controller for pitch and roll control.These evaluations represent most of the maneuvering experience with the backup
control system.
DESIGN FEATURES
The backup control system was designed to provide redundancy for the F-8digital fly-by-wire control system. It was a triplex analog fly-by-wire control-stick-to-control-surface system in which the electronic trim, sensor and electronics
equalization, primary control system synchronization, and servo and electronics
monitoring were independent of the primary control system. The system incorpo-
rated several innovations that are common in modern electronics equipment but not
as common in airplane control system hardware. These design features aredescribed in the following sections.
A functional block diagram of the F-8 digital fly-by-wire control system is pre-
sented in figure 1. The upper portion of the figure is the primary control system,
and the lower portion is the backup control system. The secondary actuators are
shared between the primary and backup systems, and the primary control elec-tronics provide the interface between the digital-to-analog converters of the primary
system. The secondary actuators and the synchronization between the primary andbackup systems are also discussed in this paper.
Triplex Channels
The backup control system consisted of three identical computing channels,one for each airplane control axis. The system provided an interface between the
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triplex control stick and pedal position sensors and the triplex servovalves. In
addition, the three backup control system channels, including the sensors, elec-
tronics, and servos, were powered by three isolated power busses that were
connected to a common power source.
The servo commands, which consisted of stick and pedal commands that were
summed with the trim and equalization signals, were processed by voters in each
channel to insure that the three backup channels tracked. The voter selected the
middle value of the three channel commands to drive the control valve in each
channel. For certain types of failures in the voter, actuator, or servo electronics,
the failed channel would be detected and the servovalve associated with the failed
channel would be disengaged. Therefore, the backup control system was opera-
tional after one or more failures.
Synchronization
An integrator in each axis of the three backup control system channels provided
electronic trim, equalization, and synchronization. When a primary channel was
engaged, the backup control system servo commands were synchronized with the
primary servo commands with these integrators. These inputs to the backup con-
trol system voters tracked the primary channel servo commands, even though
variations in control sensor outputs and in intersystem control laws existed. Con-
tinuous synchronization of the backup with the primary control system was neces-
sary to minimize control surface transients during the switchover from the primary
to the backup control system. Switchover occurred if there was a failure in the
primary system or if disengagement was commanded by the pilot. The synchroniza-
tion network had a bandwidth of approximately 2.5 hertz.
Equalization and Trim
When the backup control system was engaged, the integrators performed the
backup control system trim and equalization function. Trim was accomplished by
applying a fixed reference to the integrator, changing trim at a fixed rate. The
integrator output was then summed with the control stick or pedal position inputs
to form the total surface command. Since the trim inputs, sensor position inputs,
and electronic gains were not necessarily the same in each backup control sys-
tem channel, equalization was included to reduce errors between channels. Limited
equalization, combined with the voters, produced essentially identical channel
servo commands to the three backup control system servovalves and minimized the
force fight between the secondary actuator pistons.
The trim and equalization functions required a low or zero drift integrator.
The backup control system integrator design, which was classified as having zero
drift, used digital techniques to accomplish the zero drift or memory function and
analog techniques for the integration function.
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Backup Control System Monitoring
Electronic and servo signals were monitored at two points within the backup
control system. The channel voter output was compared with the voter input. Ifthe signal difference was greater than the set threshold, the monitor was latched andthe electronic channel was reported failed.
The other monitoring point was the backup control system servos. Backup con-trol system servo monitoring was accomplished by cross-channel comparison of thedifferential pressure signals from each of the three servovalves. This detected ex-cessive force fights within the backup control system servos. A preset differencein two of the three differential pressure signals resulted in latching the commonservo monitor, disengaging the failed servo, and reporting the failure to the pilot.When a failure was detected and the failed servo disengaged, the resulting surfacetransient was minimized by the operating characteristics of the force-summed
actuator.
Self-Test Procedure
Preflight testing was accomplished by an automatic self-test procedure thatprovided a pseudo-end-to-end testing of the system. The self-test involved the in-troduction of a logic-controlled stimulus and the disabling of circuit functions andused in-flight monitors to indicate the response. The use of the in-flight monitorsas the self-test feedback elements served to check the channel signal paths and the
operation of the in-flight monitors. This resulted in a "bang-bang" type of test withno indication of system degradation.
A block diagram of the self-test unit is shown in figure 2. The power for theself-test was routed to the computing electronic assemblies only after the self-testpower switch was closed and the self-test start switch was depressed. A counterstarted to count and addressed the read-only memory, which was preprogramed foreach particular test to activate certain stimuli and disable certain circuits in theelectronic assemblies. The test results were compared with the predicted results,
which were stored in the read-only memories in the diagnostic analysis circuitry.The self-test automatically stepped to the next test if the test results were as pre-dicted. This procedure was repeated with different combinations of stimuli and dis-
abling circuits active until the test was complete and a GO signal was reported ineach airplane control axis.
If the test results from the electronic assemblies were not as predicted, thetest sequence was stopped and a diagnostic routine was initiated. The diagnostic
analysis circuitry analyzed the test results with respect to the predicted results todetermine where the failure occurred. The diagnosis was indicated on the self-testdiagnostic readout.
Status Engage Panel
The status engage panel was in the left cockpit console. It housed all theservo engage switches and servo status lights and indicated the status of the
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backup control system electronics. The panel also contained the self-test program,
power switch, and diagnostic readout to indicate a failed self-test condition or satis-
factory completion of the self-test. The servo switches were three-position positive-
action switches labeled Auto-Off and Manual. Even though five secondary actuators
were utilized for the three control system axes, only three switches and servo status
lights were used for the three primary control channels, whereas individual channel
switches and status lights were mechanized for each backup control valve. The
lights indicated when the various comparator networks had exceeded preset values.
The light was also a reset switch that sent a reset pulse to its comparator. The
servo status lights for backup servo systems 2, 3, and 4 lit up after any two common
comparators tripped. That is, the left pitch 2-3 comparator and the left pitch 4-2
comparator lit the left pitch number 2 light when both comparators tripped. The logic
for the primary control system pitch servos was that if either the left or the right
pitch channel indicated failure, the number 1 pitch status light lit, and control was
switched from the primary to the backup control system. The servo system logic
was designed to provide a manual override capability for any channel per actuator
regardless of the remaining servo system switch positions.
SYSTEM COMPONENTS
The approximate locations of the control system components in the F-8 digital
fly-by-wire test airplane are shown in figure 3. As might be expected, using the
F-8C airplane as a test-bed resulted in some design problems that were unique to
the F-8C configuration. A major problem was the requirement for different control
gearing for the wing-up (approach and landing) and wing-down (cruise) positions.
A pair of dual wing potentiometers was mounted to provide an electrical signal pro-
portional to wing position to droop the ailerons for flaps and to provide automatic
trim of the horizontal tail. Other system components that provided control, signal
conditioning, and actuation are described below.
Control
Stick and pedal transducers.- Two transducers that each contained triplex
redundant linear variable differential transformers (LVDT's) were connected to the
existing F-8C flight control linkage to provide electrical signals as functions of the
pilot's stick and rudder commands. One transducer was provided for the primary
control system, and one was provided for the backup control system for each air-
plane axis of control. The pitch transducers were on the right and the roll trans-
ducers were on the left side of the airplane underneath the primary flight pallet.
Because of rudder cable stretch, the two rudder transducers were installed in the
base of the vertical tail.
Each transducer assembly contained isolated sensors for excitation and signal
output to drive as many as three separate control paths. All the transducers were
linear, except for the pitch transducers for the backup control system, and all had
an electrical stroke of +1.5 centimeters. The pitch transducer for the backup control
system transducer had a special winding to provide parabolic stick shaping.
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Stick and pedal gearing. - An attempt was made to duplicate the control author-
ity and gearing of the original F-8C airplane in the F-8 digital fly-by-wire airplane.
The final gearings are shown in figures 4(a) to 4(c) for the pitch, roll, and yaw
axes.
The data presented in figure 4(a) indicate that there was reasonable agreement
between the pitch stick gearing of the fly-by-wire airplane and that of a conven-
tional F-8C airplane. Only the wing-down data are presented for zero trim command.
With the wing in the up position, the horizontal stabilizer surface was biased 50 from
the wing-down position, and the zero stick position corresponded to zero surface
position.
Figure 4(b) shows the left aileron position as a function of lateral stick position
for a wing-down and a wing-up configuration with zero trim command. The gra-
dients are nearly the same for all backup control system commands except for the
wing-up right stick command, where the gradient is higher than in the conventional
F-8C airplane. The fly-by-wire gradients were symmetrical for both wing positions,
whereas the wing-up gradient was not symmetrical (differential aileron) for the con-
ventional F-8C airplane. The aileron did not move down as far as it moved up for a
given stick command.
Figure 4(c) shows rudder displacement as a function of pedal force. Gradients
are shown for the wing-up and the wing-down configurations. The higher gradient
was used with the wing-down configuration. The pedal forces were provided by the
existing F-8C mechanism. The gradients show good agreement for both wing posi-
tions. The backup control system deadband was slightly larger.
Side stick. - The side stick sensor flight tested during the program was a two-
axis, four-channel, minimum-displacement transducer. The principal of operation
for the transducer was that an applied force at the stick grip caused a flexure-
supported tube assembly to move quadruplex LVDT's that generated a voltage pro-
portional to the applied force. The side stick transducer was recessed in the right
cockpit console to allow the pilot to sit comfortably in the seat with his arm in a
natural position.
Side stick gradients.- The side stick gradients flight tested are shown in fig-
ures 5(a) and 5(b) for the pitch and roll axes, respectively. Figure 5(a) shows
the pitch stick force as a function of elevator surface position for both wing posi-
tions. The circuit mechanization consisted of a deadband, a low gradient, and a
high gradient for both a pull and a push force. The variable high gradient was
mechanized to function only with the wing down, and it was controlled by a switch
in the cockpit. In figures 5(a) and 5(b), switch positions increase with increasing
stick gradient. The side stick authority was always less than the center stick
authority.
Electronics
Backup control system. - Three identical backup control system electronics
boxes were the heart of the backup control system. Each box contained all the
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signal processing, engage logic, monitoring, and dc power necessary for a single
backup control system channel in the pitch, roll, and yaw axes. A block diagram
of a single channel in the roll axis (channel 3) is shown in figure 6. Except for
scaling, trim rate, and the gearing change with wing position, the network for the
pitch axis was basically the same. The yaw axis differed in scaling and trim rate,
and a limiter was added just after the voter. The voter output drove only one
actuator network.
Figure 6 shows one electrical comparator across the voter and a single compara-
tor across each backup valve. In total, there were eight comparators per backup
control electronics box. The trip level of the electrical comparators was set at
3.0 volts, which was approximately one-third the maximum voltage for each axis.
This corresponds to a stick displacement of approximately 2.5 centimeters for roll
and 5 centimeters for pitch. The differential pressure comparators were set to trip
at 2.4 volts, which represents a differential pressure error of 8273 kN/m 2
Primary control electronics. - The primary control system electronics box con-
tained the signal interface between the computer's digital-to-analog converter outputs
and each secondary actuator for the airplane's pitch, roll, and yaw axes. A simpli-
fied block diagram of a typical primary signal circuit is shown in figure 7. For each
control axis, there were two identical signal paths, the active and monitor channels,
from the computer to the control valves of the respective secondary actuator. The
primary control electronics box contained two 5-hertz second-order smoothing
filters in each of the three axes. Follow-up signals from the secondary actuator
were biased with the wing position voltage for the pitch and roll actuators. The
signal was then divided for summing and sent directly to the monitor servo amplifier
or quadruplex voter and processed with the three comparable signals from the back-
up control system. In conjunction with the hydrologic comparator, this provided
hard-over protection from open servo follow-up signals.
The primary control electronics box also contained engage logic, monitoring,
and the dc power supply for the box and the primary secondary actuators. A
separate return comparator was used to monitor the difference between comparable
points in each axis of the primary and backup control systems. When the error was
greater than 30, 40, and 30 for the elevator, aileron, and rudder, respectively, the
primary control system could not be engaged. However, the backup control system
could always be selected.
Side stick electronics.- The installation of a side stick required additional
electronics that could not be readily added to the backup control electronics boxes.
Therefore, the additional electronic networks needed to provide demodulation,
deadband, shaping, and gradient (fig. 8) were mechanized to interface between the
side stick transducer and the backup control electronics boxes. The triplex elec-
tronics concept was maintained from sensor output to the appropriate channel sum
points in the backup control electronics boxes.
Secondary Actuators
The secondary actuator (fig. 9) was a four-channel electrohydraulic actuator
designed to convert electrical signals to surface motion and to have two-fail-operate
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capability. There were five secondary actuators: two for roll, two for pitch, and
one for yaw. The mechanization of the secondary actuator was an active/standby
configuration which consisted of two valves in the active configuration and three
valves in the standby configuration. The secondary actuator was designed to be
controlled by any of the four electrohydraulic control channels. Each primary
channel commanded one active valve to position the actuator; the second valve, in
conjunction with the hydrologic failure detection network, was used for self-
monitoring. The actuator standby or backup channels commanded by the backup
control system consisted of three force-summed channels with electronic failuredetection.
Two-stage flapper nozzle servovalves were used for the primary system active
and monitor valves. During normal operation, these valves received separate
commands, and the active valve positioned the actuator ram as required. The fail-
ure detection for the primary control system was provided by a hydraulic comparator
network. A comparator spool was balanced between the force exerted by two
springs and the output pressures from the active and monitor spools. If a pressuredifference beyond a predetermined threshold existed, motion of the comparator
spool dumped the supply pressure to the return line, which caused the primary
engage valve to reposition and block the commands from the active servovalve.
Errors that could cause the hydrologic comparator to trip were measured in terms of
either single control surface deflection or commanded current. These were 40, 40,
and 1.50 for the elevator, aileron, and rudder control surfaces, respectively, or
one-half the maximum valve current.
A dual pressure switch was installed in the primary hydraulic circuit of each
secondary actuator to sense minimum pressure. The switch caused the primary servo
system to disengage at 4137 kN/m 2 , and a pressure of at least 5516 kN/m 2 was re-quired for manual reengagement. When the primary channel tripped, the pressure
switch opened, which caused the engage logic to automatically energize the three
solenoids in the backup control system and to transfer control to the three single-
stage jet pipe servovalves (servo systems 2, 3, and 4).
The backup system servos were monitored by differential pressure transducers
that were installed across the output legs of each jet pipe servovalve. Each differen-
tial pressure signal was compared with the other two differential pressure signalsfor each actuator. The comparison was made in the backup control electronics boxes.
The secondary actuators were modular in construction and were designed around
three tandem pistons on a common shaft. The primary channel and one backup con-
trol system channel shared one of the piston networks, and the remaining pistons
were controlled by the other two backup systems. Each secondary actuator was
supplied by two separate hydraulic systems. Figure 9 shows the secondary actuator
mechanization in the primary configuration.
The figure shows that the valve outputs of backup channels 2 and 4 were blockedby separate hydraulic engage valves and that the cylinders bypassed fluid as the ram
moved. Backup channel 3 was blocked by an engage valve with a slightly differentdesign.
The servo position loop was closed electrically for each channel in the elec-
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tronics boxes. The electrical signal utilized for the servo ram position came from
the quadruplex redundant LVDT in each servo actuator shaft. The stroke of all the
secondary actuators was 5 centimeters, and by utilizing the necessary mechanical
linkage, the desired control surface rotation was obtained for all five surfaces.
Response characteristics.- Ground test data were taken for each actuator with
different valve combinations. The performance of each secondary actuator was a
function of the engaged servovalves. The primary valves had much higher re-
sponse than the valves used in the backup servo systems (systems 2, 3, 4), but
because of hardware problems (ref. 1) the primary servo amplifier gain was
lowered.
A typical frequency response curve of the elevator secondary actuator with the
primary servovalve in control is shown in figure 10. The figure compares the flight
tested servo amplifier gain, 5 milliamperes per volt, with the designed servo ampli-
fier gain of 22 milliamperes per volt. Even though the pitch servo bandwidth flight
tested was 6 hertz, the addition of a second-order filter reduced the effective servo
bandwidth to 2.5 hertz. The total bandwidth of the filter, secondary actuator, and
elevator power actuator was 1.5 hertz for an elevator surface amplitude of 10 peak
to peak, normalized at 0.5 hertz.
The frequency response of the same pitch secondary actuator when controlled by
the backup control system valves is shown in figure 11. Data are compared for two
valve drive configurations. One data set was obtained with a single backup control
system channel valve in control of the secondary actuator. The other data set was
obtained with all three backup valves in control. The single backup control system
channel bandwidth was 7 hertz, and the bandwidth of the three backup control sys-
tem channels was 13 hertz. All three backup control system channels per airplane
control axis had the same servo loop gain, which indicates that the performance in-
crease was a result of the force summing of the secondary actuator pistons.
Hysteresis.- Hysteresis measurements were also taken for each secondary ac-
tuator for the various valve drive combinations. The data were obtained by driving
the appropriate servovalves with a signal generator set at 0.01 hertz. For example,
the hysteresis of the elevator secondary actuator for the primary channel (fig. 10)
was 0.440. By increasing the loop gain, this value could be reduced to 0.130. The
equivalent measurements for the two backup control system conditions presented in
figure 11 are 1.100 for the single-channel drive configuration and 0.470 for the
three-channel drive configuration.
A minor item of interest pertaining to the secondary actuators was observed dur-
ing single channel operation with the backup control system. Even though the elec-
trical commands to each paired surface, such as the aileron and elevator, were the
same, the control surfaces did not track each other during large control cycles.
This was caused by the component offset characteristics in the_serv_o_loopaswell-as-
by the seal-ffTitio-f-the respective actuator channel. A given servo system took
more current to retract the ram for the left control surface than the right control
surface and less current to extend the left than the right. From outside the airplane
the control surfaces did not appear to track. This was most noticeable with the ele-
vator surfaces. This condition existed with every actuator, and there was no way to
adjust the offset. When additional servo systems were engaged, the condition was
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minimized and the agreement between the deflections of the paired surfaces was good.
The condition was not apparent with the primary control system engaged
because of the higher bandwidth servovalve and pressure gain.
Electrical Power
The electrical power for the operation of the F-8C aircraft was supplied by the
main generator power package. This unit was comprised of ac and dc brushless
generators that were mounted on a common shaft, regulators for the generators, an
air turbine motor, and the necessary reduction gears. Energy for the turbine was
supplied by high pressure bleed air from the engine. The ac generator was rated at
12 kilovolt amperes at 115 volts and 400 hertz. The de capacity was 68 amperes at
30 volts. An emergency power package supplied backup electrical power as well as
a hydraulic pump driven from a ram air turbine. The capacity of this unit was
30 amperes of dc and 4.2 kilovolt amperes of 400-hertz power. Figure 12 shows the
power distribution system of the F-8 digital fly-by-wire airplane.
The power requirements of the fly-by-wire system were determined by the char-
acteristics of the Apollo equipment. This equipment limited the ripple, spike, and
surge voltages on the nominal 28-volt bus to a maximum of 32.5 volts and a minimum
of 24.5 volts, with a peak current demand of 60 amperes. These requirements, in
addition to a requirement for an estimated 30 amperes for the backup control system,
made it necessary to install an additional power source in the airplane. Therefore,
a direct-drive, 100-ampere, 32-volt dc flight control system generator was mounted
in the nose cone of the engine. The voltage regulator was set to provide 28-volt
power at the primary (number 1) bus. To give the additional protection required by
the Apollo equipment, zener diodes and a 55,000-microfarad capacitor were placed
on the number 1 bus. Flight control system power was controlled from the cockpit
through normally closed power relay contacts. A warning indicator informed the
pilot of loss of generator power.
To provide the necessary redundancy, 28-volt power was divided into four sep-
arate busses by isolation diodes and circuit breakers (fig. 12). Each bus, one for the
primary system and one each for the triply redundant backup control system, had a
24-volt, 11-ampere-hour nickel cadmium battery as an alternate source of power.
Backup control system batteries were always on the line, and they were kept fully
charged by a constant trickle charge. They could provide power for a minimum of
1 hour after the loss of the flight control system generator. For additional protection,
it was made possible for the pilot to place the main de generator on the backup control
system busses with normal loads reduced. To assist the pilot in monitoring the con-
dition of the backup control system battery, a battery capacity meter was installed in
the cockpit. This device measured current flowing into or out of the battery in
terms of percent of full charge. It was not intended for the number 1 battery to
supply the primary system with power for more than a few minutes. Its sole purpose
was to aid in the stabilization of the bus voltage and to allow operation during tem-
porary power interrupts like those that occurred during bus switching. For the pro-
tection of the number 1 battery, a circuit was installed to remove the battery from the
bus whenever voltage dropped below 20 volts.
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OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE
The first operational experience with the F-8 digital fly-by-wire control system
was acquired during the integration and checkout of control system components in an
iron bird simulator (paper 2). The simulator was used to fine tune the control sys-
tem to give it the necessary authority, trim rates, servo loop gains, and comparator
trip levels. Before the first flight, the entire flight control system was subjected to
an extensive ground test program that lasted 7 months. During this period, two
major hardware changes were made. Because of the nonlinear characteristics of the
Apollo hardware (ref. 1) unacceptable noise was transmitted to the secondary
actuators. A second-order filter network was installed to smooth the primary system
electronics. The backup control system integrators were changed to digital from
analog because of drift.
Backup Control System Flight Evaluation
Before the first flight, the backup control system was tailored to the primary
channel gearing and trim rates in each airplane axis. The flight controllability of
the primary control system and the backup control system was evaluated on the sim-
ulator. Since the sole purpose of the backup control system was to provide an emer-
gency return-home capability if the primary system became inoperative, the flight
testing of the backup system was minimal. The testing did insure that the backup
system would provide acceptable controllability, and at least once per flight the F-8
digital fly-by-wire control system was downmoded to the backup control system to
perform an inertial measurement unit alinement. This was done in level flight.
Center stick.- The piloting tasks used to evaluate the backup control system
with the center stick paralleled those used to evaluate the primary control system in
the direct mode. The evaluation maneuvers included routine flying while evaluating
gross and fine control maneuvers, formation flight, and gunsight tracking. The
low-speed evaluations included ground control approaches. The first flight evalua-
tion took place at speeds between 275 and 300 knots indicated airspeed with routine
flying maneuvers. The pilot comments indicated that roll response was adequate
and pitch control was good at these flight conditions. The airplane also exhibited
satisfactory handling qualities and control power in the landing approach. During
subsequent flights, the airplane seemed sensitive in the roll axis, and in a more
demanding control task, that is, formation flight, the pilot indicated that airplane
roll response became too oscillatory (paper 7). He assigned the task a pilot rating
of 6 on the Cooper-Harper scale (ref. 2). The lateral sensitivity problem was
reduced by adding electrical deadband to the roll stick command signals. The
modification yielded the roll gearing shown in figure 4(b). Even though the backup
control system roll gearing was approximately the same as that in a conventional
F-8C airplane, some pilots commented that the airplane rolled a little faster than
they liked for a given stick displacement at 300 knots indicated airspeed. However,
they felt that the roll response was not overly sensitive. A viscous damper was
added to the aileron stick linkage to improve the dynamic stick characteristics for
both the primary and the backup control systems.
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For the first eight flights of the F-8 digital fly-by-wire airplane, a linear trans-
ducer was used in the pitch axis of the backup control system. As flight speeds
increased, a longitudinal sensitivity problem was observed by the pilot in both the
primary and the backup control systems. This problem was solved by reducing the
slope of the curve around zero but maintaining the previous control authority. Be-
cause of the inflexibility of the design of the backup control electronics boxes, non-
linear characteristics were obtained by having a stick transducer manufactured that
was similar to the original but gave the desired curve shape. The pitch modification
and appropriate scaling change in the backup control electronics boxes resulted in
the backup control system pitch gearing presented in figure 4(a). Subsequent flight
evaluations indicated that control was satisfactory in cruise as well as in the landing
approach. In normal flight, the airplane's control characteristics with the backup
control system were similar to those in the primary control system's direct (unaug-
mented) mode. For maneuvers that required large changes in pitch, however, such
as gunsight tracking during windup turns, the pilots preferred the backup control
system to the primary control system because of its smoother pitch response. The
characteristics of the primary channel were poorer because of stick quantization(paper 6).
The trim switches for the backup control system pitch and roll axes were on the
left cockpit console just forward of the throttle control. During the evaluation of
the backup control system, it became apparent that the location of the trim switches
was undesirable. One pilot rating was at least one number higher (poorer) because
of the additional workload due to this location. Beginning with the side stick evalua-
tion phase of the flight testing, the backup trim was activated from the conventional
center stick trim switch.
Side stick.- The side stick was evaluated primarily by two pilots during six
flights. Six other flights were flown by four pilots who were evaluating other fea-
tures of the control system. Although the side stick gradients were not optimized,
the side stick controller was considered to be of interest in the overall control sys-
tem evaluation. Side stick evaluation tasks included formation flight, gunsight
tracking, mild aerobatics, ground control approaches, landing, and takeoff. Since
takeoff was considered the most uncertain phase of flight, it was performed only
after side stick control was evaluated in a high pilot gain task during up and awayflight. During the 12 evaluation flights, three takeoffs and seven landings utilizing
the side stick controller were made.
The stick gradients selected for flight test were based upon the six-degree-of-
freedom simulation results obtained with the iron bird simulator. The stick-to-
surface gradients were selectable, as shown in figures 5(a) and 5(b). The wing-down gradients selected by most of the pilots were position 1 in pitch and position 3in roll. The roll gradients were not changed during any of the flights, whereas a
slight change was made in the pitch axis. The original transition, or knee, of the
curve between the low and high gradients was at approximately 36 newtons, and
this value was increased to approximately 57 newtons for the last three flights.
All the pilots adapted easily to the side stick controller in flight after practice
on the simulator. They all commented on the sensitivity of the pitch axis, particu-larly in high pilot gain tasks like formation flight. The center stick was also some-
what sensitive, but the excursions were lower in amplitude. Some of the pilots
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tended to fly both pitch and roll with a pulsing type of input. Most pilots tended to
hold a nose-up stick force during the various maneuvers. The value they used was
approximately 23 newtons, which was outside the stick deadband. One of the six
pilots noted arm fatigue after a flight in which he evaluated side stick control. Sev-
eral pilots rated the formation flight control task 3 to 5.
As discussed in paper 7, gunsight tracking was typified by good to excellent
control over the lateral-directional axis and continuous pitch oscillations caused by
pitch commands that were too abrupt. Crosstalk was absent in the tracking task.
A comparison between a side stick-controlled and a center stick-controlled tracking
run showed a higher frequency output from the force side stick, indicating a higher
pilot workload.
The wing-up stick force gradients were evaluated in the power approach con-
figuration for pitch out maneuvers and ground control approach patterns. Many of
the approaches were flown in light turbulence, which seemed to have little adverse
effect on control. Pitch and roll control was adequate, and pilot ratings ranged
from 2 to 4 for the landing approach task.
Synchronization Performance
An important design requirement for a backup control system is that it track
the primary system closely to minimize the switching transients. Therefore, syn-
chronization networks were used to keep the systems synchronized. During every
flight, the primary system was downmoded to the backup control system at least
once to aline the inertial measurement unit in level flight.
Thus, downmoding to the backup control system was checked approximately
40 times. The surface transients were always less than 10. The transients observed
during these downmodes were caused primarily by the differences in null between
the primary and the three backup servovalves of each secondary actuator. Overall,
the system's static performance was good.
Simulation studies on the iron bird simulator showed that the synchronization
network bandwidth of 2.5 hertz provided satisfactory backup control system track-
ing of the primary system for all except abrupt stick commands. The 
simulator
studies also indicated that the synchronization/trim network characteristics could
produce a large out-of-trim condition during a dynamic downmode if stick or pedal
commands were being applied. The corrective action was to trim out the stick or
pedal signal present at the time of the downmode.
Trim
The backup control system was mechanized with a digital integrator for trimming
the backup control system and for synchronizing the backup control system with the
engaged primary system. Since the control systems had to be synchronized 
over the
full authority of the control surfaces, the integrator had to be scaled for full control
authority. This resulted in an integrator resolution of 0.180, 0.300, and 0.200 for
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elevator, aileron, and rudder, respectively. Trimming a control surface became
a stepping operation and was not precise.
Hydraulics
The conventional F-8C hydraulic systems were not changed except for the addi-tion of the F-8 digital fly-by-wire secondary actuators. Two hydraulic pumps eachdelivered a maximum of 45 liters per minute at a nominal pressure of 20,684 kN/m 2This capacity was marginal during two operations. At idle power, the hydraulicflow was inadequate to support preflight self-tests. A power setting of 80 percent
proved to be satisfactory and was used for airplane ground checks. The self-testswere designed to operate in all three axes or one axis at a time. The latter proce-dure was used most often, although the three-axis tests were completed in approxi-
mately 4 minutes. During landing at idle power, high control surface activity
caused the hydraulic pressure to drop, which caused the secondary actuator pres-sure switches to downmode the F-8 digital fly-by-wire system from the primary tothe backup control system. This occurred during two landing rollouts, but no con-trol system transients were observed by the pilot.
CONTROL SYSTEM RELIABILITY
The primary and backup control systems operated approximately 2500 hoursduring the fly-by-wire program, including both aircraft and iron bird operation,without any major problems. Six evaluation pilots flew the F-8 digital fly-by-wireairplane 42 times for a total flight time of 58 hours. Because of its length, the pro-gram was not expected to establish a level of confidence in fly-by-wire control sys-tems, but it did constitute a first step toward developing such confidence. Fromthe first flight, the airplane was flown with a control system that had no mechanicalbackup or reversion capability. During the evaluation flights, there were no sys-tem failures that could be attributed to the fly-by-wire aspect of the digital flightcontrol system. There were no electronic failures in flight in either the digitalprimary system or the backup control system. There was one hydraulic line failurethat reduced the total system redundancy level from four channels to two channels,but flight was no more critical than it would have been if a similar failure had
occurred in a standard F-8C airplane. This is discussed in more detail below.
In addition to the reliability of the total system, it is important to discuss the
reliability of the elements of the system. Table 1 summarizes the discrepancies thatoccurred in the F-8 digital fly-by-wire control system. The table includes the dis-crepancies experienced with the iron bird simulator as well as those experienced
with the F-8 digital fly-by-wire airplane. Discrepancies observed during groundoperation, preflight testing, and in flight are listed by major system component. Adiscrepancy was any system operation that appeared to be abnormal. Some wereminor transient effects that did not affect the system's performance or reliability.The number of discrepancies that required a repair or replacement action is indi-cated. Even if no repair was required, extensive tests were made to insure that thecomponent in question performed as designed.
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The discrepancies listed for the computer and related hardware, which are dis-
cussed in paper 6, are listed here to present an overview of the operational prob-
lems encountered during the program A coolant system designed specifically for the
Apollo system used on the F-8 digital fly-by-wire airplane caused one flight to be
canceled before takeoff and one flight to be terminated early. The coolant system
problem was attributed to lines that were frozen and did not permit the coolant to
flow through the cold plates. When this occurred in flight, the coolant system was
being monitored and the flight was terminated before it affected the control system.
The pilot continued to fly on the digital primary system, and four channel redun-
dancy was retained through landing. This problem was unique to the Apollo equip-
ment and therefore would not be expected in production fly-by-wire systems.
Three power turn-on problems were observed, two with the backup electronics
and one with the primary electronics. On one occasion, measurements indicated that
the voltage supply for the primary electronics was not present. Recycling the power
switch brought the power supply on line, and during subsequent testing the problem
did not reappear. Laboratory testing did not reveal the cause of the problem, but a
similar power turn-on indication was obtained by grounding either the plus or minus
power supply.
Six failures due to open buffer resistors were recorded in the primary and back-
up electronics early in the program. It was discovered that the resistance wire 
in
these resistors was affected by chemical or electrolytic corrosion. All the buffer
resistors were replaced by a different type of resistor, and no other problems of
this type were encountered. The other component failures listed were caused by an
intermittently functioning capacitor, a failed zener diode, and an open transistor.
None of these occurred in flight, and all were detected through normal testing pro-
cedures. During the flight program there were 12 backup electronic comparator
tripouts, but the redundancy level of the total system was not affected. Ground
checkout indicated that there were no failed components.
The secondary actuator discrepancies consisted of component failures, problems
related to differential pressure, and differential pressure comparator tripouts. With
25 servovalves, 20 engage solenoids, and 20 differential pressure transducers in the
airplane, occasional problems were expected. The servovalve was the only second-
ary actuator component to fail. Three such failures occurred in the aircraft 
system.
They were detected during ground tests and repaired. If such a failure had occurred
in flight it would have caused the loss of one of the four actuator channels.
As the table shows, the largest number of discrepancies occurred in the second-
ary actuator differential pressure network. Four aborted takeoffs were charged
against the differential pressure network, as well as four in-flight and 26 preflight
differential pressure comparator tripouts. Most of these discrepancies were classi-
fied as nuisance tripouts and occurred during control cycles whenever the primary
system was engaged. All comparator tripouts were resettable by the pilot, 
and the
total system's redundancy was not affected. Generally speaking, most of the differ-
ential pressure problems experienced were caused by a tracking error between the
various differential pressure signals, which caused the servo comparators to trip.
This frequently occurred at the maximum travel of the actuator, where the differen-
tial pressure signals were the highest. These nuisance tripouts were caused by a
55
combination of the various components' tolerances and valve nulls, and were pre-dictable for certain stick motions. The problem could be resolved by adding nullingcapability to the servo loop to balance the various differential pressure signals.
Another problem associated with the differential pressure monitoring systemwas the inability to detect some of the open failures. Unless the ram was stationary,it was difficult to develop the differential pressure necessary to disengage thefaulty servo channel. As a result, a latent channel failure could occur in flight inthe backup control system and not be indicated to the pilot. However, no such fail-
ures occurred during the program.
Six discrepancies were attributed to system wiring and aircraft power distri-bution. Four involved, respectively, a pin that was pushed back in a connector,a short-circuited cable clamp, a defective latching relay, and a faulty battery capac-ity meter. The faulty items were identified and repaired during the regular air-
plane preflight. Two flights were aborted because of aircraft power problems. Onewas due to a checklist error that allowed the flight control system generator to re-main off, causing a low-voltage shutdown of the computer, and the other was due toa main generator failure. All those discrepancies were considered to be typical air-plane operating problems and not unique to fly-by-wire control systems.
Four discrepancies that affected or would have affected the digital fly-by-wire
system occurred in the aircraft hydraulics systems, and all required repair action.Hydraulic leaks that caused two flights to be cancelled were detected in the second-ary actuators. During one flight, hydraulic oil was seen streaming along the out-
side of the airplane, and as a precautionary measure the flight was terminated andthe airplane returned for a normal landing. During another flight, a hydraulic lineruptured, causing a loss of hydraulic pressure to backup channels 2 and 4. Thehydraulic line was part of the basic F-8C hydraulic system that was not modified forthe program. The loss of hydraulic pressure was detected by the pilot from theconventional F-8C hydraulic pressure gages and warning lights. The pilot terminatedthe flight and landed the airplane with the primary control system. Hydraulic linefailures are rare but serious for flight control systems that depend on irreversiblehydraulic actuators, such as those being used in all high-performance fighter andbomber aircraft and many new transport aircraft. Protection against hydraulicsystem failure is provided by using dual or triple hydraulic systems. Experiencewith aircraft that use irreversible actuators has shown the protection provided bythis practice to be adequate.
As the table shows, similar operating problems were experienced with the ironbird control system. All the simulation systems were flight qualified and could beflown on the airplane except the mechanizations of the primary and backup elec-tronics, which were not maintained with flight system quality control. The experi-ence obtained during the almost 2500 hours of operating time on the iron bird andthe F-8 digital fly-by-wire airplane is indicative of what could be expected of asimilar period on the aircraft system.
Although many component discrepancies occurred during the program, theywere detected by the monitoring system and testing procedures, and the reliabilityof the total system was maintained throughout the program.
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CONCLUDING REMARKS
A digital fly-by-wire control system with a triplex analog backup control sys-
tem was flight tested in an F-8C airplane. Six pilots logged 58 flight hours during
42 flights. The backup control system operated well in conjunction with the digital
primary system and provided satisfactory handling qualities throughout the flight
envelope evaluated. This experience showed that a dissimilar control system can
be made to synchronize with the primary flight control system and provide satis-
factory control during normal flight maneuvers.
A limited flight test program was flown to evaluate airplane handling qualities
with a force side stick controller through the backup control system. Even though
side stick force gradients were not optimized, the control of the airplane in a variety
of control tasks, including takeoff, landing, and formation flight, was satisfactory.
The operational reliability of the digital fly-by-wire system, both primary and
backup, was excellent. There were no downmodes from the digital primary con-
trol system to the backup control system in flight due to real or apparent system
failures. Several component discrepancies occurred within the redundant system,
but they did not affect the reliability of the total system. Most of the discrepancies
were in the secondary actuator differential pressure network and were nuisance
tripouts (capable of being reset) within the backup control system during large
control inputs to the digital primary control system.
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TABLE 1.- F-8 DIGITAL FLY-BY-WIRE CONTROL SYSTEM DISCREPANCIES
Iron bird simulator F-8 digital fly-by-wire airplane
Total Repair action Total Repair actiondiscrepancies required discrepancies required Preflight In flight
Primary system
Computer (program characteristics) 4 0 6 0 0 0Related hardware - mode panel, stick transducer, 1 4 3 0 0pallet signal boxes, inertial measurement unit
Coolant system 2 0 2 2 a Ial
Primary control electronics
Power 0 1 0 0 0Components 0 0 2 2 0 0
Backup control electronics
Power
Components 0 O 7 7 a 0Electronic comparator (tripouts) 0 0 12 7 a0 12
Secondary actuators
Components G 5 3 3 0 0Differential pressure related 2 0 5 4 a 4  0Differential pressure comparator (tripouts) 0 0 30 0 26 4
Aircraft and system wiring 0 0 2 2 0 0
Aircraft power 0 0 4 3 a 2 0
Aircraft hydraulics
O. O O 4 4 a2  a,b2
SaFlight terminated.
bSystem redundancy reduced to two channels on
one flight.
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to electronics Active
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Stick transdu cers
Synch roni izat ion Surface power
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Baku lectr nics
Side stick electronics
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Figure 1. F-8 digital fly-by-wire control system.
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Figure 2. Self-test unit.
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Figure 3. Components of F-8 digital fly-by-wire control system.
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(a) Pitch.
Figure 4. Comparison of conventional F-8C and F-8 digital fly-by-wire
backup control system pitch, roll, and yaw axis gearing.
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Figure 4. Continued.
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Figure 5. Side stick gearing in pitch and roll axes.
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Figure 9. Hydraulics of secondary actuator with primary channel
in control and channels 2, 3, and 4 in standby configuration.
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Figure 10. Comparison of elevator secondary actuator frequency response controlled
with off-design and design gains of primary servo amplifier.
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Figure 11. Comparison of elevator secondary actuator frequency
response controlled with backup control system valves.
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Figure 12. Simplified diagram of F-8 DFBW power distribution system.
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SUMMARY
Present practices in lightning protection of aircraft
deal primarily with the DIRECT EFFECTS of lightning, such as
structural damage and ignition of fuel vapors. There is
increasing evidence of troublesome electromagnetic effects,
however, in aircraft employing solid-state microelectronics in
critical navigation, instrumentation and control functions.
The potential impact of these INDIRECT EFFECTS on critical
systems such as Digital Fly-by-Wire (DFBW) flight controls has
been studied by several recent research programs, including an
experimental study of lightning-induced voltages in the NASA
F8 DFBW airplane. The results indicate a need for positive
steps to be taken during the design of future fly-by-wire sys-
tems to minimize the possibility of hazardous effects from
lightning.
INTRODUCTION
Present practices in lightning protection of aircraft
deal predominantly with what may be called the DIRECT EFFECTS
of lightning, including burning, blasting and physical defor-
mation of skins and structural elements. Existing lightning
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protection specifications, such as MIL-B-5087B, (Bonding,
Electrical, and Lightning Protection, for Aerospace Systems)
concentrate on electrical bonding and its function in mini-
mizing-.these effects, Other criteria such as FAA AdvisoryCircular'No. A C25-'A, provide guidance for protection against
lightning ignition of flammable fuel-air mixtures. Concern
with these effects has been necessary since safety of flight
in a lightning environment has heretofore primarily depended
upon protection against fuel ignition and structural damage
that can be produced by lightning. There is increasing evi-dence of troublesome electromagnetic effects due to lightning,
however, as a result of transient surge voltages induced in
aircraft electrical wiring. These voltages have caused both
permanent damage and temporary malfunction of equipment.
Earlier vacuum tube electronics were inherently less
vulnerable to lightning-induced voltage surges; however, the
newer generations of modern, solid state microcircuitry are
increasingly more vulnerable to upset or damage from such
effects. Because these are electromagnetically induced ef-fects, they are often referred to as the INDIRECT EFFECTS oflightning. Recently, these effects have been receiving addi-
tional attention since the flight safety of modern aircraft isincreasingly dependent on reliable operation of critical
electronic systems. At present there are no standards or
specifications applicable to the INDIRECT EFFECTS of lightning.
With the advent of fly-by-wire systems, particularly
those with digital computer and control electronics, the in-direct effects of lightning very clearly have the potential of
presenting a hazard to safety of flight. This hazard may beparticularly acute for digital systems. While most practical
digital fly-by-wire systems would include multiple redundant
control circuits it is possible to conceive of a situation in
which the high level electromagnetic interference produced bylightning could interfere with all channels of a fly-by-wire
system at once, raising the possibility that there may in fact
be no real redundance with respect to lightning effects.
The NASA Flight Research Center has developed and is
presently demonstrating a digital fly-by-wire (DFBW) flight
control system in an F8 aircraft. Recognizing the possibility
of this hazard, a program was implemented with General Electricto evaluate the possible electromagnetic effects of lightning
on this flight control system and obtain data for use in mini-
mizing these effects in future generations of fly-by-wire air-
craft. The F8 DFBW system was not designed to withstand light-ning strike effects. Therefore, the opportunity existed to
experimentally determine the severity of effects in this unpro-tected system, thus providing test data upon which to base
design guidelines for protection of future systems.
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SYMBOLS
A/C Aircraft
AGC Apollo Guidance Computer (DFCS computer)
BCS Backup Control System
DFCS Digital Flight Control System
DFBW Digital Fly by Wire
IR Structural ohmic resistive voltages
i Lightning current
TEST AND MEASUREMENT TECHNIQUE
A recently developed simulated lightning test and measure-
ment system known as the TRANSIENT ANALYSIS technique offers a
means of investigating the electromagnetic effects of light-
ning without hazard to the aircraft being tested. This tech-
nique, the development of which was sponsored by the Aerospace
Safety Research and Data Institute of NASA-Lewis Research
Center (Ref. 1), consists of injecting current surges into an
aircraft, of the same waveshape as those produced by lightning
but of greatly reduced amplitude. The responses of the air-
craft's electrical circuits to these current surges can be
measured and then extrapolated to correspond with full light-
ning stroke amplitudes to determine if they present a hazard to
the equipment under test. During the development of this
technique, tests were made to show that the response of an
aircraft electrical system was linear with lightning current
amplitude and that this extrapolation was valid. The transient
analysis technique was utilized in the study of the NASA F8
DFBW aircraft in this program. A photograph of the aircraft
and test setup is shown in Figure 1.
The test circuit is shown on Figure 2(a). The airframe is
connected to ground at the point nearest the terminals of the
circuit being measured via a 36 inch wide, 3 mil aluminum foil.
This was attached to the instrument table and the hangar ground
about 20 feet away. Use of the aluminum foil provides a very
low impedance between the airframe and instrument table. The
instrument cable was placed along this foil so that no air gap
existed between it and the foil. As shown on Figure 2(b), the
lightning current circuit is grounded once and only via this
airframe ground foil. Consequently, no simulated lightning
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current could flow off of the airframe along this path or theinstrument cable shield and get back to the transient analyzer.
Most of the tests were made with a unidirectional simu-lated lightning stroke current rising to its crest in 2.75
microseconds and decaying to half value after 60 microseconds.This waveform is representative of natural lightning stroke
waveforms and is similar to the waveform specified for indirect
effects testing of the Space Shuttle. Its crest amplitude was
set at 300 amperes to minimize the possibility of interference
or damage to any of the electronic systems or components aboard
the aircraft. Natural lightning strokes exceed 200,000 amperes
about 1% of the time and average about 30,000 amperes in ampli-
tude. Therefore, voltages induced by this waveform must be
extrapolated upward by a factor of 100 to correspond with an
average lightning stroke or 670 to correspond with a severe
200 kA stroke. The test current waveform is shown on Figure 2a.
It will be noted that damped oscillations appear on thetest current wavefront. These are believed to be the result
of traveling wave reflections in the transmission line formed
by the aircraft and return conductor beneath it. Measurements
were made of the current entering as well as leaving the air-
craft, verifying that the superimposed oscillations flowed
through the aircraft along with the fundamental current wave-form. The extent to which oscillations or "jagged edges" occur
in natural lightning current wavefronts is not well known,
although available oscillographic data (Ref. 2) does show
evidence of such occurrences in some strokes.
Induced voltages were measured by a Tektronix Type 545
oscilloscope with a Tektronix Type G differential pre-amplifier.
The differential measurement system previously developed for
this technique and described in Ref. 1 was utilized. Onechannel of the measurement circuit was normally connected to
the circuit conductor being measured, and the other channel wasconnected to the DFCS ground, airframe ground or circuit low
side, as required for the measurement being made. The pre-
amplifier subtracted the signal on the second channel from that
on the first so that common-mode errors induced in the instru-
ment cable would not appear in the measurement.
Measurements were made with the DFBW system powered withbatteries and operating in the primary mode. Access to mostcircuits was made with break-out boxes at important interfaces
in order to maintain circuit continuity, although some measure-
ments were made at opened interfaces to obtain measurements of
open-circuit voltages at cable ends.
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DESCRIPTION OF DFBW SYSTEM
The F8 digital fly-by-wire flight control system compo-
nents are shown in Figure 3. A single digital primary channel
and triple redundant electrical analog backup channels replaced
the F8 mechanical control system. The primary and backup
channels all provide three-axis control of the airplane. The
digital channel consists of a lunar guidance computer, inertial
measurement unit, coupling data unit, and astronaut display
and keyboard, all taken from the Apollo guidance and navigation
system. A mode and power panel permits the pilot to request
the lunar guidance computer to make mode and gain changes. The
three-channel backup control system consists only of surface
position command electronics. Specially designed electro-
hydraulic secondary actuators interface the primary and backup
electronic commands with the conventional F8 control surface
power actuators.
Figure 4 shows the general arrangement of the flight con-
trol system hardware in the F8 airplane. Five secondary
actuators were required, one for the rudder and one each for
the two horizontal stabilizers and the two ailerons. The Apollo
lunar guidance computer is the heart of the primary control
system and performs all flight control computations.
The DFBW system is described in more detail in Reference 3.
TEST RESULTS
Measurements were made at a variety of primary and backup
system interfaces. Of greatest interest were the induced volt-
ages appearing at the wiring interfaces with the primary DFCS
system, which includes the Apollo lunar guidance computer (AGC).
Figures 5, 6 and 7 show some of the measurements. For all of
these measurements the simulated lightning current entered the
nose and exited from the tail of the aircraft. Figure 5 shows
measurements made at the J25 interface on circuits coming from
the mode and power control panel and stick, BCS and yaw trim
transducers in the cockpit area. These appear as damped oscil-
lations at a fundamental frequency of about 1 megahertz. Most
of the voltage has subsided after about 6 microseconds has
elapsed. Each voltage shown on Figure 5 is a damped oscillation
at a fundamental frequency of about 1 megahertz since all con-
ductors follow the same bundle to the cockpit. The waveforms
have slight variations which are probably due to differences in
load impedances at each end.
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Figure 6 shows voltages induced in the pitch, roll and yaw
control sensor circuits coming to the DFCS computer, but the
measurements were made at plug P4 with this plug disconnectedfrom the DFCS system. These, therefore, are open circuit volt-
ages and are not necessarily the same as the voltages which
might appear at the closed interface, since DFCS input impedances
would affect the voltages impressed across them. The charac-
teristic frequencies of the open-circuit voltages measured atpins D-E (osc. 528), G-H (osc. 525), W-X (osc. 523) and Y-Z(osc. 526) have a fundamental frequency of about 1.7 megahertz
with lower amplitude oscillations of several higher frequencies
superimposed. These are induced in circuits coming from the
DFCS stick transducer in the cockpit. The fundamental fre-
quency of voltages measured at pins A-B (osc. 524) and U-V(osc. 527) in circuits coming from the rudder pedal
transducer in the tail area is also 1.7 megahertz but withoutas much of the superimposed higher frequency component. Neither
fundamental frequency is the same as that measured at the closed
J25 interface in circuits also coming from the cockpit area.
The closed circuit J2 interface measurements shown onFigure 7 are of the same 1 megahertz fundamental as those mea-
sured at the J25 interface of Figure 5, except that the polarity
is reversed.
DISCUSSION OF RESULTS
Induced Voltages
Study of the induced voltages measured in this system indi-cates that they are primarily of aperture magnetic flux origin
due to the absence of long-duration unidirectional components
induced by diffusion magnetic flux appearing inside the airframe
when lightning current has diffused to the inside of its skin.Indications of structural IR voltage components are also absent,
as expected, since the system is single-point grounded and hasno direct reference to the airframe at locations remote fromthe DFCS pallet where these measurements were made. The single-
point ground to the airframe is at the DFCS pallet.
The most prevalent frequency of oscillation of induced
voltages measured at the DFCS interface is about 1 megahertz.
This is not the same frequency as the oscillations superimposed
on the simulated lightning current wavefront, which is 2.6 mega-
hertz. If fact, there is no similarity between this frequency
and that of induced voltages measured anywhere in the DFCS
system. Fourier transformations were made to determine the
frequency spectral distribution of the actual lightning test
waveform as compared with an idealized smooth-front waveform.
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Spectral peaks above the smooth-front waveform distribution
occur in the test waveform distribution at 2.5, 5 and 8 mega-
hertz, but not at the 1 megahertz frequency of the induced
voltages measured at the DFCS interfaces.
The induced voltages reach their maximum during the first
several microseconds of lightning current flow, which is when
the lightning current and corresponding aperture flux are
changing most rapidly. Continued oscillations appearing for
several more microseconds are most likely the result of subse-
quent traveling waves in the circuit being measured. 
If this
is so, the frequency of these voltages is primarily a function
of the distributed circuit inductance and capacitances.
The variation in fundamental frequencies and presence of
more than one frequency component in a single voltage is prob-
ably due to variations in circuit routing and interconnections
with other circuits in the system.
The ranges of voltage amplitudes measured at the DFCS
interfaces, when scaled to a 200,000 ampere (fast) lightning
waveform, are presented in Table I.
Table I - Range of Induced Voltage Amplitudes
(Scaled to iL = 200 kA)
INDUCED VOLTAGE AMPLITUDE
INTERFACE (0 - Peak Volts)
MIN. MAX.
Stick Trim and MPC Inputs to DFCS(J25) 233 900
Stick Transducer Inputs to DFCS(P4) 40 87
DFCS Control Outputs(J2) 233 400
BCS Control Inputs(J12) 222 422
Mode and Power Control(J15) 833 1132
Mode and Power Control(J14) 213 732
Power Dist. Bay (+28VDC BUS) 160 200
DFCS Ground to A/C Ground - 666
Voltages measured at other locations in the DFBW system,
such as at the secondary actuators and BCS electronics, were of
generally similar magnitudes.
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Impact on DFCS System
The expected impact of the induced voltages measured in theDFCS system on system operation was analyzed by DELCO Electronicsmanufacturer of the DFCS. Comparison of individual component
vulnerability data, when available, with induced voltage levels
at single circuit interfaces was utilized to determine vulnera-bility of system components and effect on circuit operation. Inother cases, best engineering judgment was used. An example of
such an assessment is the attitude (yaw, pitch or roll) gainlogic power circuits (pins A-W) from the MPC panel to the DFCSpallet. The schematic diagram of one of these circuits is shownon Figure 8. Induced voltages at the J25 interface are shown
on Figure 5 (i.e. osc. 505). The voltages at the J25 interface(DFCS) ranged from 566 to 865 volts, and at the J15 interface(MPC), 1065 to 1132 volts. At the MPC, the induced voltage
exceeds the 1000 volt (at sea level) dielectric breakdown ratingof the switch. Arc-over may therefore occur either to case andmounting or between contacts, with a possibility of switch fail-
ure.
This circuit (+28 VDC) provides a request to the computerto change attitude control loop gain. If the wiper arm of the
switch burns open, the computer will notice no gain requestsand under this condition is programmed to assume attitude gainposition 1. The DFCS control will survive at this gain position.If the switch would short such that two gain-position requestsexist, the computer is programmed to assume the lower gain ofthe two requests. The DFCS control will survive.
At the AGC, the induced voltage exceeds the 500 volt dielec-
tric breakdown rating of the 20K resistor, R2. Arc-over of R2may then expose capacitor Cl to damaging overvoltage, causingit to short circuit. If it remains shorted during the entirelightning flash, no further damage should occur. If Cl opensbetween successive strokes of a multiple stroke flash, arc-
over(s) of the 1.5K resistor R4 on successive strokes may per-manently destroy transistor Ql. If Cl-is short circuited, theAGC gain change circuit will be inhibited. Selection of thisgain position after the lightning flash will cause the computer
to select attitude gain position 1. The DFCS control will sur-vive at that gain position. The same applies if transistor Q1fails.
As another example, the DFCS digital control output cir-cuits are considered. The schematic diagram of these circuitsis shown on Figure 9. Induced voltages measured at the J2interface are shown on Figure 7 and range from 233 to 400 volts.Those measured at the P12 end ranged between 222 and 422 volts.At the DFCS, capacitor C2 has a 15V rating. Therefore it would
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break down as a short circuit. The capacitor could then fail as
an open circuit. In either case the remaining circuit compo-
nents would probably survive the lightning stroke. These are
dual circuits which provide attitude commands which are utilized
as control surface inputs. The dual outputs are compared to
each other for failure detection purposes. Since capacitor C2
can be failed as an open or short circuit, several combinations
were considered. If C2 is shorted as a dual output, no failure
detection would occur. The pilot would discover that a problem
existed only by noting the lack of aircraft response to control
stick position. If one of the dual command outputs contained
C2 open circuited and the other short circuited, any off-neutral
control stick position would trigger the failure detection
circuit which would remove that attitude axis control from DFCS
to the BCS. In the case of C2 open-circuted as a dual output,
DFCS aircraft attitude control could be maintained.
Other individual circuits were assessed in the same manner,
Failure in some circuits is likely to degrade DFCS performance,
but in others, the consequences appear minimal. It is evident,
from Figures 5, 6 and 7, that lightning-induced voltages appear
simultaneously in all DFCS circuits.
They also appeared in the 3 BCS channels. Thus, the con-
sequences of simultaneous failures in many circuits must be
fully assessed before the total impact on system operation can
be determined. This has not been accomplished for this system.
In general, however, it was found that many DFCS components
are vulnerable to the induced voltages expected from a 200,000-
ampere lightning stroke. The most vulnerable components are
capacitors, transistors, and relay arc-suppression diodes.
The least vulnerable components that may be damaged are switches,
relays, forward loop diodes, and inductors.
It should be remembered that the DFCS equipment is an
adaption of existing Apollo Lunar Module equipment that was not
designed to survive lightning-induced voltages, and also, that
a 200,000 ampere stroke is likely to occur only about 1% of the
time. The average amplitude is about 30,000 amperes. Under
this condition, component vulnerability is reduced.
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CONCLUSIONS
This program represents the first experimental investi-
gation of lightning-induced effects on a fly-by-wire system,
digital or analog. The results of this study are therefore
significant, both for this particular aircraft and for future
generations of aircraft and other aerospace vehicles such as
the Space Shuttle, which will employ digital fly-by-wire flight
control systems. Particular conclusions from this work are as
follows:
1. Equipment bays in a typical metallic airframe are poorly
shielded and permit substantial voltages to be induced
in unshielded electrical cabling inside.
2. Lightning-induced voltages in a typical aircraft cabling
system pose a serious hazard to modern electronics, and
positive steps must be taken to minimize the impact of
these voltages on system operation.
3. Induced voltages of similar magnitudes will appear
simultaneously in all channels of a redundant system.
4. A single-point ground does not eliminate lightning-induced
voltages. It reduces the amount of diffusion-flux induced
and structural IR voltage but permits significant aperture-
flux induced voltages.
5. Cable shielding, surge suppression, grounding and interface
modifications offer means of protection, but successful
design will require a coordinated sharing of responsibility
among those who design the interconnecting cabling and those
who design the electronics. A set of Transient Control
Levels for system cabling and Transient Design Levels for
electronics, separated by a margin of safety, should be
established as design criteria. Data from this and other
experimental programs should be utilized to help establish
these criteria.
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5. MAN-RATED FLIGHT SOFTWARE FOR THE F-8 DFBW PROGRAM
Robert R. Bairnsfather
The Charles Stark Draper Laboratory, Inc.
SUMMARY
The design, implementation, and verification of the flight control soft-
ware used in the F-8 DFBW program are discussed. Since the DFBW utilizes an
Apollo computer and hardware, the procedures, controls, and basic management
techniques employed are based on those developed for the Apollo software sys-
tem. Program Assembly Control, simulator configuration control, erasable-
memory load generation, change procedures and anomaly reporting are discussed.
The primary verification tools--the all-digital simulator, the hybrid simula-
tor, and the Iron Bird simulator--are described, as well as the program test
plans and their implementation on the various simulators. Failure-effects
analysis and the creation of special failure-generating software for testing
purposes are described. The quality of the end product is evidenced by the F-8
DFBW flight test program in which 42 flights, totaling 58 hours of flight time,
were successfully made without any DFCS inflight software, or hardware, fail-
ures or surprises.
INTRODUCTION
From early 1971, CSDL participated in Phase 1 of the Digital Fly-by-Wire
program being administered by NASA Flight Research Center (NASA/FRC). Overall
program effort was directed toward a series of demonstration Fly-by-Wire (FBW)
aircraft flights. A triply redundant Analog Fly-by-Wire (AFBW) Backup Control
System (BCS), employing a simple open-loop control algorithm, is coupled with
the primary flight control system to provide the two-fail-operate/fail-safe
reliability necessary for severing mechanical linkages. The simplex Digital
Fly-by-Wire (DFBW) Primary Control System (PCS) has both software and hardware
failure-detection capability in the digital computer. There are also indepen-
dent monitoring and failure-detection modules operating on PCS control com-
mands, power supplies, pilot input devices, and other critical areas. Finally,
there is the capability for pilot-initiated downmoding to BCS via several inde-
pendent paths. There are seven selectable PCS flight control modes available.
Three Direct (DIR) modes consist of pilot stick/pedal plus trim applied directly
to the control surfaces. Three Stability Augmented System (SAS) modes incor-
porate body-axis angular rates (and lateral acceleration) as feedback variables.
The Command Augmented System (CAS) mode is basically pitch SAS with normal
acceleration feedback and forward-loop integral bypass. The only BCS mode,
Direct, is also selectable by axis.
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SThffirst VEy4by ire flight was made on 25 May 1972, in the high per-
formance F-8C fighter assigned to the DFBW program. Takeoff and landing were
made in PCS/DIR. Basic performance and handling qualities were demonstrated
at several flight conditions, both in BCS and PCS/DIR. Closed-loop PCS/SAS was
first flown on 18 August 1972 with subsequent flights building toward full sys-
tem capability. The demonstration flight test program continued through late
1973.
The CSDL role in the F-8 DFBW program has been directed at the PCS soft-
ware, hardware, and peripherals. Specific tasks have been: the hardware de-
sign, development, and testing of the uplink and downlink converters, the PIPA
Simulator, and the Gimbal Angle Simulator; and software design, implementation,
and verification of the NASA/FRC three-axis Primary Control System algorithms;
the functional design, software design, production, and verification of the
mode and gain change routines, miscellaneous ground test programs, and open-
loop inflight earth-rate torquing routine; the interface design including
failure analysis; simulation support; the review and verification of preflight
erasable loads.
The F-8 DFBW System
Aircraft--The F-8C Crusader, a carrier-based U.S.Navy fighter of mid-50's
vintage, is a high-performance single-seat aircraft capable of Mach 1.8 flight
at altitudes of 60,000 feet. NASA/FRC obtained several surplus aircraft of the
F-8 series. Two of them are involved in the F-8 DFBW program, one as the flight
article and one as the Iron Bird Simulator test article. Figure 1 depicts the
F-8C aircraft, showing the physical distribution of key F-8 DFBW hardware. De-
scriptions of the hardware are given in Table 1 and Table 2.
Digital System--The digital computer used by the PCS is the general pur-
pose Apollo/LM Guidance Computer (LGC). An Apollo Inertial Measurement Unit
(IMU) provides attitude angles, angular rates, and linear accelerations for
feedback control. Major considerations for using the Apollo hardware were that
it possessed a demonstrated reliability and flexibility. Moreover, surplus LM
hardware was available from cancelled Apollo missions. Experienced teams of
software and hardware specialists were also available, for software and systems
integration tasks, at CSDL and Delco Electronics. A functioning Operating Sys-
tem software existed for the LGC, in addition to the supporting facilities of
the powerful Assembler software, the All-Digital Simulator, and two hardware-
integrated simulators at CSDL. Starting with this framework meant that a signi-
ficant portion of the development task was already completed. There were some
disadvantages, the most significant being the July 1972 scheduled shutdown of
the core-rope manufacturing facilities for the LGC fixed memory. Another dis-
advantage, although not recognized immediately, was that the F-8C performance
envelope exceeded the design capabilities of some Apollo hardware items. This
influenced the digital flight control system (DFCS) performance, and required
a reduced performance envelope, which, while less than F-8C capabilities, was
nevertheless acceptable for an experimental digital fly-by-wire testbed.
94
Computer--The LGC contains two distinct memories, fixed and erasable, as
well as hardware logic circuits. The fixed memory is stored in a wire braid
which is manufactured and installed in the computer. This memory cannot be
changed after manufacture and it can only be read by the computer. Fixed memory
contains 36,864 words of memory grouped into 36 banks. Each word contains 15
bits of information, plus a parity bit. The erasable memory makes use of fer-
rite cores which can be both read and changed. It consists of 2048 words
divided into 8 banks. Erasable memory is used to store such data as may change
up to or during a mission, and is also used for temporary storage by the pro-
grams operating in the computer. The memory cycle time (MCT) in the LGC is
11.7 ps. Most single-precision instructions are completed in two MCTs; most
double-precision machine instructions are completed in three MCTs.
SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT
The software control procedures employed for F-8 DFBW selectively follow
those developed and successfully applied during the generation of software pro-
gram assemblies for the Apollo command and lunar module computers. A continua-
tion of useful procedures, made necessary because the F-8C uses the same Apollo
hardware, and desirable because of schedule limitations, was easily imposed by
the CSDL personnel connected with F-8,all of whom were contributors to the
Apollo effort. The limited scope of F-8 dictated some changes in procedure, but
these were basically simplifications commensurate with the level of effort.
After all, approximately 400 man-months/month were expended in Apollo by CSDL
programming and engineering groups just prior to the first lunar landing, while
F-8 DFBW peaked at about 9 man-months/month. The critical time span was from
Control Law Specification delivery in March of 1971 until program release for
fixed-memory core-rope manufacture in mid-December of 1971. Since that date,
CSDL has supported Preflight Erasable Load generation, failure analysis, pre-
flight procedure preparation, and Erasable Memory Program development and
verification. The timely development and excellent flight-test performance of
DFBW software attest to the effectiveness of the control procedures employed.
It is worth emphasizing that we now have more modern software techniques, but
that Phase 1 of F-8 DFBWwas a basic evaluation program, and utilized off-the-
shelf software as well as hardware. Approximately 85 man-months and 95 hours
of IBM 360/74 computer time were required for the Phase 1 software design,
implementation, and verification tasks. The F-8 chronology is shown in Fig. 2.
Operational Software
The operational software for F-8 DFBWconsists of two basic categories:
the DFCS Program Assembly, and the Preflight Erasable Load Assembly. In the
finished product, the DFCS Program Assembly is embodied in the core rope and
comprises the computer's fixed memory. At this stage, it has become hardware
and is effectively a breadboard autopilot in that the structure is invariant
while most parameter values and switch words are variable. For F-8 DFBW, there
is only one final Program Assembly, from which the flight rope and an identical
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spare are manufactured. The Preflight Erasable Load Assembly is embodied in a
tape and comprises the computer's Initial Data Load. The tape, KSTART, con-
tains parameter values and switch settings required by the program, and the
computer receives it as a part of each power-up sequence. A new Preflight
Erasable Load Assembly is made whenever a flight test requires new parameter
values. To ensure the high degree of reliability and safety that is necessary
for man-rated flight software, both assembly processes are carefully controlled.
Program Assembly
The Program Assembly has two main functional areas: Systems and Appli--
cations. Grouped under Systems are Executive, Restart, and Service. Applica-
tions covers Flight Control, and Miscellaneous. The Executive code includes
the priority job-queue processor, the time task-queue processor, the time-
dependent interrupt processor, the idle-job routine. The Restart code includes
the hardware restart interrupt processor, computer initialization routine, the
program alarm processor, the restart-group phase-control routines. The Ser-
vice code includes the list-processing interpreter, the IMU monitor, the com-
puter self-test routines, the man-machine interface routines, the interrupt
processors. The Flight Control code includes the autopilot initialization
routine, the mainline processor, the filter pushdown and wrap-up processor,
the input discrete processor, the Mode and Gain change processor, the body
transformation matrix processor. The miscellaneous code includes the ground
test programs, and special-purpose applications routines.
In several areas, the flight control requirements and the LGC character-
istics posed interesting problems. Some of these are singled out.
Duty Cyle--Early in the development process it became clear that the
Flight Control system would create a relatively high duty cycle in the LGC due
to several causes: LGC instruction time (24 ps/instr), the flight control
sample period (30 ms) and the generalized nature of the control system. Since
the entire LGC is devoted to the DFCS, words of code could be traded for in-
creased time efficiency wherever possible; that is, code is designed for
minimum execution time rather than for minimum storage. Time savings are also
realized for control parameters, where combinable multiple parameters are re-
placed by an equivalent single parameter in a working register, whose value is
generated only once by program initialization.
Restart Protection--A hardware restart is a special interrupt that takes
precedence over all other interrupts, and that cannot be inhibited. The hard-
ware restart is triggered by circuitry in event of selected computer malfunc-
tions. On completion of the restart, all output channel discretes are cleared,
and computer control is transferred to a specific memory location, i.e., to
the Restart Routine. The Restart software rapidly reestablishes the channel
output interfaces because F-8C control surface commands and the PCS primary-
enable signals depend on a viable interface. The restart software next restoresthe program flow by reestablishing the job-queue and time-queue, and by causing
the program whose execution was interrupted to resume at the latest restart
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point. Restart points are entry points, breaking program flow into separate
blocks, such that a properly restart-protected program will reproduce the
same values after a restart as before.
In general, a repetition of code execution is involved following a re-
start because the nature of the LGC requires software recovery procedures.
However, the repetition requires that special care be taken during code gen-
eration to avoid creating situations where a restart will cause a multiple
update of a variable. For example, if the operation A+B + A occurs between
two restart points, then A is updated at each pass through the code. This
violates the rule that the values generated by code repetition after a restart
must be the same as before. The situation of multiple updates is avoided by
a copy cycle, which involves an intermediate variable and an additional restart
point. For the example we have A+B + C, followed by the new restart point,
followed by C + A. Clearly, the final value of cell A is unaffected by code
repetition. Copy cycles are common in Apollo code and have the advantage of
economy of erasable memory usage although they are expensive in terms of exe-
cution time. Note that cell C is intermediate and can be used by many copy
cycles.
Rather than use copy cycles, F-8 DFBWprefers a method that, because of
the high DFCS duty cycle, is conservative of time but is expensive in fixed
and erasable memory cells, doubling the number. Two functionally identical
strings of code, a J-branch and a K-branch, are required with processing alter-
nating from one to the other. Two equivalent sets of erasables are required,
also J-branch and K-branch. The J-branch code uses K-branch (past value)
outputs plus J-branch (present value) inputs to compute J-branch (present
value) outputs. No special copy cycles are required, and computations are
efficiently performed. Copy cycles would likely have pushed DFCS duty cycle
dangerously close to 100%. It reaches 91% even with time-efficient restart
protection.
Indirect Transfer--At sixteen critical points in F-8 DFBW program flow,
and at one point in the downlink program, a capability is provided for erasable
indirect transfer of control. In application the program flow of the hardware
core-rope fixed memory program is determined by the address contained in a
specific erasable cell at the time the cell is accessed by the program.
Erasable cells used in this manner fall into two classes. There is the class
of cells whose contents (the destination address) is changed regularly under
program control, say every 20 ms or 30 ms. These cells, although erasable,
form an integral part of the core-rope. The second class consists of cells
whose contents are in general established only once, either by an initializa-
tion pass or by the Initial Data Load (KSTART tape). It is this second class
of erasable cells that provides the powerful capability of altering the program
flow after core-rope manufacture by means of Erasable Memory Programs.
Generalized Filters--Inasmuch as F-8 DFBW is a flying breadboard, the
feedback sensor quantities are each provided with a generalized filter. The
five filters, three for body rates and two for linear accelerations, allow
flexibility of filter choice: bypass, first order, second order, and third
order. An alternate third order is obtained by cascading the first and second
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order sections to obtain control over individual poles and zeros. The filter
coefficients are parameters in the KSTART tape. The filters are active at all
times, even in BCS/DIR.
The computations are divided into two phases, the main phase which in-
corporates the current input with past values to update the output, and the
pushdown or wrap-up phase which updates the other filter quantities in prepara-
tion for the next cycle. In this manner the control surface commands which
use the filter outputs are generated with the shortest delay. The time-
consuming filter wrap-up calculations are not performed until after closing
the aircraft control loop, and so do not contribute to the delay. The saving
is significant because the wrap-up can represent as much as 92% of the total
filter load.
Gain Change--Manual gain changing is provided in lieu of automatic gain
changing as a function of, say, dynamic pressure. Separate pitch, roll, and
yaw gain-select switches on the MAPP, each with four positions, comprise the
pilot interface. Selection of a specific gain (or coefficient) parameter is
made from a fixed list of 105 candidates, serially numbered from 1 to 105.
Each gain is associated (by axis) with a particular gain-select switch, and
a maximum of 9 gains can be designated for a given flight. Each gain chosen,
with its serial number and four values, becomes part of the PEL. When a gain-
select switch is changed by the pilot, the program recognizes the change and
the PEL-designated gains associated with that switch axis are changed. For
each gain in turn, a small routine implements the change, performing all
necessary scaling, recomputing all working registers using that gain, and
initializing any filter using that gain.
Erasable Memory Programming--Erasable memory programming provides the
only means of modifying the program once the core rope is manufactured. Modi-
fication can sometimes be accomplished by breaking into the program flow at a
suitable erasable branch point, which must be of the second class as defined
above. The procedure is to change the erasable cell contents to point to an
unused block of erasable memory and to load executable code into that area
(called an Erasable Memory Program or EMP). The final instruction of the EMP
returns control to the fixed memory program. The EMP allows some unanticipated
problems to be solved by shoehorning suitable code into the program flow.
Erasable Downlist--In Apollo, the identification and specification of
telemetered data was done by means of address tables built into the core rope.
For a mature design such as Apollo, quantities of interest are well known, and
properly can be built into the rope. F-8 DFBW, on the other hand, must offer
flexibility for experimental design. Variables and quantities of interest can
change from day to day depending on a given flight plan. To accomplish this
end, erasable specification of the downlist quantities by means of KSTART tape
is incorporated into the Downlink program.
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Preflight Erasable Load Assembly
Flexibility is achieved in the F-8 DFBW despite the hardware status of the
core-rope program by providing for a large number of erasable parameters. The
aggregate, called the Preflight Erasable Load, consists of three categories:
Data words, Downlist Words, and Erasable Memory Program words. The Data words
are constants and include loop gains, filter coefficients, nonlinearity para-
meters, IMU compensation parameters, branch control parameters, and branch
control address constants. The Downlist words are address constants that de-
fine the quantities to be telemetered. The EMP words are executable code and
associated constants.
Early in the program the Preflight Erasable Load and the KSTART tape con-
sisted only of Data words and Downlist words, and were generated by CSDL. But
the responsibility for the data values resided with FRC, so generation of the
Preflight Erasable Load and KSTART shifted to FRC as the software capability
was developed there. However, Erasable Memory Program development was a CSDL
function, and the verified and accepted EMP code was incorporated into the
KSTART by FRC.
Several unique or extremely helpful features characterize the F-8 Pre-
flight Erasable Load (PEL), and the generation of its KSTART uplink tape,
specifically:
(1) PEL parameters are expressed in conveniently scaled, physically
significant engineering units.
(2) A DFCS initialization routine translates each PEL parameter (units
and scaling) into DFCS operational parameters. Factored or ratioed
parameters are combined into single operational parameters at this
time.
(3) Comprehensive error checking and diagnostic indicators are built
into the KSTART tape generating programs.
Parameters--The basic DFCS parameters are expressed in conveniently
scaled engineering units and constitute the erasable load. The DFCS working
registers (gains, limit levels, coefficients) are defined so as to minimize
computation time where possible. This usually results in unusual scaling,
e.g., number of DFCS samples instead of seconds, or DAC bits instead of sur-
face degrees. Other working registers are functions of basic parameters,
such as a simple product, or a limit level that is computed from intercept/
slope/breakpoint values. Also a working register might contain an address
constant, selected from a table in accordance with certain rules. To accom-
plish the interface between working registers and erasable load parameters,
F-8 DFBW utilizes an initialization routine. By having an initialization rou-
tine available to translate the working registers, the engineer preparing
KSTART tapes, or changing parameters manually via the DSKY during a simulation,
can continue to think in basic engineering terms. This is especially important
in F-8 DFBW, since much of the development is performed on hybrid simulators
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where the DSKY interface is the only practical interface for changing DFCS
parameters. By keeping PEL specifications simple and by formulating them in
engineering terms for both physical feel and visibility, the possibility for
error is greatly reduced. Since programmed and verified initialization soft-
ware is involved, reliable and complete changes are made quickly by single-
parameter data entries even though that parameter exhibits multiple usage.
KSTART Generation--Two off-line diagnostic programs, DOWNDIAG and
SHERLOCK, developed by NASA/FRC, contribute significantly to the generation
of a highly reliable PEL and its KSTART tape. Operational use of these pro-
grams is shown schematically in Fig. 3.
DOWNDIAG checks the erasable downlink list specification against format,
opcode, address, and keypunch errors. It punches the Erasable Downlist (EDL)
and Downlink Processor (DLP) decks only after error-free input is provided.
The DLP deck is used for post-flight or post-simulation downlink processing.
The EDL deck is integrated with the DFCS parameter deck for input to SHERLOCK.
SHERLOCK likewise checks against keystroke, octal, and address errors,
but more significantly performs comprehensive reasonability checks, e.g.,
minimum/maximum range or compatibility between related elements. SHERLOCK
also extracts filter polynomial roots, checks the stability of poles, and
checks zeroes against minimum/maximum ranges. Diagnostic printouts must be
answered by corrections to the SHERLOCK inputs, or by signed waivers, before
output decks are punched, one for the F-8 All-Digital Simulator at CSpL, and
the other for input to KPUNCH, the KSTART tape diagnostic and punch program.
KPUNCH calculates the initialization values for the uplink summation
(UPSUM) registers such that with a proper uplinking of the KSTART tape, the
UPSUM registers equal 77777 77777 when displayed on the DSKY. Errors generated
during uplinking will leave numbers other than 7s. KPUNCH also performs
limited diagnostic checking and ultimately punches the KSTART tape, ready for
uplinking to the LGC prior to flight.
F-8 DFBW Software Package
The F-8 DFBW software package can be broken down as in Table 3 (Fixed
Memory Allocation), and Table 4 (Erasable Memory Allocation). The DFCS code
is by far the largest single item. Extensive fixed memory is used by Display
Interfaces (DSKY processing), Interpreter/Executive, and IMU Alignment. Most
of this code was transferred directly or with minor change from the LM program
for Apollo 14. The Self-Test Self--Check code came from Apollo preflight
erasable code. Roughly half (696) of the erasables used are DFCS related, and
a significant number (389) belong to the Preflight Erasable Load.
SOFTWARE PROGRAM CONTROL
The flight software for F-8 DFBW programleans heavily on the experience
developed for Apollo. The main difference between Apollo software and other
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(previous) software is that the Apollo software had to work perfectly the 
first
time it was used in its real environment. Apollo manned missions 
had a one-
shot nature that required guaranteed performance. To achieve such 
reliability,
management and supervision controls were set up, and have 
evolved over several
years into a system to monitor and check software progress 
very closely and yet
not to create an environment that is oppressive to the creativity, 
persever-
ance, and dedication of engineers. The system thus 
created has been proven in
both developmental and incremental phases of software. Man-rated flight soft-
ware depends on reliability and confidence built up by careful 
management and
supervision controls supported by thorough software verification 
using real
hardware and high-fidelity models in simulation.
Software Management
A successfully managed software effort must provide:
(1) Realistic estimates of requirements including manpower, 
assembly
and simulation budgets, memory allocations.
(2) Efficiency in the development and verification process 
including
non-overlapping testing, effective use of man and machine 
re-
sources.
(3) Achievement of milestones on schedule.
(4) Visibility of the product including developmental 
status, trouble
spots, user-oriented operations and interfaces.
(5) Flexible and efficient response to design change 
requests.
(6) Systematic verification procedures at all module 
interface levels
of testing and performance.
(7) Reliability of final products.
(8) Quality performance of final products.
The software management and control system developed 
for Apollo provided
such capability. Its selection for F-8 DFBW wasa natural 
outgrowth of success-
ful prior experience with it. Changes were made, 
but only when the differing
situations indicated a modified approach.
The management and control of flight software is directed 
toward the
timely preparation of two end items: a software program 
assembly from which
the read-only core-rope memory is manufactured, and 
a software preflight eras-
able-load assembly from which a KSTART tape is manufactured 
to initialize the
erasable read-write memory. Operational efficiency, performance 
capability,
operational flexibility, and overall reliability are 
demanded of both the fixed
and the erasable-memory assemblies, since they complement 
each other in terms
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of overall performance. Timely availability is likewise a requirement in termsof schedule milestones. Changes and additions to the baseline design must beimplemented with the same quality and timely control.
Organization and Controls
The software organization used by F-8 DFBW is relatively simple. TheProject Manager is the customer's contact point. The Project Manager inter-faces with the Software Manager, who interfaces with the engineers doing thesoftware design, coding, and verification. Both of the latter interface withAssembly Control, which is responsible for the assembly process. The types ofcontrol machinery available to the Project Manager and the Software Manager areas follows:
(1) Software Specification Document is the product specification towhich the software must conform.
(2) PCR--a Program Change Request, that officially changes the SoftwareSpecification (must be signed off by customer, Project Manager,
and Software Manager).
(3) PCN-a Program Change Notice, similar to a PCR but deemed impera-tive by CSDL (must be signed off by Project Manager and SoftwareManager).
(4) Anomaly--a request to fix an error in the program (must be signedoff by Project Manager and Software Manager).
(5) ACB--an Assembly Control Board request, identifies a necessaryprogram change that is not a specification change (must be signed
off by Software Manager).
Under Configuration Control, all coding changes and additions must be coveredby one of the above forms of approval before the Assembly Control Supervisorwill incorporate the code into the assembly.
Assembly Control
The Assembly Control functions in Apollo were highly structured and veryformal for the mainline program assemblies. There was an Applications Program-ming Development and Testing Group for the two major assemblies. A SystemIntegration Programming Group served for all assemblies, but the major assem-blies had separate Assembly Control Supervisors. Finally, the Assembly ControlService Group served all needs.
The software generation process is illustratively simplified in Fig. 4.A coding task is routed to the appropriate programming group for code design.Discussions with the other groups might follow. Completed code is submitted toAssembly Control where it is either accepted for the next revision or returned
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for corrections. At appropriate times, the assembly update deck is submitted
to make the new revision. The Assembler output is examined by Assembly 
Control
and errors are either fixed or referred back to the coder for rectification.
Notification of a good assembly is given to coder/testers who submit simulation
test runs. If tests do not work correctly, corrected code is submitted 
for the
next revision. On receipt of good results, a new coding task is begun.
In F-8 DFBW, with a total programming team of about nine people, such
structuring was not practical or necessary. Nevertheless the spirit 
of the
Assembly Control process was maintained. One member of the DFBW team was desig-
nated Assembly Control Supervisor, but his activities spanned all 
four of the
structured areas as time permitted and activity made necessary. For example,
he monitored, coordinated and submitted all assembly changes, maintained 
the
Simulator test packages, published the assembly documentation, maintained 
and
verified IGC System software, coded and verified some Applications code, and
participated in Level 4/Level 5 testing. The other team 
members likewise found
their activities spanning the four groups as specific needs came and went, each
contributing in areas of greatest interest and ability.
Controllable Items
In addition to the main program assembly, there are also other areas
where control procedures must apply. These are the Preflight Erasable 
Load
Assembly, Simulator Test Packages, Off-line Program Assemblies, and 
Erasable
Memory Programs.
A Preflight Erasable Load Assembly is associated with each mainline pro-
gram revision, and consists of data constants, branch-control 
constants, and
address constants that are defined in the mainline revision. The Preflight
Erasable Load Assembly is used to generate data and address decks 
for Simulator
test runs and it is essential that these decks be error free.
The Simulator Test Package supports the software testing and verification
by providing a common library of test case decks. 
Functionally the decks cover
three categories: program initialization, simulation control, 
and edit control.
Operationally the decks are invoked in suitable configurations 
at run time by
single cards in the user's test deck.
Off-line Assemblies--As the mainline program matures, off-line 
versions
are useful to check out code prior to updating the mainline 
assembly. Once the
design and coding is checked out, a simple transfer 
of appropriate code is made
to the mainline assembly. In F-8 DFBW two examples occurred; 
one was to check
out a major design modification in the BCS downmode logic just prior to 
Con-
figuration Control, and the other was to create a testing and training 
tool
capable of failing input/output discretes via DSKY 
commands.
Erasable Memory Programs-Erasable-memory programming is a tool enabling
a limited flexibility for modifying core-rope program 
flow. A block of code is
designed to reside in and operate from erasable memory, 
and a way is devised to
access the code from the existing rope.
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Assembly Control Tools
Assembler-Since the software was not written in a Higher Order Lan-guage, a sophisticated assembler was of utmost importance. The Assembler isby far the most powerful tool in the Assembly Control process. The lengthy
evolutionary period of Apollo has generated many fine features.
Diagnostic Package--The Assembler diagnoses faulty coding in both basicand interpretive languages. It issues diagnostic messages about refer-ences to non-existent variables, multiple definitions, illegal sequences
of instructions, improper erasable-bank or fixed-bank references, and
many others.
Basic and Interpretive Language-The Assembler recognizes two languages:
basic language, and a list-processing interpretive language. The latterpermits vector and matrix as well as double and triple precision opera-
tions; these are processed by the Interpreter software routines in theLGC. The Assembler recognizes data constants, noun and verb constants,downlink list specification constants, and address constants.
Flexibility of Memory Allocation--Blocks of fixed-memory programming canbe referenced to each other so that if a block expands, another blockneed not be moved to make room for it. Overlapping of program memory isflagged if it occurs. Overlapping of erasable storage (time-sharing),
on the other hand, is facilitated by the Assembler.
Program Visibility 
-The Assembler provides complete mnemonic cross-
reference tables, a summary of erasable memory assignments, and maps ofboth erasable- and fixed-memory storage. All operand references arethreaded, allowing rapid eyeball debugging even when the relevant pas-sages are scattered through hundreds of pages. Word count, including abreakdown by functional area, is provided.
Modularity--The Assembler provides the ability to separately assemble
and partially diagnose sections of the full program. These can be codedseparately and brought together into full programs for verification.
Interface with All-Digital Simulator--The Assembler output includes inputinformation for the All-Digital Simulator, which is useful for simulator
initializations, and for simulator run-time diagnostic error detection.The Symbol Table enables the addressing of erasable cells and fixed lo-cations by name, rather than by number which tends to vary from revisionto revision as memory layout is modified. Tapes for fixed-memory loading
of core-rope simulator can be generated. Constants, bad words (assembler-detected errors), unused words, and coding instructions are distinctivelyflagged to permit detection of such run-time errors as 'executing a con-
stant' or 'executing from unused fixed memory'. KSTART tapes can bepunched directly from the Preflight Erasable Load Assembly as a feature
of the Assembler.
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Erasable Memory Map
The limited erasable-memory size of the LGC forced a policy of cell
sharing as a means of extending memory capability in Apollo; extensive cell
sharing was necessary, more than doubling the erasable complement and resulting
in as many as seven distinct usages. An erasable-memory map was used as a
bookkeeping and planning tool. The map was looked on as a short-lived neces-
sity, otherwise the cell-sharing process would have been automated. In F-8 DFBW,
even though memory cell sharing is limited, the Erasable Memory Map is an
especially useful document. A separate map is prepared for each erasable bank
by the Assembly Control Supervisor. The primary allocation is identified in
the first column, with the overlays defined in the subsequent columns. The map
simplifies the problem of assigning multiple use to cells or blocks of cells
and minimizes the problem of run-time conflicts between LGC programs. The maps
are extremely valuable to the programmer preparing erasable memory code by
identifying unused blocks of cells and by aiding in the time-sharing usage of
cells.
Software Development Activity
The software development process, involving all phases of software acti-
vity, can be summarized in Fig. 5. All software design is based on written
specification. In Apollo, the specification was the seven volume Guidance Sys-
tem Operations Plan. In F-8 DFBW, the Control Laws, backup interface require-
ments, pilot interface requirements, and data retrieval requirements are
prescribed in the Software Specification. The LGC executive hierarchy, service
routines, interrupt processors, restart routines, downlink, and all others that
came from Apollo are specified by inference as being the same as Apollo. The
few changes in this category by rights should be documented by PCRs or ACBs.
However the ultimate documentation in this area, as was similarly true in
Apollo, is the detailed flowchart. Nevertheless, in the software development,
authorization must exist in one of the forms: Software Specification, Program
Change Request, Program Change Notice, or Assembly Control Board direction.
Another class of input to the Software Development, shown in Fig. 5, is
the Initial Data Load which becomes the Preflight Erasable Load. The load is
the cumulative array of values for control law parameters and for other rou-
tines' parameters and, as such, is jointly specified by FRC and CSDL. The load
is revised and updated to keep pace with the software development.
A third class of input to the software development is the test plans,
the most important one being the Level 4 Test Plan. Test plans exist at all
levels and are the basis for the level testing. At the lower levels, the plans
are informal tools to ensure thorough unit testing by individual programmers.
The Level 3 Test Plan and the Level 4/5 Test Plan are carefully documented
compendiums of specific tests, and cover all areas of the software. The test
plan is reviewed and updated by all concerned; it can be added to at any time
to include any overlooked areas.
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Continuing in Fig. 5, the software is designed in blocks or units with
each being tested before proceeding to the next. Testing at the unit level
(Level 1/2) is generally bit-by-bit digital simulation. When a sufficient num-
ber of units are completed, the hardware and alarm interfaces are tested as
appropriate. These tests generally involve all three simulators: the Digital,Hybrid, and System Test Laboratory. Modular Testing (Level 3) commences in any
given area when all units in a given program function are completed, for ex-
ample, the DFCS Direct Mode in the pitch axis. This level of testing continues
until all DFCS modes and capabilities are completed. Since several program
areas are developed in parallel, but not all at the same rate, testing at
several levels takes place during any given time frame.
When all major programs appear to be essentially completed, Configuration
Control is instituted, officially designating the start of Level 4, although
limited Interface testing can take place earlier. Subsequent to Configuration
Control, all program changes require the careful scrutiny and approval of one
or more of the software supervisors, as well as the coding experts in the areas
affected. Software Specification changes require a PCR. Level 4 tests are
based on the Test Plan, and all incorrect, or unexpected, or incomplete, or
anomalous behavior is documented in an anomaly report or a discrepancy report.
Discrepancies are software errors detected after Configuration Control, but
prior to release-for-manufacture. Anomalies are software errors detected after
release-for-manufacture. Verification at Level 4 and above involves exercising
the program on the three CSDL simulators, as well as the FRC Iron Bird System.
All documented anomalies and discrepancies must be resolved. In some cases
resolution of a Hybrid or Iron Bird item requires an attempt to reproduce the
behavior on another simulator, or perhaps the Digital, in order to pinpoint the
cause. When the cause of a discrepancy or anomaly is identified, an assess-
ment is made to determine: (1) the operational impact when the problem is
encountered if the program is left as is, (2) the procedures necessary to avoid
or to work around the problem, (3) the coding change necessary to eliminate the
problem, (4) the schedule impact of implementing and verifying the coding
change. The assessment is documented as a PCR, PCN, or ACB which, if approved,
is implemented as a fixed-coding change. Erasable coding is not used at thislevel for permanent changes. Disapproved PCRs, PCNs, and ACBs become program
Notes. Sometimes it turns out that what was thought to be an anomaly, ordiscrepancy, was caused by a simulator bug, or a test deck error; in which case
the problem is fixed and the test is rerun.
When all pending program changes are incorporated and tested at Level 4,
and when no unresolved problems remain, the program is ready for release andis declared frozen. A technical review of the Level 4 testing is held (pre-
FACI). If, in any areas the testing appears to need reinforcement, then new
or additional Level 4 tests are defined. The Level 5 testing consists of re-
running all of the Level 4 test decks on the final version. If any new anom-
alies or discrepancies turn up and are serious enough to require a PCR, the
Erasable Memory Program option is weighted heavily against a manufacturing
schedule slip. The First Article Configuration Inspection (FACI) is a formal
review of all Level 5 testing results, anomaly reports, change requests, pro-gram notes, and operational restrictions. The end action of the FACI is the
granting of approval to release the rope assembly for manufacturing.
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Flight Support Activity
The Flight Support Activity takes place after delivery of 
the Manufactured
rope modules and centers around Level 6 testing as shown in Fig. 6. The KSTART
tape is generated from the Preflight Erasable Load involving 
the Initial Data
Load and any existing Erasable Memory Programs. Evaluation involves careful
scrutiny of all parameters, by computer Program and by eyeball, to identify and
assess changes from the previous KSTART tape. Additionally, the CSDL 
evaluation
utilizes the Hybrid Simulator, the All-Digital Simulator, and the 
Systems Test
Laboratory hardware installation. The testing is complemented by extensive
mission-sequence testing on the Iron Bird Simulator at FRC, and involves pilot
training, pilot procedures, and system performance. The test results are pre-
sented at the Flight Readiness Review (FRR), and any anomalies resolved, perhaps
by modifying the operational envelope. FRR approval is required 
for flight go-
ahead. Following a successful flight to test one DFCS capability, the Initial
Data Load can be modified to test another capability, or to change the downlink
coverage, and the procedure of Fig. 6 is repeated.
Alternatively, the flight test results can indicate a serious 
need for a
DFCS capability that does not exist in the rope. In this case, a PCR 
is sub-
mitted to request that the capability be developed as an EMP. After assessment,
if the PCR is approved, the development and test of the EMP is undertaken 
as was
shown in the previous figure, Fig. 5. When completed, the verified 
EMP is in-
corporated into the KSTART tape for Level 6 testing.
Software Milestones
The development activity is tracked by milestones. Schedule milestones
were not treated with the level of formality accorded their Apollo 
counterparts.
Small meetings of one or two technical personnel with management personnel 
marked
many F-8 DFBW events. Nevertheless, schedule milestones were vital 
to a timely
development and verification process. The major milestones are indicated in
Fig. 2.
The Preliminary Design Review (PDR)for F-8 consisted of several meetings,
each covering a specific area of interest. These were preliminary in the 
sense
that changes were expected as subcontractors and customer had the opportunity to
review carefully each other's needs, plans, and suggestions.
The Critical Design Review (CDR) also consisted of several meetings, each
covering a specific area in minute detail. The CDRs for the Control System
Specification and the Interface Control Document are specific examples.
Level 1, 2, 3 Testing (Unit and Modular testing) allows tracking of units
of software in the early stages of development when coding and verification 
are
relatively independent of tight controls.
Configuration Control marks the transition to tightly controlled 
software
configuration and testing procedures.
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Level 4 Testing (Interface testing) allows tracking of interfaces between
modules of software. Program changes require written approval and all anomalous
simulation behavior requires documentation, analysis, and resolution.
Level 5 (Formal testing) allows tracking of software prototype.
First Article Configuration Inspection (FACI) is a formal review of allaspects of prototype software. The final action is the approval of the final
assembly for manufacture.
Release-for-Manufacture--Following FACI approval, a weaving tape is gene-rated from the final assembly to be used for core-rope manufacture.
Level 6 Testing (Mission Performance testing) is based on the KSTART tapefor the particular flight. Evaluation consists of exercising the KSTART tapeon the three CSDL Simulators and on the FRC Iron Bird System.
A Flight Readiness Review (FRR) is conducted prior to each flight. Astatement from CSDL is required concerning its review on the Preflight ErasableLoad and KSTART tape. The initial FRR had the longest agenda. The reviewassessed the flight readiness of the primary control system, the backup controlsystem, the flight vehicle subsystems, to name a few. Known anomalies and theiravoidance or work-around procedures were discussed. Erasable Memory Programs
were explained, both functionally and operationally. The failure analysis studieswere reviewed, as well as available documentation. Flight readiness reviews sub-sequent to the initial flight generally consider the current KSTART tape and any
newly applicable areas.
SOFTWARE VERIFICATION
The software verification process is vital to the preparation of reliablehigh-quality software. A screening process is employed, whereby code is sub-jected to many tests representing many different situations. This approach totesting is one of diminishing returns: early tests show up most of the codingerrors, but the later tests build confidence in the overall quality of the pro-gram assembly. Establishing the proper balance between insufficient and exces-sive verification testing is a critical task. Indeed, the verification processdoes not terminate with release-for-manufacture; it continues, in the hope of
catching any remaining errors before they show up operationally with unexpectedand perhaps dangerous consequences.
The verification process cannot be separated from the assembly controlprocess, at least prior to release-for-manufacture. The ultimate quality andreliability of code depends heavily on the verification process. The attainment
of the verification goals involves far more than the execution of high qualityobject code available near the end of the software development cycle. Facili-ties are required in the early stages of program development when the codeavailable is of low quality and may not even be executable. In the early stagesa benign and cooperative environment is required; it must provide a detailed
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visibility into the execution of code. Simplified, but fast-operating environ-
ment algorithms are desirable. Extensive diagnostic capability is mandatory,
involving both run-time and post-run software packages. As code quality is re-
fined, the environment quality can be updated to include such factors as sensor
errors and higher order effects. Ultimately the code should be exercised in a
highly realistic environment including as much real hardware as possible.
Software Verification Facilities
Several distinct facilities were utilized during the DFCS verification
process. The complementary nature of their unique capabilities is significant.
Each has contributed to the DFCS quality, and by its absence would have affected
the development adversely, mainly in terms of schedule, but perhaps even in terms
of operational performance. CSDL has utilized the All-Digital Simulator, the
Hybrid Simulator, and the System Test Laboratory facilities for the software
development and verification activities. NASA/FRC has utilized the analog
Stage 1 engineering simulation, the bench lashup Stage 2 hardware integration
simulation, and the Stage 3 Iron Bird Simulator for the systems design, hardware
integration, design verification, and pilot training/evaluation activities.
Each of these facilities has contributed to the overall success of F-8
DFBW, but certainly the significant contributions to system integration have
come from the Stage 3 Iron Bird Simulator. It was on this facility that signi-
ficant hardware integration problems were first encountered. The Stage 3 piloted
simulations gave insight for design-change evaluation. Stage 3 permitted real-
time demonstration of failure effects, and permitted engineering preliminary
and final design. Stage 3 was used for much supportive software verification
and essentially all of the system design verification. For the flight testing,
where CSDL's verification role was supportive, the Stage 3 simulation was
especially important as the primary design, verification, and training tool.
The All-Digital Simulator (ADS) at CSDL played the significant role in
F-8 software design, development, and verification, primarily because of the
powerful run-time diagnostic and post-run edit capability, as well as features
such as repeatability and snapshot/rollback. Rigidly controlled simulator
software provided a stable environment and ensured repeatability.
The Hybrid Simulator at CSDL was a very useful tool during preliminary
verification, primarily because of its real-time interactive capabilities. Its
role was somewhat diminished because CSDL did not have DFCS design responsi-
bility, which is where the real-time interactive aspects of hybrid simulation
can vastly improve the control-system designer's efficiency. However, on two
separate occasions, one being the time-critical development period between
Stage 2 and Stage 3 simulation, NASA/FRC came to CSDL and conducted basic and
detailed design on our Hybrid facilities.
Piloted simulations early in the development phases can improve the
overall quality of the end item, especially when schedules are tight. Pilot
contributions cover a wide range of experience including such items as human
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factors suggestions, functional change requests, performance and handling
qualities evaluation, and safety considerations.
The complementary nature of all-digital, hybrid, and hardware integration
facilities is important. The ADS provides diagnostic and edit capability plus
detailed hard-copy for documentation. The Hybrid Simulator is unmatched in its
real-time interactive capabilities for preliminary design, parameter-variation,
and sensitivity studies. The hardware integration facility represents the ulti-
mate interface verification tool short of flight test. Here, interfaces are
actually mated, often for the first time. Failures can be studied and pilot-in-
the-loop evaluations based on a maximum hardware complement can be performed.
Each of the design, development, verification, and training tools can play a
key non-overlapping role. It is the complementary nature of each facility which
should be emphasized and utilized for greatest program efficiency and end-item
quality.
A brief description of each of these facilities follows.
CSDL All-Digital Simulator 
-The Apollo Digital Simulator is a basic tool
developed and employed primarily to support the design, development, and veri-
fication of Apollo Guidance Computer (AGC) programs. The simulator is entirely
digital and consists of a number of programs implemented on a general purpose
digital computer. It simulates the operation of the AGC in storage layout, and
in detailed arithmetic and logical operation. Consistent with one's objectives,
mathematical and logical models ranging from rudimentary to comprehensive may be
selected to simulate the hardware and flight environment within which the AGC and
its coding operate. For the F-8C, only the rigid body degrees of freedom are
mechanized and there is no takeoff or landing capability. The BCS flight control
system is not simulated, so controlled flight is possible only in the DFCS modes.
The Pilot Action Simulator provides open-loop actions such as stick and rudder
deflections, push button and trim switch activity, and DSKY operations. In ad-
dition, the simulator has numerous on-line diagnostic features, a snapshop/roll-
back capability, and extensive post-run edit capability available. The edit
package provides for flexible run-time data storage and for post-run data retriev-
al. The user has the choice of using standard edit programs or of writing his
own. Extensive edit programs for plotting, computational verification, and
formatting were developed for F-8 formal verification. Summary printing includes
data on DFCS mode changes, timing, and computational delays. Plot variables in-
clude numerous DFCS and environmental quantities. Timing data indicating duty
cycle and job activity is plotted. A downlink processor edit was prepared to
verify proper downlink operation. The simulation system is illustrated schemat-
ically in.Fig. 7.
The CSDL Hybrid Simulator--The Hybrid Simulator is a combination of
selected flight hardware used in concert with analog and digital computers to
provide real-time simulated flight. The flight hardware consists of an LGC
computer, a DSKY, and the coupling data units. The LGC memory is replaced by
a Core Rope Simulator (CRS), which provides a complete erasable memory as well
as helpful features, such as the ability to monitor and change location con-
tents, to stop at a location address, or to single-step the program. The IMU
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is simulated with special-purpose electronics. Elements needing precision of
storage, as the trajectory dynamics, the aerodynamics, and the rotational
transformations, are simulated in an XDS 9300 digital computer. The high-
frequency actuator dynamics, the BCS loops, and some discrete logic are simu-
lated on the analog computer. The algorithms for BCS control and BCS downmode-
trim initialization are simulated, but the cross-channel comparator and the
hydrologic subsystems of the F-8C are not modelled. Also, provision is not made
for a parking, landing, or takeoff capability. A minimal cockpit uses the
Apollo three-axis rotational hand controller in place of stick/pedal controls.
Cockpit instrumentation includes artificial horizon, altitude, airspeed, rate-
of-climb, % thrust, g, angle of attack, and a mockup Mode And Power Panel for
real-time man-in-the-loop simulations. Strip-chart recordings and initializa-
tion printout are the only hard-copy output. The Hybrid Simulator runs in
real time to allow man-in-the-loop testing, on-line debugging, and flexibility
in verification procedures. The LGC can function alone or with the Simulator
providing an environment; in the former mode it is available independently of
the availablity of the hybrid facility. Reproducibility is not in general
possible, but this is an advantage in that a realistic randomness is introduced
into the testing.
CSDL System Test Laboratory--The System Test Laboratory (STL) is an
Apollo hardware integration facility. A real IMU interfaces with the LGC, CRS,
and DSKY. Uplink and downlink are operational. Channel inbit discretes can be
set or cleared manually and independently. The aircraft and BCS systems are
not simulated. A trace capability is available via the Apollo CORONER and off-
line processing; this is the only hard-copy output from this facility.
NASA/FRC Stage 1 Simulator--The Stage 1 Simulator was a preliminary de-
sign tool used to develop the flight control system specification equations.
Simple analog models and sample-and-hold networks were utilized. Linear analysis
based on continuous and sample-data control system design, using root locus
and w-plane techniques, provided backup for the simulation effort.
NASA/FRC Stage 2 Simulator--The Stage 2 Simulator was a hardware inte-
gration and preliminary design evaluation facility. Breadboard lashup of major
hardware components was first performed here. The LGC, the Program Analyzer
Console (PAC, equivalent to the CRS), DSKY, IMU Gimbal Angle Simulator (GAS),
and CDU package were involved. Aircraft and aero-surface servo actuator dynamics
were modelled on a small analog computer. A rudimentary version of the DFCS and
Operating System software participated.
NASA/FRC Stage 3 Simulator--The Stage 3 (or Iron Bird) Simulator is an F-8C
airframe that includes all key hardware in the configuration of the flight
article, including the pallet mounting of the LGC computer, IMU, and CDUs. The
BCS electronics, power supplies, and hydraulics are flight-article type systems.
The manufactured core-rope or PAC software can be used as the LGC memory. Simu-
lated trajectory dynamics and aerodynamics permit closed-loop simulations using
the GAS. Simple external visuals, sideslip angle and horizon line with sky/
earth differentation, are provided on a TV screen mounted on the aircraft nose.
Access to LGC and flight control system variables is by means of downlink with
post-run editing or by DSKY display.
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Software Verification Testing
It is difficult to separate software development and software verifica-
tion since both go hand in hand throughout the development phase. To consider
software verification it is necessary to consider software development. Generally
speaking, there are two categories of software design changes that contribute to
program construction.
(1) Developmental changes - these are creation of a new program or a new
routine, or extensive changes within an existing program or routine.
(2) Incremental changes - these are modifications to existing code that
cause small alterations and repercussions.
Clearly, a Developmental change has a major impact on the existing program and
requires an extensive testing approach to assure that the new code works properly
and does not interfere with other existing coding. It is equally clear that an
Incremental change has a minor impact on the existing code and requires a local-
ized testing approach. This is sort of by definition. However, it is not
always clear into which of the two categories a given software change should be
placed. Classification is a difficult problem and requires experience and
thorough knowledge of the programs. For example, a one word change could re-
quire extensive testing if that word were, say, a sample period affecting event
timing. On the other hand, the replacement of one Boolean relationship by
another, involving perhaps 30 words, could be local in effect and require only
local testing. Thus, the full arsenal of testing is brought to bear on Develop-
mental software, while a subset is used for Incremental software.
Developmental Software Testing--In order to test out developmental changes,
the six official levels of testing are normally performed. These are Unit test-
ing (Levels 1 and 2), Modular testing (Level 3), Interface testing (Level 4),
Formal testing (Level 5), and Mission Performance testing (Level 6). The major-
ity of the F-8 DFBW programming effort falls into the developmental category, as
exemplified by the flight control coding, input/output processing, ground test
programs, and special routines. Design changes that occur late in the develop-
ment cycle are often accorded the Developmental treatment. Erasable Memory
Program design is also in this category, although there have been exceptions.
Incremental Software Testing--Incremental changes require adequate testing
to assure that all paths in the program affected by the change are exercised.
This may necessitate designing new tests for specific code changes. Incremental
testing involves some combination of Unit testing, Modular testing, and Interface
testing. Since all incremental changes become part of the program rope, they
are automatically subjected to Level 5 and Level 6 testing.
There have been a number of incremental changes in F-8 DFBW. Initially,
much of the software (about 60%) came from the Apollo Lunar Module Program.
Many areas of the code required minor incremental changes to meet F-8C requirements
Late in the development cycle, especially as the release-for-manufacture date
approached, changes even to flight control code can often be treated as incre-
mental, especially if significant Level 4 interface testing has already been
completed.
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Some Erasable Memory Programs have been classified as Incremental. In
one case, two lines of code were added to an existing EMP to create the one-
pulse rudder pedal deadband. The other case was a preflight checkout program.
These have received minimal Level 4/5 testing. Conversely, other EMPs involved
significant design changes deeply imbedded in interface or systems code: para-
bolic shaping of stick inputs, or restart-triggering of BCS downmoding. These
have received significant Level 4/5 testing, being developmental in nature.
Special Testing--There are a number of special tests deserving of mention
that establish confidence in the flight software mainly by failing to find a
fault rather than by exhaustively proving every possibility. This approach is
in general true when the number of ways to exercise the code becomes unwieldy.
The fact that interaction between the Executive, interrupt processors, and ser-
vice routines falls into this category can be overlooked. A specific example
is restart testing where a large number of artificially generated asynchronous
time-triggered and location-triggered interrupts exercise the restart protection
mechanism. Stress testing involves testing operational sequences under abnormal
conditions. Potential anomaly testing attempts to duplicate the event sequences
which led to questionable behavior on another hybrid facility. Hybrid testing
occasionally encounters unexpected behavior that is usually a hardware problem,
but can be a software problem. If a problem is found, digital testing gives
conclusive evidence. Alternatively, if no problem is found, a measure of con-
fidence is restored.
An 'eyeballing' effort was performed on the F-8 DBFW assembly just prior
to release. Experienced Apollo programmers were assigned sections of the code
to eyeball for errors, based on their accumulated experience. Several errors
were uncovered, although off-nominal operational procedures would have been
needed to encounter difficulties. The fact that errors were found gave weight
to the effort as a worthwhile task. The absence of any serious errors, and the
minimal number of errors encountered, added to the confidence level being built
by the verification process.
Input and Output Discrete Failure Effects
A formal failure effects investigation was conducted late in the develop-
ment cycle by CSDL and by other systems contractors. All interfaces were
studied for fail-on and fail-off effects. Engineering analysis was the primary
investigative tool, but simulated failures were utilized whenever pilot-in-loop
problems were expected. To this end, a special version of the mainline program
was created for the Iron Bird and was given the capability to fail any selected
input/output discrete in the off-state or on-state. Failures were introduced
during Iron Bird piloted simulations by a test engineer at the DSKY. The capa-
bility enabled pilot training in recognition and recovery procedures.
An important conclusion of the failure analysis is that such studies
should be initiated early in the preliminary design phase so that failure effects
can be recognized and avoided by careful design of hardware, software, and
interfaces. Early recognition leads to design changes that often can be incor-
porated at no additional cost, whereas late recognition can be quite expensive.
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Erasable Memory Programs
The concept of an Erasable Memory Program only has application in refer-
ence to a fixed memory computer when the capability to manufacture a new fixed
memory is no longer available. Certainly, as long as the capability does exist,
the redesign of a portion of the program or the inclusion of a new portion poses
no particular problem even in a relatively mature program. In F-8 DFBW for ex-
ample, the result of early Iron Bird simulations uncovered a hardware interface
problem in that the anti-dropout filter in the CDU error counters interfered
with restart recovery. Since the software was still under development, a
straightforward redesign of the restart recovery routine was undertaken, in-
cluding redevelopment and verification. On the other hand, when the ability
to remanufacture the rope memory is gone, it is necessary to resort to an arti-
fice, like erasable memory programming, if any change is to be incorporated into
the program flow. If, however, one is dealing with a programmable memory com-
puter, then post-release software changes are treated the same as pre-release
software changes. The purpose of this section on EMPs then is to illustrate by
example that sufficient cause for software changes can and will arise after
program release, and to describe the F-8 DFBW experience.
Some of the late Stage 3 Iron Bird discoveries were not compatible with
software development schedules, bound as they were by the anticipated shutdown
of the core-rope manufacturing facilities. Erasable memory programming and
major hardware changes were required instead. For example, piloted simulations
in early 1972 indicated pilot-response problems with certain computer failures.
The work-around concept was straightforward and a software change could have
been made, except that the DFCS was no longer software; core-rope manufacture
was under way. Fortunately, an Erasable Memory Program (EMP-001, Restart
Downmoding to BCS) could do the job, so remanufacture was not necessary. How-
ever, the design and especially the verification tasks were much tougher for
the EMP than they would have been for the fixed-memory equivalent, a character-
istic of most erasable memory programming. Nevertheless, the flexibility pro-
vided by last-minute software changes represents a major selling point for
digital flight control.
Design changes to minimize the effects of stick/pedal input quantization
were not formalized until after the first flight. Hardware changes had been
made earlier, prior to core-rope manufacture, but these proved to be inadequate.
Again, an Erasable Memory Program (EMP-004, Parabolic Stick Shaping) provided
an acceptable approach, but the fixed-memory equivalent would have been easier
to design, develop, and verify. Also, the DFCS computational burden would have
been lower with the equivalent fixed memory code, and operational aspects would
have been simpler.
Problems do not always show up during the systems analysis and preliminary
design phases, no matter how detailed the activity, but instead crop up during
the hardware integration phase, or even worse, conceal their identity until the
flight test phase. F-8C, during high-q flight for example, encountered a single-
pulse null shift in the output from the pedal LVDT, which supplies the rudder
pilot commands to the DFCS. The phenomenon apparently has something to do with
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airframe distortion at high-q flight conditions. Neither the Stage 3 Iron Bird
Simulator nor preliminary analysis models could indicate such a phenomenon. In
this case, the hardware problem of rudder bias shift was eliminated by software,
by inserting a one-pulse deadband (EMP-007, Single-pulse Pedal Deadband). There
is a real motivation for a flight test phase, however brief, between the proto-
type and production software.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The F-8 DFBW is an experimental digital fly-by-wire testbed flight control
system, implemented with Apollo off-the-shelf hardware. Existing off-the-shelf
software and software control techniques were dictated by hardware as well as
manufacturing schedule limitations. Software design was bottom-up. Time-
efficient code was important because of LGC speed. (Some of the techniques
discussed would not be applicable for a modern, faster, all core computer.)
Despite the LGC fixed memory, post-manufacturing design changes to the Specifica-
tion were possible through Erasable Memory Programs. Proof of the benefits that
accrue from good software control and from careful and thorough verification
testing is evidenced by the F-8 DFBW flight test program results: In a year and
a half, 42 flights, totaling 58 hours of flight time, were made successfully
without any DFCS inflight software failures or performance surprises.
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TABLE 1
APOLLO HARDWARE USED IN F-8 DFBW
LGC - LM Guidance Computer (approximately 2k of erasable and 36k of
programmable fixed core-rope memory; programmable hardware-
interrupt and software-executive systems; hardware restart
logic, etc.).
DSKY (LM) Display and Keyboard (three 5
-digit-plus-sign display
windows; miscellaneous warning lights; keyboard including 0
through 9, +, -, PRO (proceed), ENTR, CLR (clear), VERB, NOUN,
etc; the DSKY is the computer/astronaut or computer/ground
crew interface.
IMU - Inertial Measurement Unit (a three-gimballed gyroscopically-
stabilized platform for the PIPA accelerometers; gimbal angle
resolver and PIPA signals ultimately interface with the LGC;
several platform alignment techniques are under LGC software
control).
CDU Coupling Data Unit (for analog-to-digital conversion of IMU
gimbal angle indications; for digital-to-analog conversion
of LGC computer outputs; for control of IMU moding; includes
failure detection; used to derive body axis angular rates).
PIPA - Pulsed Integrating Pendulous Accelerometer (three mutually-
perpendicular contact-acceleration-sensing and incremental-
velocity-indicating devices located on the IMU stable member,
with a direct LGC interface; used to derive body axis normal
and lateral acceleration).
PSA Power and Servo Assembly (power supplies, amplifiers, etc.,
for inertial subsystem).
PTA Pulse Torque Assembly (input/output processing for inertial
subsystem).
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TABLE 2
HARDWARE UNIQUE TO F-8 DFBW
MAPP - Mode and Power Panel (computer and IMU power control, auto-
pilot gain and mode select/indicators, warning indicators,
etc.
IFB - Interface Box (junction box containing an Apollo DAC stick/
pedal comparators, special amplifiers, etc.).
BCS - Backup Control System (triply-redundant stick/pedal to aero-
surface open-loop control, with trim, hydrologic comparator;
cross-channel comparator; etc.).
DLC/IFR - Downlink Converter/Inflight Recorder (100 word-pair list
every 2 seconds on a 20ms interrupt; recording on FM tape
for post-flight processing/review).
GSE Ground Support Equipment (the Apollo Program Analyzer Console
(PAC) for simulating LGC hard-wire rope memory; the Uplink
Converter (ULC) for preflight erasable loading and for DSKY-
type program control via tape; the Ground Test Cart containing
downlink converter/ground recorder, miscellaneous switches
and indicators; etc.).
SPCC Servo Pressure Control Console (PRI select/indicators for
each axis; servo pressure switches and indicators for each
BCS servo-valve and for PCS servo-valve pairs; each switch
has three positions: OFF which disables that valve, AUTO
which enables that valve, and MAN which overrides any auto-
matic moding and locks that valve into the active state).
CCS - Coolant Control System (coolant for IMU, computer, etc.).
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TABLE 3
F-8 DFBW FIXED-MEMORY ALLOCATION
F-8 DFBW Flight Control System (total) 5586
Body Rate/Acceleration Feedback 320
Generalized Feedback Filters 1930
Pilot Stick/Pedal Processing 168
Control Loop Equations 1178
Channel Monitor Routine 523
Gain/Mode Change Routine 985
Initialization/Restarts/Miscellaneous 482
Ground Test Programs/Extended Verbs 768
Self Test/Check 
1436
Fresh Start/Restart/V37/etc. 
853
Display Interfaces/Pinball/etc. 3578
Interpreter/Executive/Waitlist/Downlink/Uplink/etc. 
3830
IMU Alignment, Compensation, and Tests/T4RUPT 3263
TOTAL F-8 DFBW FIXED-MEMORY USED 19314
TOTAL LGC FIXED-MEMORY (36 FBANKS AT 1024) 36864
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TABLE 4
F-8 DFBW ERASABLE-MEMORY ALLOCATION
Preflight Erasable Load (total) 389
F-8 DFBW Flight Control System 169
IMU Compensation/Alignment 33
Erasable Downlink List 100
Erasable Memory Programming (EMP-001,4,7) 87
F-8 DFBW Flight Control System Working Registers 321
Extended Verbs/Ground Test Prog/Miscellaneous 50
Self Test/Check 263
IMU Alignment/Perf Test/Ops Test 17
Uplink/Downlink 32
Display Interfaces/Pinball/etc. 56
Executive/Waitlist/Service/Centrals/etc. 468
TOTAL F-8 DFBW ERASABLE-MEMORY USED 
1596
TOTAL LGC ERASABLE-MEMORY (8 EBANKS AT 256) 2048
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6. FLIGHT TEST EXPERIENCE WITH THE F-8
DIGITAL FLY-BY-WIRE SYSTEM
Kenneth J. Szalai
NASA Flight Research Center
SUMMARY
Flight test results of the F-8 digital fly-by-wire (DFBW) control system are
presented and the implications for application to active control technology (ACT) are
discussed. The F-8 DFBW system has several of the attributes of proposed ACT
systems, so the flight test experience is helpful in assessing the capabilities of those
systems. Topics of discussion include the predicted and actual flight performance
of the control system, assessments of aircraft flying qualities and other piloting
factors, software management and control, and operational experience.
INTRODUCTION
In May 1972 the flight testing of the F-8 DFBW aircraft began. This aircraft,
which used Apollo guidance and navigation system hardware, was the first to rely
on a DFBW system for primary flight control. The design and development of the
F-8 DFBW control system are described in references 1 and 2 and paper 2. This
paper presents the major flight test results for the control system. A detailed
description of the system's software development and verification is given in
paper 5, and the backup control actuation systems are described in paper 3.
The primary objectives of the flight tests were to evaluate the performance of
the digital flight control system and to acquire operating experience with it. The
program also served to determine whether the long-advertised advantages and
capabilities of DFBW control systems could be realized. Many of these advantages,
such as software flexibility, system reliability, and computational ability, make a
DFBW system a logical candidate for active control technology applications. The
F-8 DFBW control system had characteristics in common with systems proposed
for ACT applications. Specifically, it was a highly reliable, full authority system
that was committed for use from the first takeoff and landing. An analog control
system was the only backup to the DFBW system. The mechanical controls of the
basic F-8C airplane were removed before the first flight.
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This approach parallels that taken toward the development of an active control
system, both in terms of the importance attributed to the design of the control
system and the reliability and management of hardware and software, and in terms
of the requirement fordetailed peflight testing. This paper emphasizes the aspects
of gth0-ftt og h rerate to the broader considerations of an active
control sse n. ys - A.
SYMBOLS
al, a 2 , a 3 , bl, b2' b 3 , digital filter coefficients
V
C* = n co
Z  57.3g ' g
G(s) general s-plane filter
G(w) general w-plane filter
G (z) general digital filter
K general gain constant
KC* C* feedback gain, deg/g
Kp roll rate feedback gain, deg/deg/sec
Kq pitch rate feedback gain, deg/deg/sec
Kr yaw rate feedback gain, deg/deg/sec
L8  roll acceleration due to aileron deflection,
a deg/sec2 /deg
M Mach number
M8  pitch acceleration due to elevon deflection,
e deg/sec2 /deg
N8  yaw acceleration due to rudder deflection,
r deg/sec2 /deg
n Z  acceleration along positive Z-body axis, g
P roll rate, deg/sec
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q pitch rate, deg/sec
r yaw rate, deg/sec
s Laplace transform variable
T sample period, sec
V velocity, KIAS
V crossover velocity, m/sec
co
w sampled-data system frequency domain variable
z sampled-data domain transform variable
A incremental change
5 general surface command, deg
8a pilot roll stick deflection, cm
p
8 horizontal stabilizer deflection, deg
e
Sdamping ratio
8 pitch attitude, deg
r effective roll mode time constant, sec
<p roll attitude, deg
heading angle, deg
D natural frequency, Hz
Subscripts:
d Dutch roll mode
n current sample
n-1 last sample
p pilot
sp longitudinal short period mode
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ss steady state
Z component along aircraft Z-body axis in positive (down)
direction
( A) derived quantity ( )
ABBREVIATIONS
ACT active control technology
A/D analog to digital
CAS command augmentation system
D/A digital to analog
DFBW digital fly-by-wire
DSKY display and keyboard
KIAS knots indicated airspeed
PCM pulse code modulation
PIO pilot-induced oscillation
SAS stability augmentation system
CONDUCT OF FLIGHT TEST PROGRAM
Figure 1 illustrates the nature and sequence of the phases of the flight test
program. The first three flights were made by using the proportional control, ordirect, digital mode. The fourth flight culminated in a landing during which three-
axis DFBW stability augmentation was used. The evaluation of the DFBW control
system progressed rapidly from then on, and by the eighth flight all modes hadbeen flown. The airplane was then evaluated in a variety of tasks, including
ground-controlled approaches, gunsight tracking, mild aerobatics, and formation
flight. The latter portion of the flight program concentrated on flying qualities
assessments by additional pilots and on an evaluation of a minimum-displacement
side stick that operated through the backup control system only (paper 3). In total,58 hours were accumulated by six pilots during 42 flights.
The F-8 DFBW system was flight tested within the flight envelope shown in
figure 2. Most of the closed-loop evaluations were made at speeds between 250 knotsindicated airspeed (KIAS) and 400 KIAS and altitudes from 6000 meters to
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10,700 meters. Tests at low speeds (below 200 KIAS) were made with the variable-
incidence wing of the F-8C airplane in the up position. Pilot ratings were given in
accordance with the Cooper-Harper scale (ref. 3).
All flights were conducted during the daytime under VFR conditions. They
averaged 80 minutes in duration. Each flight was monitored in a control room in
which 36 airplane parameters were displayed. In addition, duplicates of the pilot's
mode panel and servo status panel showed the state of the fly-by-wire control sys-
tem. All parameters were telemetered from the aircraft's pulse code modulation
(PCM) data acquisition system.
CONTROL SYSTEM PERFORMANCE
The digital flight control system consisted of pilot-selectable modes in each
axis. The mode panel layout is described in paper 2. The available modes are
shown by axis in the table below:
Axis
Pitch Roll Yaw
Direct Direct Direct
Modes available SAS SAS SAS
CAS Test
The direct mode, which had no augmentation, and a stability augmentation sys-
tem (SAS) mode were provided in each axis. A command augmentation system (CAS)
mode was also available in the pitch axis. The roll test mode was used to facilitate
comparisons between various SAS mode configurations. Block diagrams of the
digital control modes are shown in figures 3 (a) to 3(c).
Direct Mode
The direct mode provided proportional control with no augmentation. Figure 3 (a)
shows the direct mode mechanization, which was similar in all axes. Analog-to-
digital (A/D) quantization of the stick outputs, effective quantization on trim due to
sample rate, and digital-to-analog (D/A) output quantization are aspects of digital
flight control that were apparent in this mode. Linear and nonlinear stick shaping
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were used during the flight program. In the pitch axis, linear and parabolic shaping
were used (fig. 4). The Apollo A/D interface allowed a maximum of 45 quantizationlevels for full stick or pedal deflection in one direction. The Apollo computer D/A
converter output quantization, which had ±384 levels, was approximately an order
of magnitude finer than the stick A/D converter. The linear gearing mechanization
resulted in a quantization level of 0.590 of horizontal stabilizer deflection when fullpitch control authority was retained. During early flights, various linear gearinggains were evaluated. Table 1 summarizes the pitch quantization effects found withlinear gearing. The threshold of quantization detection appeared to be from 0.15g to0.2g and 1.2 degrees per second to 1.5 degrees per second of peak pitch rate.Figure 5 shows an example of the thumping that the pilot detected at 365 KIAS ashe attempted to increase pitch rate smoothly. This small airplane excitation was
characteristic of the quantization effect in the pitch and roll axes resulting from
control surface actuator response to staircase commands.
The parabolic stick shaping resulted in a nonlinear quantization. The step sizeis shown in table 2. This shaping greatly improved the fine pitch control of the
airplane, while retaining nearly full stabilizer authority. With this mechanization,pilots reported that quantization was not apparent at speeds up to approximately400 KIAS. In the roll axis, stick quantization had to be reduced by changing thelinear gearing about the center stick position. The initial value of 1.040 of total
aileron command was changed to 0.360. This reduced the minimum commanded
roll rate from 8.32 degrees per second to 2.90 degrees per second at 250 KIAS andyielded acceptable roll control around trim. The only noticeable effect of quantiza-
tion in the yaw axis was in random 1-bit commands that were observed at 400 KIAS.Lateral acceleration peaks of 0.03g due to 1-bit or 0.380 rudder surface commands
were observed. This problem was corrected by writing software in erasable memory
to allow a 1-bit deadband in the rudder pedal command. No other rudder pedal
quantization effects were seen.
It should be noted that the ±45 quantization steps available represented less thana 6-bit A/D conversion. A 12-bit (11 bits plus sign) A/D capability is available
today. This yields a resolution nearly 50 times as fine as that in the F-8 DFBW
system. At the most sensitive F-8C flight condition, which was Mach 0.86 at sealevel, a 12-bit A/D interface would have allowed digital commands as small as0.001g, assuming linear gearing and full surface authority. Therefore it is safe to
assume that the quantization effects of a modern A/D interface would be negligible
and undetectable by the pilot.
Quantization of pilot trim inputs due to sample rate also became apparent in theflight program. In the F-8 DFBW mechanization, trim command discretes were
sampled every 90 milliseconds. Based on the pitch trim rate value of 1.25 degreesper second, the minimum software command was 0.110. This command is nearlytwice as coarse as the D/A converter quantization steps of 0.0690 for the horizontal
stabilizer. This effective trim quantization was a factor in making precise trim of theF-8 DFBW aircraft difficult at a target speed and altitude.
The pitch trim discrete inputs should have been sampled at the major cycle
sample period of 30 milliseconds, which would have resulted in a trim quantization of0.03750. This would have taken full advantage of the output D/A quantization. This
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points out the need to sample beep trim discrete inputs at a high enough rate to
yield acceptable output quantization. In some cases, trim discretes may have to be
sampled at rates higher than the major cycle sample rate, if fine trim resolution is
required.
Stability Augmentation System Mode
The nominal SAS configurations flown are shown in figure 3(b). Body axis
rate was estimated by filtering the transformed inertial attitude from the Apollo
inertial platform. Compensation filtering and gain were placed in the feedback
path. There was an aileron-to-rudder interconnect in the yaw SAS mode only.
The stick and trim processing were identical to those in the direct mode. A rate
reasonability check was applied to the final command, and an automatic transfer to
the direct mode resulted if the reasonability threshold was exceeded.
The digital SAS modes operated as expected. This is important from the point
of view of the sampled-data design process. The acceptance of digital control
systems depends in large part on the ability to predict system performance
accurately.
The digital SAS loops were designed by using sampled-data analysis methods,
especially the z-plane root locus method. The linear system model used in the
pitch axis is shown in figure 6. An ideal pitch rate signal was assumed. At first,
the rate estimation filter that acted on pitch attitude was used in the model, but the
resulting pitch rate signal was found to be nearly identical to that for the ideal
case at the F-8C short period frequencies. Neither the highly nonlinear A/D
conversion of gimbal angles nor the axis transformation steps were modeled. Four
symmetrical bending modes were included in the analysis.
The z-plane root locus for the pitch SAS mode without lead-lag compensation is
shown in figure 7 (a). A lead-lag filter was designed to improve the performance
of the pitch rate loop in increasing the short period damping ratio. A w-plane
frequency response was used to select the compensation root locations. The w-plane
compensation,
w/0.1 + 1G(w) = 2
w /0.16 + w/0.286 + 1
z-1
was transformed to the z-plane by w =- z 1 and yielded a discrete filter,
-1 -1
1.023(1 + z- )(1 - 0.818z )
G(z) = -1 -2
1.0 - 0.976z + 0.349z
The root locus for the compensated system is shown in figure 7 (b). Higher short
period damping ratios were achieved by using the lead-lag filter, as one would
expect in a continuous system. A comparison between the predicted effects of the
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compensation filter and those measured in flight is shown in figure 8, where theincrement in short period damping ratio is shown for three flight conditions. The
sampled-data system prediction is good.
The improvement in airplane response with the pitch SAS is evident in theflight time histories in figure 9. Figures 10(a) to 10(c) show a comparison ofpredicted with measured damping in the three airplane axes. Agreement is goodfor the longitudinal short period (fig. 10(a)) and Dutch roll (fig. 10(b)) modes.At low gains, rate estimation quantization and actuator friction restricted surface
motion at the angular rates tested, and, as a result, the SAS loop was less effective.
The flight performance of the digital roll SAS mode is illustrated in figure 10(c).Since the roll rate response that resulted from a step lateral stick command was
contaminated slightly by the Dutch roll, an effective roll mode time constant
corresponding to the time between the initial roll rate response and the time when63 percent of steady state was achieved was used. Yaw SAS was engaged on all
runs to reduce the Dutch roll contamination. The predicted trend, which was fordecreasing roll mode time constant with increasing roll SAS gain, is clear, although
a bias of approximately 0.05 second is apparent. One factor that contributed to
this bias was the nonideal pilot step input, which resembled a rapid ramp. This
resulted in a slightly higher than predicted effective time constant, since thepredicted value was based on a perfect step input.
To further evaluate the sampled-data analysis method, the pitch rate feedbackgain was increased in flight until the compensation root approached neutral stability.Figure 11 shows the z-plane root locus prediction of the neutral stability point to be
in good agreement with the flight-measured results.
The SAS modes also operated well at low speeds. Pitch SAS results are shownin figure 12 (a). A washout filter was designed for low speed operation in the
s-plane as
G (s) ss+l
The discrete washout filter formed by using the bilinear transformation for real
roots was
-1
G(z) 0.98522(1 - z - 1)
1 - 0.9704z-1
The results of the washout filter addition to the feedback loop on aircraft response
was as expected (fig. 12(b)). The highest loop gains used in flight wereIKqM8 I = 3.8 in pitch, IKpL I = 3.2 in roll, and IKrN r = 1.2 in yaw. One
e a r
further observation is appropriate. The Apollo inertial platform was designed forprecise navigation. It had an A/D interface, the coupling data unit, that was notdesigned to facilitate rate estimation. Even so, the derived body rate provided a
signal that could be used satisfactorily for the F-8 DFBW damper modes.
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Command Augmentation System Mode
The pitch CAS mode block diagram is shown in figure 3(c). Derived normal
acceleration is blended with derived pitch rate to form the feedback signal, C*
(ref. 4). A forward loop integrator and bypass path provided zero steady state
error and resulted in neutral aircraft speed stability. The cos e correction term
eliminated acceleration feedback in a steady climb or descent. The pilot stick and
trim interface with this mode was the same as in the direct and SAS modes.
As was the case in the pitch SAS mode, the performance of the digital CAS mode
was essentially as predicted by linear sampled-data systems analysis. However,
gain values selected for the C* feedback gain during the preliminary design could
not be used in flight. The reasons for this are traceable to the noise problems
associated with using rates and accelerations derived from the Apollo inertial
measurement unit and interface hardware. These problems are not inherent in a
digital mechanization. For acceptable noise levels at the horizontal stabilizer,
the C* feedback gain was too low for optimum response. The flight performance
of the CAS mode was reasonable at low speeds, however. Figures 13(a) and 13(b)
compare the F-8 DFBW C* response in the direct and CAS modes at 180 KIAS and
250 KIAS, respectively. These responses, normalized to the final value, are shown
with respect to the C* power approach and cruise design envelopes, respectively.
The improvement in airplane response is substantial. The 250-KIAS response
illustrates the problem encountered in CAS with insufficient loop gain. The short
period response was satisfactory, but the aircraft exhibited drift in the 3- to
8-second time period that was actually the first-order mode resulting from the
forward loop integrator. This effect was apparent to the pilots.
The CAS mode provided the expected neutral speed stability. Figures 14(a)
and 14(b) show the phugoid response of the F-8 DFBW aircraft in the direct and
CAS modes, respectively. The aircraft, trimmed at 180 KIAS, was slowed approxi-
mately 10 KIAS, where the stick was again centered. The CAS mode held zero pitch
rate while the aircraft slowed to a new steady state speed of approximately 138 KIAS.
Normal acceleration (not shown) remained constant at nearly ig during the maneuver,
while angle of attack (not shown), which started at 3.50, stabilized at 100.
The effectiveness of the CAS mode in suppressing transient effects is shown in
figure 15, where the response of the F-8C airplane is compared in the direct and
CAS modes during a wing transition (wing incidence changes from -1o to 70).
Both responses were without pilot inputs.
Although the performance of the CAS mode was degraded by the limitations of
the Apollo hardware, the control system design was relatively straightforward, and
flight results again matched predictions quite closely.
Implications of Digital Fly-By-Wire Design for Active Control Systems
The flight verification of the F-8 DFBW control system design was encouraging
from an active control technology standpoint. First, the body of continuous
control system design experience is largely applicable. In fact, if there is a
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reasonable separation between the half sample frequency and modes of interest, thedesign can be accomplished in the continuous domain and then exactly transformed
to the discrete domain by using the bilinear transform. Furthermore, direct z-planedesign is also possible. The most serious difficulty about using the latter approachis lack of experience with direct digital design.
The entire F-8 DFBW three-axis digital flight control system problem could besolved by the Apollo computer in less than a 3 0-millisecond major cycle time period.The capabilities of a current high performance computer and those of the Apollo
computer are:
Apollo computer Current computer
Memory cycle time, [tsec 11.7 1.0
Add time, jisec 23.4 2.5
Multiply time, psec 46.8 6.0
The table shows that a state-of-the-art computer can be expected to be an order of
magnitude faster than the Apollo computer. This suggests a sample rate or jobcapacity increase of the same magnitude. Although computer sizing must await aspecific ACT configuration, the capability of today's computers would appear to bemore than adequate for the control system tasks envisioned.
PILOTING FACTORS
Considered in conjunction with the control system performance reported in theprevious section, the handling qualities results confirmed the feasibility and
utility of a digital fly-by-wire control system.
Handling Qualities Summary
The flying qualities of the F-8 DFBW were evaluated by the pilots in a variety oftasks, including simulated instrument cruise, large or abrupt maneuvers, ground-
controlled approaches, gunsight tracking, and close formation flight (paper 7).
Figure 16(a) summarizes the longitudinal handling qualities results for smallinstrument maneuvers, and figure 16(b) summarizes the results for large maneuvers.The piloting tasks and the comment guide used for these evaluations are given inthe appendix. In figure 16(a) the comments and ratings are typical of the findings
of pilots at low-to-moderate cruise speeds (less than 350 KIAS) . For large maneuvers,the pilot rating improvement with control system sophistication was evident. Pilotacceptance of the SAS and CAS modes was expected on the basis of the controlsystem and vehicle response characteristics reported in the previous section. Somepilots did report a long period overshooting tendency in the CAS mode for certain
maneuvers where steady state pitch rates had to be arrested. This correlated withthe first-order integrator mode present in the CAS step response.
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Figure 17 is characteristic of the improvement in pitch control with digital SAS
as seen by the pilots in a wind-up turn. In the direct mode, the F-8C airplane
displays its undesirable short period damping. The same maneuver could be
performed easily and precisely in the pitch SAS mode.
Ground-controlled approaches were flown down to approximately 60 meters
under simulated instrument flight conditions in the various digital modes. Fig-
ures 18 (a) and 18 (b) show typical pilot comments and ratings in the lateral-
directional and longitudinal axes. The pilot ratings reflect the improvement in
Dutch roll damping provided by the yaw SAS mode. In figure 18(b) pilot A objected
to a slight long-term overshooting tendency in the CAS mode.
The tracking performance of the F-8C airplane with the digital control system
was degraded by stick quantization problems in both the pitch and roll axes. The
parabolic pitch stick shaping resulted in unacceptable quantization steps at large
aft stick positions (table 2). This degraded the pitch control of the airplane so
much that even augmentation did not significantly improve the tracking performance.
Some improvement with roll and yaw SAS was evident in a 2g gunsight tracking
maneuver, as the time histories in figure 19 and the associated pilot comments and
ratings in figure 20 show. The augmented time histories in figure 19 correspond to
a yaw SAS gain, Kr , of 0.4 deg/deg/sec.
Close formation flight revealed deficiencies in the flying qualities that were
often not apparent in maneuvers where the pilot was not required to be "in the loop"
as tightly. The improvement shown in figure 21 of the longitudinal flying qualities
with digital augmentation is typical. Pilot comments reflected the decreased work-
load evident in the time history. Barrel rolls, aileron rolls, and wingovers were
performed in all control modes. Pilots noted little difference in their ability to
perform these maneuvers between the direct and augmented modes, perhaps because
these maneuvers tended to be more open loop in nature.
Except in maneuvers where the coarse stick quantization problem was over-
riding, as in the gunsight tracking maneuver, the DFBW control system markedly
improved the flying qualities of the unaugmented F-8C aircraft. Because of the
control system performance described in the previous section, this was not
unexpected. One pilot who flew F-8C airplanes regularly found the F-8 DFBW
vehicle superior even to a standard F-8C airplane with normal augmentation. He
noted in particular the lack of the usual mechanical control slop.
The results of the flying qualities evaluations, coupled with the control system
performance previously described, indicate that a DFBW control system can perform
as well as or better than a conventional control system. The only serious problems
encountered were due to the limitations of the Apollo system hardware, which
would not be factors in a current design.
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Pilot Interface With the Digital-Fly-by-Wire System
The F-8 DFBW system was designed to permit a simple, yet flexible, interface
with the pilot. The normal astronaut interface with the Apollo guidance and
navigation system was a display and keyboard device (DSKY) that allowed the
operator to display memory contents, load erasable memory, or initiate special
programs. The versatility of this interface was important to the design and test
engineers during the development and flight test program, but it was not made
available to the pilot because of its complexity for a single place aircraft. The
pilot's only interface with the digital computer was through a mode and gain panel,
which is described in paper 2. The pilot's gain switch mechanization in software
contributed to the rapid, safe flight checkout of the digital flight control system.
Table 3 lists the different digital control system parameters that were tied to the
gain switches during the flight test program. In all, 105 parameters could be
connected via software to the three gain switches.
With this gain mechanization, different control system parameters could rapidly
be selected and optimized during the research program. More important, the gain
switches allowed the designer to make use of the pilot's capabilities. Nominal
values of critical gains that were established during the simulation phase were
placed on the gain switches along with larger and smaller values. The pilot could
change the gain values at any time. For example, one of the gain switches was for
pitch gearing. During the first flight, when the effects of the pitch quantization
and sensitivity had not yet been established, the pilot took off in the nominal gain
position. By 13 minutes after takeoff at 300 KIAS, he had reduced the gearing
10 percent because of pitch control sensitivity. Before landing he evaluated three
gain positions, finally selecting the nominal gain value 2 1/2 minutes before touch-
down. Apart from its research value, this type of gain selection and evaluation
gave the pilot an important degree of freedom. Switch arrangements like this are
not unique to digital flight control systems, but the ability to designate such a large
number (105) of parameters for this use with virtually no hardware impact is
unique to a digital system.
This kind of flexibility can be carried in a digital computer with only a small
increase in software complexity. This mechanization approach would also be
advantageous in an active control system design, because the F-8 DFBW experience
showed that the pilot could rapidly and safely assess open- and closed-loop gain
parameter variations about the nominal design point during flight.
Flight experience also showed the multimode digital flight control system to be
safe and valuable for both research and proof testing phases of the flight program.
The low mode of control in the primary digital system (direct) provided a fallback
position for both the pilot and the system. Since the direct and augmented modes
were fully synchronized, they could be switched manually or automatically under
any dynamic conditions with a minimum and safe aircraft response transient. The
pilots took advantage of this multimode mechanization to diagnose the cause of flying
qualities deficiencies by comparing airplane response in each mode.
Like the gain switch arrangement, the multimode mechanization makes use of
the online monitoring capabilities of the pilot. It too is a good candidate for active
138
control mechanization, especially for the first few flights. One problem was
encountered with this approach. Mode changes could occur without being commanded
by the pilot due, for example, to a reasonability test. The mode panel display light
configuration would change, but this was not easily detected by the pilot. A master
caution and annunciator warning of any uncommanded mode change should have
been incorporated.
In summary, software flexibility allowed the test pilot to use his real-time
diagnostic capability and to make control system alterations. The alterations could
be made with almost no hardware impact and with minimum additional software com-
plexity. These concepts are applicable to early flight testing of full time active
control systems.
MANAGEMENT OF FLIGHT SOFTWARE
The flexibility and versatility of digital flight control system software carries
with it the need for software management and control. Perhaps no other area of
digital fly-by-wire control raises as many questions and doubts as software
reliability. The concern centers on whether it is possible to achieve reliable man-
rated flight control software at a reasonable cost and whether software flexibility is
compatible with software reliability in a practical application. The F-8 DFBW
experience indicates that both questions can be answered yes.
Two aspects of the F-8 DFBW flight test program are of significance to full
authority, man-rated digital flight control software. First, not a single software
programing error was discovered during the flight test program. Much of the
credit for this is due to the thorough verification procedures and facilities developed
for the Apollo software, which were also used during the F-8 DFBW program,
although on a smaller scale. The procedures are described in detail in paper 5.
Secondly, not a single incorrect erasable memory constant propagated to a flight
tape that was used to load the Apollo computer. These results are significant
because an active control system must achieve the same level of reliability as the
basic airframe. The software, in turn, is central to the active control system's
reliability, because even though an active control system would have redundant
digital channels, the software would be common to all, as it was in the F-8 DFBW
system. For this reason, it is worthwhile to examine the software management
procedures used in the F-8 DFBW program.
Figure 22 (a) outlines the procedures established to control software programing
changes during the flight program. These procedures were used three times 
after
the hardwired memory was manufactured and before the first flight. The three
special purpose programs written into the erasable memory consisted of pitch and
roll parabolic stick shaping, yaw pedal deadband, and a special failure mode
monitor.
The software control board in figure 22 (a) consisted of representatives from
control system engineering, project management, operations, and the pilots'
office. Step 7 in figure 22 (a) consisted not only of checking out the new code but
rerunning former, documented tests on related code to insure proper program
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interaction, if any. Extensive files of detailed all-digital simulation runs generatedduring the initial verification phase were kept for comparison with identical runswith the modified code. This permitted short turnaround time for new additions
to the code.
Figure 22(b) shows the steps taken in the alteration of control system constantsin the erasable memory. In total, 394 erasable memory locations had to be loadedfor each flight. Table 4 gives a breakdown of these constants. Sum checks andbuilt-in data transmission checks in the Apollo computer made it possible to insurethat the desired octal numbers were loaded into the computer.
Making sure that the 168 control system values loaded were those actuallydesired was less straightforward. A punched tape was used to load the computer.During the flight program six tapes were manufactured, each of which representeda different flight control system configuration.
Because the Apollo digital computer is a fixed-point machine, there weremagnitude restrictions due to program scaling on most parameters. A variety ofother restrictions combined to create a formidable set of rules for the set of controlsystem constants.
An off-line diagnostic digital program (step 3 of fig. 22 (b)), which ran on adata processing computer, was developed to ease the burden of verifying thecorrect content of the master load list, which was kept on standard punch cards.One task performed by the diagnostic program was to check each of the 394 constantsagainst a previously drawn list of reasonable values. This reasonability list wasconstructed after considerable experience was gained from iron bird simulation,but before the first flight tape was made. The limits were set to encompass theexpected or allowable operating range of each variable. Deviations from reason-
ability limits were flagged by the program as major errors and had to be correctedor signed off by the responsible engineer.
The program also reconstructed digital filter forms from their coefficients andcomputed their vital characteristics, such as root location, steady state gain, andabsolute root magnitude in the z-plane. This was helpful in the case of digitalfilters, the characteristics of which are not as obvious as those of continuousfilters.
One aspect of software control became apparent during the ground testing andsimulation of various control system gain configurations. When many gain changeshad been made and the precise configuration was in doubt, it was only necessaryto dump the contents of erasable memory on magnetic tape to create a completedescription of any given configuration. This capability proved to be extremelyvaluable in the control system refinement stage, and it is unique to a digitalmechanization. It was also possible to revert to the baseline configuration merelyby reloading memory with the baseline punched tape. This required approximately3 minutes on the Apollo computer.
In summary, the F-8 DFBW flight experience indicates that highly reliable flightsoftware can be generated and maintained, but that it requires thorough control.
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Because the F-8 DFBW program was intended for research, the software program
was made more flexible than would be necessary for a production airplane. Even
with this flexibility, the software was easily managed with diagnostic digital
programs, resulting in high overall system reliability. In fact, changes were made
to the digital system more confidently than they were to the airplane's analog
systems because there was no hardware impact.
Partly because of the built-in flexibility of the control system mechanization,
only minor changes had to be made to the basic program during the flight test
program. More program changes would be expected in a prototype system develop-
ment, thus increasing the need for strict configuration management for software.
The F-8 DFBW flight results confirmed that a DFBW control system could be
used in an active control application from the standpoint of software reliability and
system flexibility.
OPERATIONAL FACTORS
Reasonability Checks
The software reasonability checks used in all augmented modes are surface
command rate checks made over one sample period (30 milliseconds). Exceeding
the threshold value in any axis resulted in an automatic downmode to the direct
mode in that axis. The threshold values per sample period that were found to be
usable in flight were 4.50 in pitch, 13.00 in roll, and 8.00 in yaw. These were the
smallest values that allowed nearly any pilot input. Ten downmodes occurred in
flight. All except four were directly related to sharp pilot step inputs that were
made for test purposes. The other four were due to noise peaks that resulted from
the angular rate derivation. At least one of these occurred in each axis.
The reasonability check was designed to detect abrupt command changes due to
sensor failures or major software faults. Experience with the F-8 DFBW system
indicated that the threshold rate limit could be reduced by at least 50 percent in
all axes for an operational fighter. If unreasonable commands were allowed to
exist for 100 milliseconds (approximately three sample periods), nuisance down-
modes would be eliminated without sacrificing protection.
Digital System Reliability
The F-8 DFBW digital control system utilized a single highly reliable digital
computer. This configuration would probably not be used in an active control
system. However, the reliability requirements of the F-8 digital system are repre-
sentative of the requirements of an ACT application. First, no single failure was
permitted that would have resulted in the generation of a hazardous control surface
command. Second, any serious failure within the digital system had to be detected.
In the F-8 DFBW airplane, the failure warning signals were used to transfer control
to the analog backup control system. In a redundant digital control system,
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operation would continue on the remaining good digital channels after a component
failure. F-8 DFBW reliability experience is nevertheless applicable to active
control technology in terms of failure detection and also in terms of the features
of the digital mechanization that led to a high level of confidence in this system.
No hardware failures occurred in the primary digital flight control system on
any flight. This is not surprising in view of the demonstrated in-service reli-
ability of the Apollo guidance and navigation equipment. The discrepancies notedin the DFBW flight system, excluding the actuators and their drive electronics,are listed in table 5. Three component failures occurred in two systems during the
2500 hours of operation (items 4, 5, and 10). Item 4 would have had no impact on
normal flight operation. The failure monitor in item 5 was added to the systemduring the flight program to protect against a potentially hazardous single-pointfailure mode in the Apollo computer output interface hardware. The monitor box
failed before its first use in flight, although it failed in the proper "safe" mode(transfer to the backup control system). The roll stick circuit failure (item 10)
would have caused a downmode to the backup control system in flight, as it did
on the ground. There were no unresolved anomalies.
Preflight Procedures
Two preflight test procedures were used for the digital system. The first was
a 1-hour test done on the system in the hangar the day before flight. Electrical
and hydraulic power were external. The second procedure was part of the total
aircraft preflight immediately before flight, with engine-supplied electrical andhydraulic power. The elements of the hangar and flight line preflight tests arelisted in table 6. Virtually all the hangar tests except the specialized inertial
measurement unit checks and the detailed surface deflection measurements were
repeated. Although the digital system's flight line preflight was not optimized inthe built-in software, it took only 10 to 15 minutes.
One sensitive preflight test was the computer activity check. A program in the
erasable memory was used to measure computer duty cycle indirectly, by detectingidle time over a several second interval. In a given configuration, the duty cycle
was consistent within a few percent over several time intervals. This test confirmedproper software operation to a high level of confidence.
During the investigation of the anomalies that occurred on both the iron bird
and the F-8 DFBW airplane, it became apparent that it was possible to determinethe health of the digital control system rapidly and confidently. The state of thedigital control system could be determined in less than 5 minutes by running a
self-test and by monitoring the internal control system parameters on the DSKY inthe flight control modes. The monitor feature was indispensable during the flight
test program. With half a dozen keystrokes, three control system parameters couldbe displayed in engineering units and in decimal format. The display was updatedevery second, so even under dynamic conditions the display was intelligible. This
monitor format permitted the immediate checkout of virtually any part of the control
system. Any future digital flight control system should incorporate such display
software capability.
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The ability to quickly and confidently assure proper control system performance
is of paramount importance to active control systems. The repeatability of the test
results of the F-8 DFBW program inspired enormous confidence in the operational
readiness of the system before flight. Even personnel not thoroughly familiar with
the digital control system were able to perform detailed tests of the system because
of the well-designed display and monitor software. The component failures that
did occur during ground operation were all detected by the system itself.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The F-8 digital fly-by-wire (DFBW) flight program showed the feasibility and
advantages of DFBW control for aircraft. Even with hardware designed a decade
ago for space applications, an Apollo computer easily handled the F-8 DFBW flight
control computation task. This demonstrated the inherent flexibility of a digital
system.
The following conclusions can be drawn on the basis of the F-8 DFBW flight
test program.
(1) Existing design tools, such as the w-plane frequency response and the
z-plane root locus, are suitable for the synthesis of digital flight control.
(2) Flight performance of the digital flight control system verified the accuracy
of the sampled-data design results for contemporary command and stability augmen-
tation system modes.
(3) Pilot opinion correlated with that expected on the basis of the control system
performance.
(4) A modern digital control system design would display no quantization effects
noticeable to the pilot.
(5) The flexibility of the digital control system permits effective use of the
pilot in configuration optimization in early flight test stages.
(6) Man-rated software can be safely managed while retaining a high degree of
flexibility. The use of off-line diagnostic programs greatly reduced the engineering
burden of software management.
(7) Digital system integrity can be rapidly and confidently determined in pre-
flight tests by using flexible and extensive engineering interfaces.
The implications of these results for an active control application can be broadly
stated as follows:
(1) A DFBW control system possesses the computational ability and flexibility
necessary for advanced active control applications. Computer hardware advances
are leading control system applications.
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(2) Reliable software can be produced and is not an obstacle to an active control
application.
(3) The fault detection and preflight test technology necessary for digital
control systems exists. Full realization of DFBW potential awaits the successfuldemonstration of reconfiguration and normal operation after component failures in a
practical redundant system.
There was no flight or ground experience that would indicate that a DFBW
system could not be used in an active control technology application. In fact, the
F-8 DFBW flight program achieved in practice the advantages so long attributed to
a DFBW control system and confirmed the suitability of digital control for active
control technology.
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APPENDIX
PILOT COMMENT GUIDE FOR LONGITUDINAL HANDLING QUALITIES
Instrument Flight Maneuvering
(1) Trim the aircraft to desired speed at a zero rate of climb
(2) Make small heading changes of less than 300
(3) Make air traffic control altitude changes
(4) Make air traffic control speed changes
Comment on:
(1) The ability to fine trim the aircraft
(2) The need to monitor the pitch axis during lateral-directional tasks
(3) The ability to make accurate changes in attitude
(4) Stick breakout and deadband forces
(5) The acceptability of these aircraft characteristics for fighter aircraft
(6) Overall longitudinal pilot rating
Large or Abrupt Maneuvers
(1) From trimmed flight, quickly establish a 1.5g to 2.5g turn
(2) Recover to trimmed, level flight
(3) Quickly set up a constant speed high performance climb by selecting a target
pitch attitude and throttle setting
(4) Recover to trimmed, level flight at target altitude
(5) Increase speed 50 KIAS, and retrim
Comment on:
(1) The ability to control attitude and g. Tendencies to overshoot or for pilot-
induced oscillations
(2) The ability to restore the aircraft to trimmed flight
(3) Stick breakout and deadband forces
(4) The lag in aircraft response to stick inputs
(5) Residual small-amplitude oscillations
(6) The acceptability of these characteristics for fighter aircraft
(7) Overall pilot rating for the large or abrupt maneuvers
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TABLE 1.--PITCH STICK QUANTIZATION EFFECTS WITH LINEAR GEARING
Response to quantization
Dynamic Stabilizer
V, Altitude, pressure, quantization, n peak, q peak,Pilot comments
KIAS m 2 deZN/m deg g deg/sec
Stepping noticeable,
300 5,500 13,885 0.53 0.2 1.5 but easy to make
small corrections.
Feel thumping in
365 6,100 19,870 0.5 0.3 2.0 pitch control. Can
see quantization.
Cannot see
400 6,100 22,980 0.3 0.15 1.2 quantization.
Cannot see any
al80 3,050 5,030 0.53 0.05 0.5 quantization.
Smooth control.
awing up.
TABLE 2. -QUANTIZATION MAGNITUDE FOR FULL AUTHORITY
PARABOLIC PITCH STICK SHAPING
Nominal stick position, Quantization size,
cm deg
0 0.1
5 0.3
10 0.7
15 1.2
TABLE 3.-DIGITAL CONTROL SYSTEM PARAMETERS
TIED TO GAIN SWITCHES
Axis Mode Description
Pitch Direct Stick gearing
Pitch SAS Pitch rate feedback gain
Pitch SAS Type of digital filter
Pitch CAS Forward loop integrator gain
Pitch CAS C* feedback gain
Pitch CAS Pitch rate blending gain
Roll Direct Stick gearing - wing down
Roll Direct Stick gearing - wing up
Roll SAS Stick gearing
Roll SAS Nonlinear stick shaping
Roll SAS Roll rate feedback gain
Yaw SAS Yaw rate feedback gain
Yaw SAS Interconnect function slope
Yaw SAS Interconnect function intercept
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TABLE 4.-ERASABLE MEMORY CONSTANTS LOADED
FOR EACH F-8 DFBW FLIGHT
Description Number
Control system constants 168
Computer downlink identity tags 100
Inertial subsystem 29
Erasable memory program 87
(parabolic stick shaping)
Miscellaneous 10
Total: 394
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TABLE 5.--DIGITAL SYSTEM DISCREPANCIES DURING GROUND OPERATION
(a) Discrepancies.
Item Discrepancy Reason for discrepancy
1 Computer restarts Procedural error
2 Computer time-of-day wrong Procedural error
3 Inertial measurement unit test Inertial measurement unit
result out of specification degradation for navigation
4 Yaw direct light cycling on-off Failed transistor in mode panel
5 Backup control system down- Failure in relay in external fail
mode for rudder inputs monitor
6 Computer locked in loop Procedural error
7 Failure of preflight test Damage to punched tape
8 Aileron offset Procedural error
9 Roll D/A drift during backup Truncation during repeated
control system self-test primary/backup control
system moding
10 Backup control system down- Failed resistor in external stick
mode for aileron inputs electronics
aPrimary electronics failures.
(b) Summary.
Component Failures
Apollo hardware 0
Primary electronics 3
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TABLE 6.-ELEMENTS OF F-8 DFBW PREFLIGHT TESTS
Element Hangar Flight line
Verify correct memory load Yes Yes
Computer self-test Yes Yes
Inertial measurement unit fail discretes Yes No
Inertial measurement unit turn-on Yes Yes
sequence
Proper aline Yes Yes
Pilot gimbal angle indicator Yes Yes
Inertial measurement unit operational Yes No
test (12 minutes)
Primary/backup control system Yes Yes
moding
Gain switch discretes Yes Yes
Wing position discrete Yes Yes
Forced computer restart Yes Yes
Inertial measurement unit interface Yes No
zero and reset
Forced computer fail discrete Yes Yes
Mode panel warning lights Yes Yes
Differential D/A output - backup Yes No
control system downmode
Trim rate and trim fail detection Yes Yes
Stick-to-surface gearing measurements Yes No
Computer activity Yes Yes
Check failure monitor box Yes Yes
Maximum surface deflections Yes Yes
Load time-of-day No Yes
Load computer for flight No Yes
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Figure 1. F-8 DFBW flight test summary.
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Figure 2. F-8 DFBW flight test envelope.
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(b) Locus with lead-lag compensation.
Figure 7. Sampled-data system design.
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Figure 8. Improvement in short period damping ratio for lead-lag filter.
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Figure 9. Effect of digital stability augmentation. Pitch SAS; 350 KIAS; 6100 m.
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(a) Pitch SAS, 300 KIAS, 6100 m, 10,890 kg.
Figure 10. Comparison of in-flight and predicted digital SAS performance.
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Figure 10. Continued.
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Figure 10. Concluded.
165
8.33 Hz
1.0 Measured w = 2.0 Hz
10-
0 1 2 3
Ti me, sec
Imaginary
Predicted w = 2.13 Hz
Compensation pole
Secondary actuator
Short period
Power actuator
0 .5 1.0
Real axis
Figure 11. Prediction of system instability at high gain. 350 KIAS; 6100 m.
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(a) Effect of SAS on damping ratio. Pulse pilot input.
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(b) Effect of washout filter on steady state response. Step pilot input.
Figure 12. Pitch SAS operation at low speed. 180 KIAS; wing up.
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(b) 250 KIAS, 4570 m, KC = 1.5 deg/g.
Figure 13. C* response of F-8 DFBW aircraft.
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(b) CAS mode, hands off, KC,* = 2.0 deg/g.
Figure 14. F-8 DFBW phugoid response.
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Figure 15. Effectiveness of CAS mode in reducing transient due to down-to-up wing transition.
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Figure 16. Longitudinal handling qualities summary - pitch mode.
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Figure 16. Concluded.
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Figure 17. Effect of pitch SAS in wind-up turn. 300 KIAS; 6100 m.
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Figure 18. Ground-controlled approach handling qualities summary. Light-to-moderate turbulence.
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Figure 19. Improvement in lateral-directional flying qualities in gunsight
tracking maneuver.
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Figure 20. Pilot opinion of lateral-directional flying qualities in gunsight tracking maneuver.
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Figure 21. Pilot activity and airplane response in formation flight.
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7. A PILOT'S OPINION OF THE F-8 DIGITAL FLY-BY-WIRE AIRPLANE
Gary E. Krier
NASA Flight Research Center
SUMMARY
The handling qualities of the F-8 digital fly-by-wire airplane are evaluated by
using the Cooper-Harper rating scale. The reasons for the ratings are given, as
well as a short description of the flying tasks. It was concluded that the handling
qualities of the airplane were good in most situations, although occasional ratings of
unsatisfactory were given.
INTRODUCTION
A standard F-8C aircraft was equipped with a roll damper, a yaw damper, and
an aileron-to-rudder interconnect. The airplane had no pitch damper. Handling
qualities were satisfactory throughout a large portion of the flight envelope.
This paper evaluates the airplane's handling qualities on the basis of the
Cooper-Harper rating scale (ref. 1 and fig. 1) after the removal of the mechanical
control links and the addition of the Apollo hardware digital fly-by-wire control
system.
A force side stick controller was mechanized in the analog backup control system
and was evaluated by using the same tasks as those used to evaluate the digital
primary control system.
The yaw axis was not extensively evaluated, so results are not reported in this
paper.
The primary purpose of the program was to expeditiously demonstrate the feasi-
bility and reliability of a digital fly-by-wire control system for an airplane. The
space-proved Apollo system was adapted to the airplane, forcing compromises that
did not allow optimization of the airplane's handling qualities. Nevertheless, the
handling qualities were mostly satisfactory.
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SYMBOLS AND ABBREVIATIONS
BCS analog backup control system
CAS 
-ommanfa gmentation system
DIR direct mode of control
q dynamic pressure
SAS stability augmentation system
x-plane from wingtip to wingtip of a target aircraft
y-plane from nose to tail of a target aircraft
CENTER STICK HANDLING QUALITIES
Takeoff
Takeoffs with the F-8 digital fly-by-wire airplane were normally made using the
stability augmentation system (SAS) in all axes. This gave a well damped aircraft
that handled turbulence effectively. Bank angle control was good and could be setquickly and relatively precisely. A pilot rating of 2 on the Cooper-Harper scale
was given for the takeoff and climbout (figs. 2 and 3).
Cruise
Control for cruising flight was easily adequate and is not further discussed inthis paper.
Gross Maneuvering and Aerobatics
Pitch and roll control for any moderate to high rate maneuver was similar in
each flight control system configuration. Maneuvers performed with the backup con-trol system (BCS), direct mode (DIR), SAS, and command augmentation system(CAS) appeared very much alike to the pilot, which suggests that these were notgood tasks for an evaluation.
Formation Flight
The ability to fly good wing and trail formation (fig. 4) is a requisite forfighter aircraft. It is also a task that rapidly exposes deficiencies in the flight
control system. Poor control harmony between pitch and roll, poor damping,incorrect time constants, undesired force gradients, and other problems are all
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revealed when the aircraft is put to the formation task. With a good formation-flight
aircraft, vertical position can be held consistently within 30 centimeters and lateral
displacement can be held as desired. The task rated with the F-8 digital fly-by-
wire airplane was the ability to hold a close wing position and to assess the workload
required to do it.
While the airplane was in the backup control system, pitch sinusoidal oscillations
of +60 centimeters from a base position were caused by the slight delay in response to
pitch stick inputs. Considerable pilot compensation was required to achieve even
that amount of control. The response in the stability augmentation system was satis-
factory but slightly sluggish because we were operating in the flat portion of the
stick curve (fig. 5). Control in the direct mode was inferior to control with the
stability augmentation system because of underdamped short period oscillations.
By far the most difficulty was encountered in trying to conquer the roll axis.
Considerable attention was required on the part of the pilot any time formation was
attempted in the roll backup control system or the direct mode. Response was ob-
jectionable because of small control deflections when low stick displacements were
used and fast response when the apparent lag was overcome by using larger stick
displacements. Using the roll stability augmentation system markedly improved the
ability to hold close position, possibly because the stability augmentation system
tended to initially oppose a rapid response to a pilot input. The stability augmenta-
tion system made the aircraft well behaved up to speeds where quantization became
a factor.
Tracking
Gunsight tracking with a fixed reticle (fig. 6) was flown because it was an ex-
cellent way to assess the response of the airplane to pilot commands. The film was
analyzed frame by frame to determine the miss distance, which was referenced to
the plane running through the target airplane's wingtips (x-plane) or to the plane
running from the target airplane's nose to its tail (y-plane). This allowed control
difficulties to be classified as either a lateral-directional or a pitch problem (figs. 2
and 3).
The pilot's ability to keep the gunsight aiming point (pipper) on the tailpipe of
the target airplane in a dynamic, tight loop situation was the task rated.
Tracking in the pitch stability augmentation system was unsatisfactory unless
considerable trim was used to return the stick to the flatter portion of the parabolic
deflection curve. If the trimming was omitted, quantization and its accompanying
short period oscillations caused pipper oscillation in the pitch plane. Tracking in
the stability augmentation system with a trimmed stick was good enough to perform
the mission without improvement. The same problems arose in the direct mode, but
this mode was without pitch rate damping, and was thus rated moderately objection-
able.
The pitch backup control system was by far the smoothest of the modes tested
and afforded good pitch steering at all angles of attack. Some short period
oscillations occurred, but they were not significant.
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The difficulties were considerable in the roll axis. There was a definite tendencytoward pilot-induced oscillations whenever precise, rapid corrections were required.
This was evident in both the backup control system and the direct mode. The roll
stability augmentation system reduced the magnitude of the problem, but its sensi-
tivity degraded the airplane's ability to track precisely.
The fixed-ratio aileron-to-rudder interconnect produced slight proverse yaw
during roll-in. This was considered desirable, since it provided a slight lead in
the direction of the target.
Ground-Controlled Approach
Ground-controlled approaches were flown using radar for positioning. This was
an excellent task for the evaluation of precision control during tight loop instrumentflight. Deviations from a preset position and altitude were radioed to the pilot, who
then maneuvered the airplane back toward zero deviation. The response of the air-plane to the pilot-initiated corrections was rated.
Pitch control was fair in the backup control system and the direct mode because
of the short period oscillations generated by pitch corrections. Pitch response in the
stability augmentation system was excellent, in that 3 0-meter-per-minute changes
could be made in the rate of descent. Corrections in the pitch command augmentation
system were initiated satisfactorily, but a distracting tendency to overshoot was
noted that increased the pilot workload and therefore worsened the pilot rating.
Lateral control with low damping gains showed some deficiencies because of
continuous low amplitude oscillations up to +60 of bank. No attempt was made to
correct this deficiency during the flight test program.
Landing
A portion of several flights was devoted to the assessment of the aircraft in
various control modes in the landing pattern. The pitch backup control system was
relatively smooth, and there was little tendency for the pilot to couple with the air-
craft. In the direct mode, however, there was a tendency toward a pilot-induced
oscillation during wing and gear transients. Sink rate control was fair with both ofthese modes. The stability augmentation system offered good pitch control through-
out the pattern, with reduced transients and good flare control. The pitch command
augmentation system was the best mode evaluated, but it masked the speed stability,
which tended to lead the pilot to believe that changing stick force meant changing
aerodynamic conditions; that was not always true.
Flare and touchdown control were satisfactory as long as a slight amount of back
stick pressure was held to keep the airplane off the flat portion of the parabolic pitch
curve. If this was not done, the delay in response caused firm landings or balloon-ing.
Lateral control in the landing pattern was characterized by low damping, over-
responsiveness, and some periods of continuous low amplitude bank excursions.
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The effects of these characteristics were reduced somewhat by consciously lowering
the pilot's response and having him accept 10 to 20 deviations from the bank angle
desired. This was considered moderately objectionable in itself, and coupled with
a strong crosswind it became unacceptable.
The stability augmentation system reduced the airplane's response to gusts and
small inputs and therefore it was rated better than the simpler control modes.
SIDE STICK HANDLING QUALITIES
The side stick in the F-8 digital fly-by-wire airplane (fig. 7) was installed to
ascertain whether a force side stick could be used to control an airplane during most
phases of flight, especially takeoff and landing. No attempt was made to optimize
the control parameters, although some changes were made for the flights near the
end of the program. The side stick was mechanized in the analog backup control
system, which had no dampers. A side stick takeoff was considered the most
uncertain phase of flight and was therefore performed only after side stick control
was evaluated in up and away flight.
Takeoff
During side stick takeoffs, the pilot applied nosewheel steering (with the center
stick) until rudder power was sufficient and then moved his right hand to the side
stick. He made no inputs until lift-off speed was reached, when he applied a smoothly
increasing pitch force to the stick. No lateral force was used near the ground to
reduce the tendency for pilot-induced oscillations. Lift-off was smooth and similar
to center stick takeoffs except that the pilot did not know the elevator and aileron
positions through stick position (figs. 8 and 9).
Gross Maneuvering
Gross maneuvering was easy with the side stick. Maneuvers such as large
pitch attitude changes, wind-up turns, wingovers, and aileron rolls were performed
without difficulty. Crosstalk between pitch and roll was not apparent.
Formation Flight
Formation flight, a high pilot gain task, was enlightening during the early de-
velopment of the F-8 digital fly-by-wire control system, when it exposed the severity
of the task. Formation flight was also difficult with the side stick.
Loose wing formation flight could be satisfactorily performed with the side stick,
although there were occasional random force pulses in pitch or roll. As the distance
between the two aircraft diminished, the pulsing became more frequent and pro-
nounced, indicating the tightening of the pilot in the loop. This resulted in a
tendency for pilot-induced oscillations in pitch or roll or both with the system as it
was mechanized, that is, without dampers and without attempts at optimization.
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Some crosstalk (force interaction) was apparent during formation flight.
Although its effect was not severe, it did start a disturbance in one axis while thepilot was trying to control the other axis.
Tracking
Side stick tracking was typified by good to excellent control over the lateral-directional axis and continuous oscillations in pitch caused by pitch commands that
were too abrupt and could not be smoothed. Crosstalk was absent in the tracking
task.
Ground-Controlled Approach and Landing
Power approaches from both pitch out and ground-controlled approach patterns
were flown easily with the side stick. Roll control was good with respect to bank
angle itself, but continuous left and right lateral force inputs had to be made. Thisdid not degrade bank control, but it did drive the workload up quite a bit. Pitch
control was precise.
Many of the approaches were flown in turbulence, which had little adverse
effect on control.
Landings were characterized by final approaches that were well controlled down
to the flare point. The flare was easy to initiate, and control was good almost to
touchdown. Just before touchdown on every flight, the flightpath was stairstep-like. This was caused by pulsing pitch inputs from the pilot.
No large extraneous motion was generated by a simulated go-around if the trimkept the forces down to low levels.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The F-8 digital fly-by-wire airplane was generally well behaved throughout
the flight envelope tested. Most of the handling qualities deficiencies encountered
were a result of the original compromises made to adapt the Apollo system to the
airplane. No extensive attempt to improve the Apollo-related deficiencies was made.
REFERENCE
1. Cooper, George E.; and Harper, Robert P., Jr.: The Use of Pilot Rating in the
Evaluation of Aircraft Handling Qualities. NASA TN D-5153, 1969.
Flight Research Center
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Edwards, Calif., September 25, 1974
186
Excellent 1
Satisfactory Good 2
Fair 3
Acceptable
Some minor but annoying 4
deficiencies
Moderately objectionable
Controllable Unsatisfactory deficiencies
Very objectionable deficiencies 6
Major deficiencies which require 7
mandatory improvement
Unacceptable Controllable with difficulty 8
Marginally controllable in mission 9
Uncontrollable
Uncontrollable in mission 10
Control will be lost during some portion of mission
Figure 1. Cooper-Harper rating scale (ref. 1).
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Figure 4. Formation flight.
190
Quantization
level
Surface
deflection
Parabolic
Stick deflection
Figure 5. Control gearing.
191
Figure 6. Gunsight tracking display.
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